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ABSTRACT
SIMPLES AND GUNK
SEPTEMBER 2004
KRIS MCDANIEL, B.A., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
An object is a simple if and only if it has no proper parts. An object is gunk if
and only if every proper part of that object itself has a proper part. In my dissertation, I
address the following questions.
(1) The concepts of simples and gunk presuppose the concept of parthood.
What is the status of this concept? his question itself divides into the following: does
the concept of parthood have universal applicability, so that, just as every object is self-
identical, every object has parts? Finally, is the concept of parthood univocal
,
or are
there different notions of parthood, each of which is defined on distinct ontological
categories? I argue that the concept of parthood has univocal. I also argue that there is
some evidence that the concept of parthood has universal applicability.
(2) I address the Simple Question, which is “under what circumstances is it true
of some object that it has no proper parts?” I argue against several popular answers to
the Simple Question, such as the view that simples are all and only point-sized objects,
and the view that simples are maximally continuous material objects. I defend the
Brutal View, which holds that there is no true, finitely expressible, and informative
answer to the Simple Question. In short, there is no criterion for being a simple. Along
the way, I address the question of whether extended simples, i.e., simples that are
vi
extended in space, are possible. I argue that one popular argument against the
possibility of extended simples is unsound.
(3) I address the question of whether both simples and gunk are possible. 1
argue that it is metaphysically possible that material objects be composed of gunk.
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INTRODUCTION
An object is a simple if and only if it has no proper parts. An object is atomless
gunk if and only if every proper part of that object itself has a proper part. In this
dissertation, I address three questions about simples and atomless gunk.
First, the concepts of simples and atomless gunk both presuppose the concept
of parthood. What is the status of this concept? Compositional monism is the view that
there is exactly one fundamental parthood relation that answers to this concept.
According to the compositional monist, the concept of parthood is univocal. The
compositional pluralist disagrees. One kind of compositional pluralism holds that there
are different notions of parthood, each of which is defined on distinct ontological
categories. In chapter one, I defend compositional monism from a series of attacks.
Second, I address the Simple Question, which is “under what circumstances is it
true of some material object that it has no proper parts?” I argue against several popular
answers to the Simple Question, such as the view that simples are point-sized objects,
and the view that simples are maximally continuous material objects. I defend the
Brutal View, which maintains that there is no true, finitely expressible, and informative
answer to the Simple Question. In short, there is no non-mereological criterion for
being a simple. The defense of the Brutal View occupies chapter two.
Along the way, I address the question of whether extended simples, i.e., simples
that are extended in space, are possible. I argue that the standard arguments against
extended simples are unsound. I also present reasons to believe that they are possible.
This project is taken up in chapter three.
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Third, I address the question of whether material atomless gunk is possible. An
object is material atomless gunk just in case it is atomless gunk and every proper part of
it is located in spacetime. I discuss several recent attempts to disprove the possibility of
material atomless gunk. 1 argue that these arguments fail. However, I also present a
novel argument for the conclusion that it is impossible that spacetime be gunky. If it is
possible for material objects to be gunky, then it must be possible for gunky objects to
reside in non-gunky regions of spacetime. I argue that we have no reason to think that
this latter state of affairs is impossible. So, even if we have good reason to think that
gunky spacetime is impossible, we do not have a reason to reject the possibility of
gunky material objects. This project is taken up in chapter four.
No serious metaphysical inquiry can proceed without presuppositions. Although
it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all of the theses I take for granted in this
dissertation, it seems reasonable to at least discuss the ones that are directly related to
the project. What follows is my attempt to list those presuppositions that have shaped
what I have to say about parthood, simples, and gunk.
The first set of assumptions concern ontological categories. I believe in
ontological categories, that is, I believe that there are fundamental kinds in the world.
Ontological Categories are kinds of things that satisfy the following conditions:
(OC1) Exhaustiveness-. Every object belongs to at least one ontological
category or decomposes without remainder into objects that
belong to exactly one ontological category.
1
(OC2) Exclusivity. No object belongs to more than one ontological
category.
(OC3) If x belongs to an ontological category, then every part ofx
belongs to that category.
2
(0C4) If x is composed of the^s, and each of the^s belongs to category
C, then x is belongs to C. 2
(OC5) Fundamentality : Ontological categories carve nature at the joints;
they are fundamental kinds.
An ontological scheme is a list of ontological categories. One of the basic projects of
metaphysics is to provide principles telling us what ontological categories there are and
what distinguishes the categories from one another. This project is ontology.
Second, I hold that whether a particular ontology is correct is not up to us. The
correctness of a particular ontology is not dependent on our thoughts, hopes, desires, the
kind of language we speak, or the form of life that we enjoy. Admittedly, it is
extremely difficult to figure out how we could know what the correct ontology is, given
this second constraint. Perhaps we can’t. But, nonetheless, there are mind-independent
facts about which ontology is correct, and we can speculate about which ontology is the
correct one.
Third, the ontological scheme that I favor contains the following categories.
One category is spacetime region. I endorse robust spacetime realism, according to
which regions are not reducible to constructions made out of their actual or possible
occupants. So, for example, regions are not propositions, sets, ordered ^-tuples,
relational structures, or possibilities of location. I will freely talk about regions of
spacetime in what follows, and I take such talk with complete ontological seriousness.
In chapter three, I argue that friends of extended simples should also endorse robust
spacetime realism.
Part of my commitment to robust spacetime regions is a commitment to regions
that are not simultaneous with regions that are present now. That is, I deny presentism ,
3
the doctrine that to be is to be present.
4
There is nothing ontologically special about the
time that is now any more than there is anything special about the place that is here. On
this supposition, the future is as real as the present, just as Bellingham, Washington is as
real as Amherst, Massachusetts. My denial of presentism covers non-present objects as
well. If we were to make a complete inventory of all of the things that there are, we
would have to include past objects, such as Socrates, and future objects, such as the first
fully manned station on Mars, as well as present objects. This position is usually called
Eternalism.
A second category in the ontological scheme that I favor is material object.
Material objects are not reducible to spacetime regions. Instead, they are the things that
we find located in spacetime regions. Material objects are not reducible to bundles of
properties. Instead, they are the things that have the properties. Many philosophers
have attempted to reduce the category of material object to these other categories.
6
I
reject these attempts at reduction.
Some philosophers reject the category material object for a different reason.
These philosophers hold that the material world is fundamentally a
world of stuff, not ot
things. One friend of stuff is Michael Jubien, who writes:
the world does not come naturally divided into a definite array
ol
discrete things. Instead, it consists of “stuff’ spread more
or less
unevenly and more or less densely around space-time. ... I
am taking it
as a fundamental ontological doctrine that the raw material
of the
physical universe is stuff, not things, and that the organization
of (some
of this) stuff into things is done by us. [Jubien (1993):
1-2].
Jubien claims that a complete description of the
physical universe need not employ the
concept of a thing. [Jubien (1993): 2], Andrew Cortens says
something similar in his
sympathetic description of the stuff ontology:
4
According to [the stuff ontology], reality is to be thought of, not as a
collection of objects, but rather, as being made up of stuff of various
kinds.
. .. On this view, mass terms serve as the best vehicle for
representing reality in a perspicuous way. [Stuff ontologists] will resist
any attempt to recast “stuff-talk” into standard object idioms. Any
attempt to do so, however “elegant” from a purely formal point of view,
they will view as being a move away from, rather than toward, greater
perspicuity. In view of this, it seems reasonable to say that the stuff-
ontologist endorses a picture of reality which excludes objects. [Cortens
(1997): 46-47].
I take it that the central doctrine of the stuff ontology is that truths about the
properties and relations of things - if there are any such truths - always supervene on
the truths about the properties and relations had by various stuffs. If we wish to assert
these truths in a maximally perspicuous way, we should use sentences employing mass
terms, not count nouns. In a similar vein, Theodore Sider writes:
It is important to be clear on how radical this view must be, if it is to be a
genuine alternative to a thing-ontology. Some philosophers talk as if
they defend a stuff-ontology, when they really just believe in things in
stuffs clothing: ‘The world consists of quantities of stuff; we can decide
to interpret thing-quantifiers as ranging over any of the quantities of stuff
we choose. One could use thing-quantifiers to range only over small bits
of stuff, in which case the nihilist is right. Or one could use the thing-
quantifiers to range over all the quantities of stuff, in which case there
exists scattered objects.’ In fact, this view assumes that the world is a
world of things: quantities of stuff. ... A genuine no-conflict stuff
ontologist must claim that a truly fundamental description of the world
must completely eschew a thing-language. This requires completely
eschewing the usual quantifiers and variables— the backbone of
contemporary logic. ... A whole new language must be developed.
Somehow, ‘quantifiers’ over stuff must be introduced without slipping
into talk of things; somehow language must be invented to express all the
facts about the world we take there to be, while not slipping into thing-
language in disguise. [Sider (2001): xvii-xviii],
I reject the stuff ontologist’ s attempts to eliminate things or reduce talk about
things to talk about stuff. In fact, I assume something stronger. The truths about
the
properties and relations stuffs bear - if there are any such truths
- supervene on more
5
fundamental truths about the properties and relations had by things. This is my fourth
assumption: the world is a world of things, not stuff. (And, moreover, every world is a
world of things, not stuff.)
This doesn’t mean that we must eschew mass terms. That would be an entirely
inappropriate response to the claim that the world is a world of things. We are still
allowed to say, “Some water is wet” and “More mashed potatoes is always better than
less.” But the truth-values of these sentences are determined by facts about things.
Specifically, that some portions of water are wet suffices to ensure the truth of “Some
water is wet”; likewise, the fact that it is always better to receive a larger portion of
mashed potatoes than a smaller portion entails the proposition expressed by “More
mashed potatoes is always better than less.”
Suppose that the properties and relations instantiated by mereologically complex
objects supervene on the properties and relations instantiated by mereological simples.
That is, suppose that, once we fixed the properties and relations of all of the material
simples, we have fixed the properties of and relations of every complex object. If this is
the case, and the world is a world of things, then there is nothing else that the properties
and relations of the simples supervene on. There is no “fundamental stuff’ that (i)
“constitutes” or “makes up” these simples, and (ii) is such that the properties and
relations of the simple objects supervenes on the properties and relations of this stuff.
This is one metaphysical consequence of the doctrine that the world is a world of things.
So the category material object is not to be replaced by the categories region of
spacetime, property, or even stuff. It is a fundamental category.
6
The next set of presuppositions I will discuss concern identity. I assume that
there is a relation of classical identity. Identity is not irreducibly relative to a sortal
.
7
Nor is identity irreducibly temporally relative
.
8 On the contrary, sentences of the form
“x is identical with/’ are well formed and require no additional context in order to
express a determinate proposition. Sentences of the form “x is identical withy,” if true,
are true at all times.
Moreover, the predicate “is identical with” is neither vague nor ambiguous.
That is, any sentence of the form “x is identical withy” in which the singular terms
substituted for the variables are neither vague nor ambiguous is a sentence that is
determinately true or determinate/ false and contains no semantic ambiguity. Finally,
the predicate “is identical with” is not category-restricted. That is, when we say of two
regions of spacetime that they are identical, or of two material objects that they are
identical, or of two properties that they are identical, we assert in each case that the
same relation is instantiated. Entities of all kinds are identical with themselves in
exactly the same way.
The third set of presuppositions I will discuss concern parthood. I assume that
there is exactly one fundamental parthood relation that material objects can bear to each
other. It is true that objects can have all sorts of parts. For example, objects can have
spatially connected parts, causally integrated parts, functional parts, immediate parts,
etc. And, for each kind of part, there is a corresponding parthood relation, e.g., x is a
spatially connected part ofy, x is a causally integrated part ofy, x is a functional part of
y, x is an immediate part ofy. But none of these parthood relations is fundamental.
7
Each of them is definable in terms of the fundamental notion of parthood and other
concepts. For example, we can define these relations as follows:
x is a spatially connectedpart ofy =df. x is a part ofy and each of x's
parts is connected to some other part of x.
x is a causally integratedpart of
y
=df. x is a part ofy and each of x’s
parts is causally related to every other part of x.
x isfunctional part of
y
=df. x is a part ofy and x plays some functional
role in the production of some state ofy.
x is an immediate proper part ofy =df. x is a proper part ofy and there is
no other proper part ofy, z, such that x is a proper part of z.
Each of these definitions presupposes the basic notion of a part simpliciter. I assume
that there is exactly one such basic notion of parthood that applies to material objects.
Several philosophers have denied this presupposition. Chapter one contains an
examination of two attempts to argue against this presupposition. I argue that both
attempts fail. A lot rides on this presupposition. In chapter two, I discuss the Simple
Question, which asks, “Under what circumstances does a material object have no proper
parts?” If there is more than one fundamental parthood relation that material objects
can bear to each other, then presumably there is more than one way in which an object
can be a simple. An object could fail to have one kind of proper part but perhaps have
proper parts of another kind. If this could occur, then we really need to ask a variety of
“simple questions.”
This is not to say that the parthood relation that material objects bear to each
other is the same parthood relation that objects of other ontological categories bear to
8
each other. Whether this is the case will be examined in chapter one. I do not
presuppose that it is the case; nor do I presuppose that it is not.
I assume that the mereological structure of an object is a mind-independent
feature of that object. It is not up to us whether an object is a simple or a composite
object. If x is a part of y, then this is a fact about x and j' that is metaphysically
independent of our hopes, dreams, desires, conventions, language, thought, or form of
life.
Some philosophers have denied this assumption. On my way of interpreting
him, Kant was one such philosopher. Let us say that P is a mind-independent property
or relation just in case it is possible that P is instantiated and there are no human
persons. According to my interpretation, transcendental idealism is the view that we
have no knowledge of the mind-independent properties of things and that our ignorance
of the mind-independent properties of things is in some way related to our ability to
have synthetic a priori knowledge of these things . 9 Since everyone should grant that we
do know that some objects have parts - for example, I know that I have a left arm as a
part - then, given transcendental idealism, it follows that the relation x is a part ofy is
mind-dependent . 10
Kant’s view that parthood is mind-dependent plays a central role in his attempt
at providing a solution of the second antinomy .
11
According to Kant, if parthood is a
mind-independent relation, then a contradiction must be true. Specifically, Kant argues
that if parthood is mind-independent, then the physical universe both does and does not
decompose without remainder into mereological atoms. Kant’s argument for this claim
9
is interesting and complex. I respond to it elsewhere
.
12
Here, I simply assume that it
fails.
So I assume that there is always a fact of the matter whether one object is a part
of another. A related assumption is that there is also a fact of the matter about what this
parthood relation is like. The endurantist typically holds that the fundamental parthood
relation that material objects bear to each other is a three-place relation, x is apart ofy
at t. The perdurandist denies this and instead holds that the fundamental parthood
relation defined on material objects is a two-place relation, x is a part ofy. I assume
that there is a mind-independent fact of the matter about who is right in this debate.
My fourth set of assumptions concern the nature of predication. I reject so-
called adverbalist theories of temporal predication. Adverbalist theories of predication
are almost always offered as a response to the problem oftemporary intrinsics. Many
philosophers have argued from the conjunction of eternalism and the claim that objects
persist through time and undergo change to the conclusion that objects have temporal
parts .
13 Suppose that Bill is square Monday night and circular Tuesday morning. On
the assumption that shape properties are intrinsic properties - an assumption I challenge
in chapter three but provisionally accept here in order to faithfully represent the
standard argument from temporally intrinsics - Bill must have undergone a change in
his intrinsic properties.
Since eternalism is true, Monday night is just as real as Tuesday Morning, and,
more importantly, so are the facts about what occurs on these days. So how Bill is on
Tuesday Morning (when Tuesday Morning is present) is not to be identified with how
Bill is simpliciter. If a predicate F stands for an intrinsic property, then any
10
substitution-instance of the schema Fx with a non-empty name yields a semantically
complete sentence. Since shape properties are intrinsic properties, straightforward
ascriptions of these properties to Bill are semantically complete.
But then it seems that we should say that Bill is both circular and square, which
is impossible. What to do?
The relationalist responds that shape properties are not intrinsic properties but
are instead relations to times. Strictly speaking, to say that Bill is circular is either to
say that Bill is circular now or at some other time supplied by the context of utterance,
or it is to say nothing at all. To have a shape is to bear the is shaped at relation to some
time. The perdurantist claims that the things that have these intrinsic properties are
ultimately not Bill, but temporal parts of Bill. Bill is square on Monday because he has
a temporal part that exists at Monday and is square.
Allegedly, the adverbalist theory is a different response to the problem of
temporary intrinsics than both the relationalist and the perdurantist solution. However,
it is not clear in what respects the metaphysics of the adverbalist solution differs from
the metaphysics of the relationalist solution.
As I understand adverbalism, the difference is that the relationalist accepts,
while the adverbalist rejects, a view I call the Doctrine of Timeless Predication. I will
begin by explicitly stating an assumption commonly made by both the relationalist and
the adverbalist alike, which I call the Doctrine of Tenseless Quantification (DTQ).
According to DTQ, serious existential claims have no temporal import; tenseless
quantifiers, the use of which is free from the assumption that the members of the
domain of quantification are either located in the present or temporally located at all.
11
are the quantifiers to be used when providing a putatively complete ontology. Serious
quantification, the kind of quantification that metaphysicians do and should employ
when stating their preferred theories of the structure and content of the actual world, is
tenseless quantification. Given DTQ, it makes sense to speak of objects that exist but do
not presently exist, or even of objects that exist but do not exist in time
.
14
Moreover,
tenseless quantifiers are more basic than their tensed counterparts. According to DTQ,
any proposition expressed by a sentence that employs a tensed quantifier is necessarily
equivalent to some proposition expressible by a sentence that does not employ a tensed
quantifier. DTQ holds that the truth-makers of tensed claims are supervenient upon the
truth-makers of tenseless claims . 15
In ordinary language, verbs almost invariably are tensed when they are
employed; the word ‘exists’ is, unfortunately, no exception. Frequently, in ordinary
contexts, when we make existential claims, we make them using tensed quantifiers. For
example, when I say “there is nutritional yeast in the fridge,” it is reasonable to interpret
my claim as meaning that there is nutritional yeast in the fridge now. We also make
past- and future-tensed existential claims, e.g., “there was nutritional yeast in the fridge
yesterday” and “there will be rain tomorrow.” However, there are some semi-ordinary
contexts (i.e., contexts outside the philosophy room) in which it is not implausible to
claim that tenseless quantifiers are being employed. For example, the quantifiers
employed by mathematicians when conducting their business are plausibly construed as
tenseless quantifiers. Similarly, when a physicist claims that some portions of
spacetime have more curvature than others, the quantifier she is employing is a
tenseless quantifier that ranges over the entire spacetime manifold.
12
There are properties and objects that have the properties. What is the nature of
this having? Every perdurantist, and every endurantist who accepts the relationalist
solution, takes the fundamental instantiation relation between an object and its intrinsic
properties to be a two-place relation: x exemplifies F simpliciter. 16 I call this view the
Doctrine of Timeless Predication (DTP). According to DTP, just as serious existential
claims have no temporal import, serious predication has no temporal import; not only
are the existential claims concerning what properties exist stripped of any temporal
implications, so too are the claims concerning what properties are instantiated by what
objects. According to DTP, serious claims concerning instantiation are timeless.
For ease of exposition, let us assume that the number two is an atemporal entity:
it literally does not occupy time, just as it literally does not occupy space. Still, we can
claim truly that the number two has certain properties, such as the property of being
prime. A certain relation obtains between the number two and the property of being
prime. This relation is the relation of instantiation , or more simply, the having relation.
This is the relation that is represented by the ‘is’ in the sentence, ‘the number two is
prime.’ I will call this usage of the copula timeless predication.
This is not to say that, according to DTP, we cannot make claims using tensed or
time-indexed copulas, for it is obvious that we frequently do. However, in these
situations, any proposition that we express with a sentence that employs a tensed or
time-indexed copula is necessarily equivalent to a proposition expressible by a sentence
that does not employ a tensed or time-indexed copula.
The adverbalist avoids the problem of temporary intrinsics by rejecting DTP.
What does denying DTP involve? One way to be an adverbalist is to claim that the
13
instantiation relation that links objects to their intrinsic properties is actually a three-
place relation between an object, a property, and a time. To say that an object has a
property P is shorthand for saying that the instantiation links the object and the property
to some time t, where the value of t is fixed by the context of utterance. A problem with
this strategy is that there are entities that are not temporally located but nonetheless
have properties. Consider the number two. It has the property of being prime. But
there is no time at which it has this property. It is not that the number two has the
property at every time; the number two simply has the property.
Perhaps a better way to implement the adverbalist strategy is to hold that there
are many distinct instantiation relations. There is no single relation of instantiation;
there is more than one way in which an object can have a property. Some objects, such
as enduring objects, have their properties in a temporally relative kind of way; other
entities, such as numbers, have their properties in an atemporal way. Both of these
kinds of instantiation relation will need to be taken as irreducible, since it is clear that
the adverbalist cannot analyze talk of instantiation-at-a-time in terms of ‘just plain
instantiation’, parthood and location. So, on this view, for each time t, there is a
relation instantiates-at-t. Roughly speaking, this involves embracing a plurality of
equally legitimate copulas; there is more than one way of tying an intrinsic property to
an object.
My main complaint with this view is that I do not understand it. I simply cannot
grasp more than one instantiation relation. As I see things, there are entities of various
kinds, such as material objects, spatiotemporal regions, properties, sets, propositions,
etc. Each of these can have properties and stand in relations. There is one
14
metaphysically basic linking relation between objects and their properties: instantiation.
An object either has a property, or it does not. Instantiation, unlike ice cream, does not
come in different flavors.
A third way of cashing out the metaphysics of adverbalism appeals to states of
affairs. States of affairs (henceforth: SOAs), understood robustly, are complexes
somehow made up of objects and their properties. If an object has an intrinsic property,
then, according to the friend of SOAs, there is an entity, an SOA, that is in some way
composed of this object and this property. 18 Conversely, SOAs exist only if their
constituent objects and properties exist and the objects instantiate the properties.
According to this third way of dealing with the problem of temporary intrinsics,
sentences of the form ‘x is F at f in which F is an intrinsic property assert that a state of
affairs in which x is F exists at t. As E.J. Lowe puts it in his discussion of this variant of
adverbalism:
a's having a bent shape obtains at t while a’s having a straight shape
obtains at t’. ... a thing’s being shaped itself stands in relation to times,
not that a thing’s being shaped is partly a matter of that thing 's standing
in relations to times. [Lowe (1988): 75].
In order to get this version off of the ground, we need states of affairs. But
states of affairs are troublesome entities. I believe that we have good reason to do
without them.
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Accordingly, I reject this version of adverbalism as well.
Let me summarize the picture that I have sketched: the material world is a world
of things that occupy certain regions of spacetime. Both the things and the regions they
occupy enjoy determinate, non-sortal relative, and non-temporally relative identity with
themselves. Some of these things are parts of other things, and there is always a mind-
independent non-conventional fact of the matter whether this is the case. There is only
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one fundamental parthood relation that material things bear to each other. Things have
properties and stand in various relations to one another, but there is only one way in
which a thing can have properties or stand in relations, namely by instantiating them.
This metaphysical picture has many controversial elements. But it is a plausible
and commonsensical picture of the nature of the physical world. It is a reasonable
starting point from which to begin an investigation into the natures of simples and gunk.
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Notes
1
The second clause is necessary if we allow for composite objects that are
composed of objects from different ontological categories. If we restrict composition in
clause
*hat PreVen‘S ‘heSe °bjeCtS from being generated, we do not need the second
2
Note that OC4 follows from OC1-OC3.
For a detailed defense of substantivalism, see Nerlich (1994).
4 On presentism, see Sider (2001) and Zimmerman (1998).
5 For a more adequate statement of Etemalism, see Sider (2001): 11-12.
6
For an earlier attempt at such a reduction, see McDaniel (2001). For worries
about these strategies, see Hawthorne (2002).
7
For a defense of this kind of relative identity, see Geach (1980).
8
For a defense of this view, see Gallois (1998).
9
See McDaniel (unpublished a).
10
Compositional nihilists - those philosophers who hold that everything is a
mereological simple - will of course deny the claim that I have proper parts. But
although they will deny this claim, they shouldn’t.
11
See Kant (1998): 476-483.
12
See McDaniel (unpublished b).
13
See Lewis (1986a): 202-205, 210, Lewis (2002), and Sider (2000).
14
However, DTQ does not imply that there are such objects. So it is possible
for the presentist to accept DTQ. On this issue, see Markosian (1994).
Iy
This ontological thesis should be distinguished from the linguistic thesis that
tensed claims can be paraphrased without loss of meaning in tenseless terms.
16 A fuller discussion of perdurantism can be found in chapter one.
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The advocate of this strategy should probably introduce polyadic
instantiation-at-t relations as well, since enduring objects can, I assume, stand in
relations to other enduring objects at various times as well as have-at-a-time various
intrinsic properties. Alternatively, the advocate of this strategy could embrace a
multigrade instantiation-at-a-time relation.
1
8
For defenses of states of affairs, see Armstrong (1997). Mellor embraces this
strategy in Mellor (1998).
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For worries about states of affairs, see Lewis (2002) and Lewis (1986b).
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CHAPTER 1
A DEFENSE OF COMPOSITIONAL MONISM
1 . 1 Introduction
An object is a simple if and only if it has no proper parts. An object is atomless
gunk or gunky if and only if every proper part of that object itself has a proper part. An
object is partially gunky just in case it has some gunky parts and some simple parts. The
concepts of a simple and a gunky object both presuppose the concept ofparthood}
Compositional monism is the view that there is exactly one fundamental
parthood relation. According to the compositional monist, the concept of parthood is
univocal. The compositional pluralist disagrees. One kind of compositional pluralism
holds that there are different notions of parthood, each of which is defined on distinct
ontological categories. Let us call this kind of compositional pluralism categorical
pluralism. A more radical kind of compositional pluralism holds that there is more than
one fundamental parthood relation defined on the category of material objects. Let us
call this kind of pluralism radical pluralism.
There are also several ways to be a compositional monist. The debate between
advocates of the different versions of compositional monism turns on the issue of the
scope of the parthood relation. One view - universalist compositional monism - holds
that the fundamental parthood relation is defined on every ontological category.
According to this view, the parthood relation enjoys universal applicability. A view
opposed to universalist compositional monism is restrictivist compositional monism ,
according to which the fundamental parthood relation is defined only for material
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objects, events, and regions of spacetime. The fundamental parthood relation does not
enjoy universal applicability on this view.
The question of compositional pluralism is important for the following reasons.
First, many philosophers are attracted to the thesis that parthood is strongly analogous
to identity. A radical version of this view holds that composition is identity. Both
varieties of compositional pluralism threaten the moderate and radical versions of the
view that composition is identity.
Second, there is reason to think that many important philosophical concepts can
be analyzed partly by appealing to mereological concepts. For example, consider David
Lewis’s analysis of intrinsic property : a property is intrinsic just in case it never differs
between duplicates; two things are duplicates just in case there is a 1-1 correspondence
between their parts that preserves perfectly natural properties and relations. [Lewis
(1986a): 61-62]. This analysis of intrinsic property appeals to the notion ofpart.
However, the analysis attempts to be fully general, since entities of all ontological
categories can have intrinsic properties. However, if compositional pluralism is true,
then whether an analysis of this sort can be fully general must be questioned.
Third, some metaphysicians endorse a metaphysic according to which some
material objects constitute other material objects. According to this metaphysic, the
golden statue is not identical with the lump of gold with which it shares its location.
Instead, the lump of gold constitutes the statue. Advocates of constitution typically
explicate the notion of constitution partly by appealing to the notion of parthood. But if
there is more than one fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects, the
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possibility arises that one of these parthood relations is the one in which the notion of
constitution should be explicated.
Fourth, one of the questions concerning the metaphysics of material objects that
has occupied metaphysician's attention is the special composition question
,
which asks
under what circumstances some objects compose a whole. If there is more than one
fundamental parthood relation defined on the category of material objects, then strictly
speaking there is more than one special composition question. And if this is the case,
there is no guarantee that the answers to these questions are extensionally equivalent.
Finally, one of the questions addressed in this dissertation is the simple question
.
which asks under what circumstances an object fails to have proper parts. If there is
more than one fundamental parthood relation defined on the category of material
objects, then strictly speaking there is more than one simple question. And, as before,
there is no guarantee that the objects that are simple with respect to one parthood
relation are also simple with respect to a different parthood relation.
I note that the last three worries are primarily worries for the radical pluralist. It
is not obvious that the categorical pluralist faces those worries. Accordingly, I will
focus (for the most part) on radical pluralism. In what follows, I attempt to clarify the
questions of whether parthood is univocal and universal. I then critically examine
several arguments for compositional pluralism. I argue that the reasons discussed for
accepting compositional pluralism fail.
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1 .2 Is Parthood Univocal?
As I noted in the introduction, I believe in ontological categories, that is, I
believe that there are fundamental kinds in the world. Perhaps the common-sense
ontological scheme is composed of the following categories:
(1) material objects
(2) times
(3) regions of space
(4) events
(5) properties and relations
(6) possibilities
One fundamental project of metaphysics is ontology, which is the attempt to
discover a complete and correct inventory of ontological categories. Another
fundamental project of metaphysics is to provide the principles that tell us under what
circumstances an element of an ontological category is simple or complex, i.e., under
what circumstances it is appropriate to attribute part-whole structure to a particular
entity. It is important to note that the concept of part-whole structure does not appear to
apply only to material objects like tables and chairs, for each of the following
attributions of part/whole structure makes perfect sense:
(1) The first measure is a part of the song.
(2) 12:30 PM is a part of the interval ranging from 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM.
(3) This part of space is curved.
(4) The third inning was the most boring part of the baseball game.
(5) The weakest part of his argument is where he confuses types and tokens.
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(6) Part of what he did when he killed the butler was hit him with a
candlestick.
(1) ascribes part/whole structure to abstract types; (2) ascribes part/whole
structure to intervals of time; (3) ascribes part/whole structure to regions of space; (4)
ascribes part/whole structure to events; (5) ascribes part/whole structure to arguments;
and (6) ascribes part/whole structure to actions. Each of these is perfectly intelligible;
each of these might be true. 2
However, we should not infer from the intelligibility of (l)-(6) that universalist
compositional monism is true. Recall that universalist compositional monism is the
view that (i) there is exactly one fundamental part-whole relation and (ii) this relation
applies to elements of every ontological category. According to the universalist
compositional monist, parthood is importantly similar in this respect to the relation of
identity. Just as there is only one fundamental identity relation that applies to any entity
regardless of what ontological category it belongs to, there is only one fundamental
parthood relation.
The mereologist, i.e., the person who believes that the axioms of standard
mereology adequately characterise the topic-neutral part-whole relation, is a
• • *3
compositional monist. According to the mereologist, there is exactly one fundamental
parthood relation and one way of generating complex entities out of simple ones,
namely mereological fusion.
The compositional pluralist disagrees. According to the compositional pluralist,
just as there is more than one ontological category, there is more than one fundamental
irreducible parthood relation. There are, of course, many forms of compositional
pluralism. One way of being a compositional pluralist is to claim that each ontological
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category has its own parthood relation. According to this way of being a compositional
pluralist, the relation of part to whole that obtains between, e.g„ regions of space is not
the same relation as the relation of part to whole that obtains between material objects.
I called this form of compositional pluralism categorical pluralism in the previous
section.
According to categorical pluralism, it makes no sense to say that there is a whole
composed of objects from distinct ontological categories, since there is no part-whole
relation that links objects from different categories. So, for example, there is no object
made out of my car and the region of space that it exactly occupies, contrary to the
claims of the mereologist.4 Given categorical pluralism, the following principle
governs ontological categories:
Strong Exhciustivity. Every object belongs to exactly one ontological category.
Moreover, conditions (OC3) and (OC4) become completely trivial, since each parthood
relation has a restricted domain.
Categorical pluralism is in tension with the doctrine that there are states of
affairs that are “unmereologically composed” of objects and properties, where these
entities belong to distinct ontological kinds. 5 According to this doctrine, objects and
properties can fuse into a distinct kind of whole, a state of affairs. A state of affairs
literally has these entities as some kind of constituent. As I see things, there are three
reasonable responses to this worry available to the advocate of categorical pluralism.
The first response is to give up states of affairs. This is the response that I favour, as I
indicated in the Introduction.
6
The second response is to give up the claim that states
of affairs are unmereologically composed of objects and properties, and instead merely
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say that, e.g., necessarily, the state of affairs that a is F exists if and only if a is F. The
third response is to allow that there is a distinct kind of composition that can unite
members of distinct ontological kinds but still have some categorically restricted
composition relations.
Similarly, categorical pluralism is in tension with the claim that sets or classes
are wholes that are made of their members. According to this view, class formation is
kind of composition. Since, for example, there are classes that contain regions of
spacetime, material objects, and propositions, on this view, there are wholes made out
of regions of spacetime, material objects, and propositions. In this case, the best
response for the categorical pluralist is not to deny that classes exist, but instead to deny
that class formation is a kind of composition. Membership is not a parthood relation.
One of the challenges facing compositional pluralists is to provide principles
that determine when a relation is a fundamental parthood relation . 7 In other words, the
compositional pluralist must provide a way of filling in the following schema:
R is a fundamental parthood relation defined on ontological category C if and
only if
.
This strikes me as being a very difficult project. It is clear that there are
necessary conditions on being a parthood relation. For example, no relation deserves to
be called a (fundamental) parthood relation unless it is reflexive, transitive, and non-
o
symmetrical. (One could even say that every parthood relation obeys the axioms of
classical mereology when the quantifiers in those axioms are restricted to each
respective ontological category.) However, these structural conditions are clearly not
sufficient. What other conditions are there?
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In a recent paper in which he defends the claim that composition is strongly
analogous to identity, Theodore Sider discusses two other salient features of the concept
of parthood. [Sider (unpublished): 3,9], First, there is a necessary connection between
the intrinsic properties of a part of an object and the intrinsic properties of the object.
Suppose that x is a part of and that x has intrinsic property F. It follows from this
supposition that y has an intrinsic property, specifically, having a part that has F. And in
general the intrinsic properties of an object’s parts partially fix the intrinsic nature of the
whole that they compose. We can extract a necessary condition from these remarks: a
relation R is a parthood relation only if (i) if x bears R to y and x has an intrinsic
property F, then y has the intrinsic property bearing R to something that is an F and (ii)
the intrinsic properties ofy are partially fixed by the intrinsic properties of those objects
to which y bears R.
A similar constraint is that any parthood relation should be preserved by
intrinsic duplication. If R is a parthood relation, and x bears R to y, then for any z, if z is
an intrinsic duplicate of_y, then there is some w such that w is an intrinsic duplicate of x
and w bears R to z.
A second salient feature that Sider discusses is that wholes seem to inherit their
spatial locations from their parts. If the xs compose y, and the xs are collectively
located in spacetime region R, then y exactly occupies R. [Sider (unpublished): 3, 10].
Of course this second salient feature has no clear application to other ontological
categories. For example, regions of spacetime do not have locations; they are locations.
More pressing, it is not obvious that classes have spatial location. I am inclined to think
they don’t. So, if classes have parts, it is trivially true that classes inherit their locations
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from their parts. But it is also trivially true that a part of a class inherits its location
from the whole it is a part of. In neither case do the entities have locations to inherit.9
Mereological essentialism is the doctrine that every whole has its parts
essentially. If mereological essentialism is true, then we have another constraint that
must be satisfied in order for a relation to count as a parthood relation: R is a parthood
relation only if for all x, ifx bears R to y, then, necessarily, ifx exists, then x bears R to
y. Mereological essentialism seems supported by the claim that composition is identity.
If the xs that compose y really are y, then, just as y is necessarily identical to y, y is
necessarily composed of the xs. [Merricks ( 1 999)] . However, many people resist
mereological essentialism. It seems absurd. Perhaps this shows that the doctrine of
composition as identity is also problematic. 10
Third, no relation is a parthood relation unless it is existence entailing. That is,
ifx bears R to y, then both x and y exist.
It is not clear to me whether these constraints are sufficient to determine whether
a particular relation counts as a parthood relation.
Arguments for Radical Pluralism
Some philosophers have claimed that there are multiple fundamental parthood
relations that are defined on the category material object. I called this view radical
pluralism. Radical pluralism seems to me to be a much less plausible view than
categorical pluralism. In fact, one of my presuppositions is that this kind of
compositional pluralism is false. Nevertheless, it will be worthwhile to examine
whether there are reasons to abandon this presupposition. I will argue that there are
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not. I will now discuss two arguments for this kind of compositional pluralism, one due
Charles Krecz and the other due to Ariel Meirav.
In a paper titled “Parts and Pieces,” Charles Krecz defends a version of
compositional pluralism. [Krecz (1986)]. The version of compositional pluralism he
defends has the following interesting features. First, Krecz’s version of compositional
pluralism (henceforth KCP) implies that there are two distinct part-whole relations that
material objects can bear to one another. Second, not only do these two kinds of
parthood relation apply to objects of the same category, they apply objects of other
ontological categories as well. 1
1
I ignore this second feature of his view in what
follows.
In his paper, Krecz argues that (1) the relation “x is a part of y” and the relation
“
x is a Piece of y” are distinct relations, (2) the distinction between these two relations
is non-arbitrary, and (3) both relations generate fundamental ways of dividing up
material objects into components. Although Krecz does not claim that both relations
are “parthood” relations, it is fair to characterize his view as a kind of compositional
pluralism. Krecz begins his paper with the following slogan: parts are not pieces.
In order to present Krecz’s claims and my responses to them in a neutral way,
we will need to be careful with our terminology. Presumably, Krecz is willing to grant
that both parts and pieces are components of objects, since, in some sense, both kinds of
things compose wholes. Once you have all the pieces and the interrelations to each
other, you have the whole object. Likewise, once you have all of the parts of the object
and their interrelations to each other, you have the whole object. Objects are made up
of their parts and they are made up of their pieces. But, according to Krecz, the relation
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between pieces of a whole to the whole and parts of a whole to the whole are
fundamentally different.
Accordingly, let us employ the word “component” instead of “part” in those
contexts in which we wish to remain neutral with respect to KCP. We can now say that,
according to Krecz, objects have two different kinds of components, and there are two
fundamentally different ways of generating wholes out of material objects. This is why
KCP is a kind of compositional pluralism. (In what follows, when I say “component,” I
mean “proper component,” i.e., a component not identical with the whole.)
Krecz denies that the word “part” as it is used in ordinary English is properly
applied to every component of material objects. Some components of material objects
are not parts of the object but are instead pieces of the object. According to Krecz,
parts of objects have the following features that pieces of objects lack:
(1 ) Parts of objects are non-arbitrary
;
pieces of objects are arbitrary. 12
(2) Parts of objects are not “indifferent with respect to remainder”; pieces of
objects are indifferent.
(3) Parts are always parts of “unified wholes” and are never parts of “mere
heaps”. Pieces can be pieces of unified holes, but can also pieces of
mere heaps.
(4) The phrase “x is a part of y” is semantically incomplete. The proper
analysis of this phrase is “x bears R to A, B, C, and so on, and thereby x
is a part of y.” “x is a piece of y” is semantically complete.
(It is not entirely clear if Krecz intends (l)-(4) to stand for completely distinct criteria.)
Krecz also claims that the part/piece distinction is relevant to understanding “coming-
to-being” and “passing away,” and can shed light on the ontological schemes of our
philosophical predecessors. [Krecz (1986): 397-400]. I will ignore these contentions
and focus on (1) - (4).
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In defense of (1), Krecz writes:
There is something arbitrary about a piece of a whole, something
nonarbitrary about a part of it. This is made evident upon considering
the ways in which a whole may be divided or thought of as divided To
obtain one sort of division, one may start nearly anywhere; the locus ofthe ™t is arbitrary. A piece of a pie is such regardless of the original cut
or the locus from which it is taken. [Krecz (1986): 382.]
n the other hand, the division of parts in a whole is neither arbitrary
with regard to cut, nor indifferent with regard to remainder. The cut of a
part in a whole is locus-specific and therefore non-arbitrary. Cut in the
wrong place and you have failed to distinguish the part. Instead you
will end up with a piece. [Krecz (1986): 383.]
Consider a bicycle. It has many easily identifiable parts. For example, the parts
of the bicycle include its tires, its spokes, its chain, its handlebar, etc. Each of these
parts is reasonably well demarcated. Moreover, each of these parts serves a specific
function such that, if that function were not served well, then the bicycle either would
not function as well or would not function at all.
The pieces of the bicycle are not like this. They are arbitrary, undetached
chunks of the bicycle. We do not typically have names for them for we do not usually
have occasion to refer to them. But we can if we like. Some examples of pieces of the
bike include the chunk of metal right below the water-bottle holder, the lump of worn-
out rubber near the rim of the front tire, and the bit of plastic in the right toe-clip.
The distinction between arbitrary components and non-arbitrary components
does seem to line up with our intuitions about many typical cases. However, there are
other cases in which the distinction does not seem to cut any metaphysical ice.
Consider a heap of sand, which was randomly formed by desert winds. Consider the
left half of this heap of sand. Presumably, Krecz would say this left half is a mere piece
of the heap of sand and not a part of it. Let us now consider a second heap of sand,
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which is intrinsically indiscernible from our first heap. Suppose, however, that this
second heap was created by an artist who painstakingly brought the left half of the heap
into contact with its right half. The artist has dubbed his creation “The Love Sand
Castle and claims that it represents the obtaining of true love. The left half of the heap
represents one of the lovers; the right half of the heap represents the other lover; and the
love they feel is represented by the fact that they these two halves are touching.
It seems to me that in the second case it is natural to say that the left half of the
heap is a part of the heap and not a mere piece. The left half plays an important
representational role in this art object and accordingly is necessary if the art object is to
express what the artist intends to express via this work. (Recall that the left half
represents one of the lovers; it is the left half that has this representational property, not
the concept of the left half.)
However, the two heaps that we have been considering are intrinsic duplicates.
So the relation x is a piece ofy violates one of the constraints on being a fundamental
parthood relation. One of the heaps has a part that occupies its left side. The other heap
does not have a part there; it instead has a mere piece.
In general, it seems that the arbitrariness of a component is partly determined by
what our interests are. Imagine a bronze statue shaped like a man. We think that the
patch of bronze in the statue’s left shoulder is an arbitrary component. But someone
from the tribe of Fargo who holds that the soul resides in the part of the body near the
left shoulder might not think that the component of the statue is arbitrary. That
component corresponds to an area in the human body that he holds to be highly
significant.
31
In defense of (2), Krecz writes:
Another mark of a piece is that the status of a piece is retained regardless
o what relationships obtain or fail to obtain between that piece and the
whole from which it is taken and regardless of what changes take place
in the whole. The remainder may be further divided, the remaining
slices may be further arranged, taken away, or even destroyed. Yet in
such circumstances, the slice of a pie remains what it is. To characterize
something as a piece is to allow an unrestricted range of alteration in the
whole from which it is taken. [Krecz (1986): 382],
Further, unlike pieces, parts must stand in a certain definite relation to a
whole and its other parts, a relation that admits alteration only within
restricted parameters. [Krecz (1986): 383],
Krecz’ s idea seems to be this. Suppose that we say of some x that it is a piece of
a particular piej;. Then we would also say that x is a piece of pie. Suppose we remove
x and place it on a dinner plate. We then proceed to consume the rest of the pie, but
leave x completely untouched. Afterwards, we would still say that x is a piece of pie.
Its status as a piece of pie is unchanged and is in fact completely independent of any
relation it bears to the pie from which it came. We would even say that the piece of a
pie is a piece of the pie from which it came.
On the other hand, we do not have a similar convention governing the word
“part.” Prior to its division and eventual consumption, the crust is a part of the pie.
Suppose we dump the filling of the pie onto a dinner plate, leaving only the crust in the
pie pan. We would certainly not say that the crust is now a part of the pie. And we
would not say that the crust is a “part of pie”. At most, we would say that the crust used
to be a part of the pie.
This shows that the relation x is a piece ofy does not imply that the relata of this
relation exist. Something can be a piece of another thing at a time, even if the thing of
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which it is a piece does not exist at that time. This violates another constraint on being
a fundamental parthood relation.
Moreover, these facts about how we use the terms “piece” and “part” in ordinary
language seem to be of no metaphysical significance. Although it is true that we would
still say of something that is a former piece of a pie that it is a piece of the pie now. I
cannot see how this could be considered important. When we say that something is a
piece of the pie, we say this because we know where the thing came from. We could, if
we liked, coin a similar phrase “x is a part* of (the pie) y,” where a pair of things
satisfies this phrase just in case the first thing used to be a part of the second thing, the
second thing is or was a pie, and the first thing still has certain relevant characteristics,
such as being visible, edible, etc. The fact that we have not done this shows that we
treat the words “part” and “piece” somewhat differently in ordinary English, but it does
not show that there is a fundamental metaphysical difference between parts and pieces.
Moreover, once we have coined this phrase, we can see that parts* of the pie are
as indifferent to what happens to the wholes that they were formerly parts as pieces of
pie are. The crust is a part of the pie; we separate it from the filling, and now it is no
longer a part of the pie. But it is a part* of the pie. And moreover, it will remain a
part* of the pie regardless of what we do the rest of the pie. So “indifference with
respect to what happens to the remainder” does not seem to be a significant
metaphysical feature.
In support of (3) and (4), Krecz writes:
Parts are sensitive to a whole and to other parts in that they are as one in
the whole. The actual division of the parts in a whole, unlike an actual
division into pieces, precludes neither the unity nor the singularity of the
whole. In fact, as we shall see, the manner of division of the parts in a
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whole IS responsible to a considerable extent for the unity of the wholeSince being as one” is what ultimately distinguishes the many partstrom the many pieces, it is our task to analyze this difficult notion[Krecz (1986): 386],
The sentence “A is a part of W" is elliptical. Its proper analysis is “A is
related to B, C, and so on, and is thereby part of W.” [Krecz (1986): 387],
Krecz appears to be saying that the parts of an object are integrated in a way that
the pieces of an object are not. In order for a collection of objects to form an
integrated unit,” the collection needs to be systematically related in some way. It takes
hard work, apparently, to bring about true unity. To be a piece is much easier. A
collection of objects can be pieces of some further thing without much work. However,
this further thing is a mere heap, and not an integrated whole. Heaps come cheap.
Moreover, all ascriptions of part-whole structure to a pair of objects are
semantically incomplete; a semantically complete ascription of part-whole structure to a
pair also mentions the relation that the part stands in to other parts in virtue ofwhich
each ofthem is apart ofthe whole. However, sentences of the form “x is a piece of/’
are not semantically incomplete or elliptical. To say that an object is a piece of another
is just to say that it is a piece of another. This claim that sentences of the form “x is a
part of y” are elliptical strikes me as deeply problematic. I grant that no object can have
exactly one component. (Recall that by “component”, I mean “proper component.”) So
no object can have exactly one part. So the claim that A is a part of W does imply the
claim that there is some y such that y is not A and y is a part of W. But this fact provides
no reason to think that the claim “A is a part ofW is semantically incomplete or
elliptical.
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Similarly, we could grant that some objects are parts of some whole only if there
is some relation R such that these objects compose a whole in virtue of the fact that they
instantiate R. Still, we should not infer from this claim that talk about parthood is
semantically incomplete.
Accordingly, let us focus on claim (3). Krecz writes:
Consider the parts of an ordinary object, say, an apple with its skin,
flesh, and core. When the core of an apple is indeed part of it, it receives
a determination it would not otherwise have. To be a core it must yield
prerogatives. Simply, it goes where the whole apple goes and nowhere
else. Were the core to gain new prerogatives and were it able to go
elsewhere, it would lose its status as part; to be the part that it is, viz., a
core, it must remain inside the apple, enveloped by flesh and skin. But
the skin of an apple is part of it as well. To be the part that it is, viz., the
skin, it must envelope flesh and core. Further, it can achieve this only
because there is flesh and core. Now such claims about the parts of an
apple are hardly remarkable. Further, they reveal little of the superb
complexity and subtlety of other relations of codetermination which
actually obtain between the various parts of an apple. But they do
illustrate codetermination directly and simply; the determination of the
prerogatives of the core, flesh, and skin of an apple obtains in virtue of
the relations between these parts. Such determination is requisite of the
apple to be a whole. Similar determination may be attributed to any of
the parts of any whole. [Krecz (1986): 387-388],
The idea expressed here seems to be this: when an x is a part of an object, it
acquires certain relational characteristics. Moreover, the other parts of an object acquire
relational properties as well in virtue of x’s being a part of the same object. And, unless
these objects had these relational properties, the composite object would not be an
integrated whole.
The relevant relational properties in the passage Krecz discusses seem to be ones
that guarantee that the parts of an object move as a unit. If the skin of an apple and the
core of an apple are part of the same apple, then when the apple is moved ten feet, so
too are the skin and the core. And, were the skin of the apple not to move when the
35
apple moves, then the skin would cease to be a part of an apple. Finally, if the skin of
the apple or the core of the apple were to move independently of each other, then one of
them must not be a part of the apple.
Krecz’s claims with respect to apples and their parts have a lot of plausibility.
But I m not clear how this helps us draw the distinction between parts and pieces in way
that would cut any metaphysical ice. For similar claims with respect to pies and their
pieces have equal plausibility. Consider a pie and a large chunk of the pie in the
middle. If we remove that chunk of pie from the pie -if they no longer move together
as one - then that chunk of pie is no longer a component of the pie. It is true that the
chunk is still apiece ofpie - it is even a piece of the pie -- but these facts don’t seem
relevant. And it is true that the chunk is a piece that camefrom the pie
,
but again, that
fact doesn’t seem relevant to establishing that the parts/pieces distinction is
metaphysically fundamental. So I have a hard time seeing how (3) supports the claim
that the parts/pieces distinction is metaphysically fundamental.
I have addressed each of the distinctions that Krecz alleges underlies the
difference in usage of the terms “part” and “piece” in ordinary English and have argued
that each of the associated claims about these distinctions is problematic. Let us class
these worries aside and now attend to what I take to be the fundamental worry about
Krecz’s position.
Once we have the concept of a component of an object, it seems clear that we
should not take the fact that we distinguish between parts and pieces in ordinary English
to support compositional pluralism. For, once we have the concept of a component, we
can define these two notions in terms of the concept of a component and the distinctions
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that Krecz claims underlies the difference in usage of the terms “part” and “piece.”
And, if we can give such definitions, then there is no reason to think that the relations x
is apart ofy and x is a piece ofy are metaphysically basic.
It is easy to see what the definitions should look like, given that we accept (1)
(2), and (3):
13
x is a part of
y
—df. (1) x is a component ofy, (2) x is a non-arbitrary component
ofy, (3) x is not indifferent with respect to remainder and, (4) v is a “unified
whole.”
x is a piece ofy =df. (1 ) x is a component ofy, (2) x is an arbitrary component of
y, and (3) x is indifferent with respect to remainder.
In fact, we can see that it is possible to think of intermediate kinds of
components, which are neither parts nor pieces. Such components might be non-
arbitrary components that nevertheless are indifferent with respect to remainder. We
could, if we liked, call these components “partlike pieces.” Similarly, we can think of
possible components that are arbitrary but not indifferent with respect to remainder. We
could, if we liked, call these components “piecelike parts.” However, our exercise in
conceptual generation would not give us any reason to think that there are four
fundamental part-whole relations defined on the category of material object. So I
conclude that Krecz has not provided us with a reason to believe that there are two
fundamental part-whole relations defined on this category.
Another advocate of compositional pluralism within the ontological category
material object is Ariel Meirav, who defends the view in an intriguing paper titled
“Non-Unique Composition.” [Mierav (2000)]. Mierav’s version of compositional
pluralism has the following interesting features. First, according to Mierav’s view
(henceforth: MCP), although there is only one fundamental parthood relation defined on
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the category material object
,
there are two metaphysically basic composition relations.
Second, Mierav argues that MCP provides a successful account of how two objects can
be composed of exactly the same parts at the same time but nonetheless be non-
identical. Clearly, Mierav’s view deserves further examination.
Several issues need to be addressed. The first concerns whether it really is
possible for two things to be made out of exactly the same parts at the same time.
Mierav assumes throughout the paper that this is possible and accordingly accepts that
he must explain how it is possible
.
14
There is certainly nothing improper about Mierav
simply assuming that material objects can be superposed in this fashion, for other
philosophers have elsewhere argued that this is possible. Mierav is simply trying to
further the research program to which he has sworn allegiance.
However, I do not belong to this research program. I am unmoved by the
considerations that lead many to say that the lump of clay is not identical with the
statue. I am my body, and you are yours. Since I reject Mierav’s starting point, I am
not in any position to be moved by his argument for compositional pluralism. Compare
my situation with the following: it might be that the best way for the committed theist to
solve the problem of evil is for her to endorse a libertarian account of free agency. This
fact might imply that the theist has a reason to be a libertarian. But it certainly does not
give the atheist a reason to endorse libertarianism.
Let us table this issue. I will grant for the sake of the argument the claim that
non-unique composition is possible. Instead, I will argue for the following conditional
claim: even if you grant that non-unique composition is possible, you should reject
38
MCP. I will now present an exposition of MCP. Afterwards, I will present an
argument against MCP.
Mierav assumes that there is only one parthood relation, x is a pan ofy. [Mierav
(2000):330-33
1 ]. Given this, it seems hard to see how there can be a plurality of
composition relations, for in standard mereology, the multigrade relation x is composed
ofthe ys is defined in terms of parthood. The standard procedure for defining
composition is as follows. First, we define overlap and sum:
D 1 : x overlaps y =df. for some z, z is a part of x and z is a part ofy.
D2: y is the sum of the xs =df (i) each of the xs is a part ofy and (ii) for all z,
z overlaps y if and only if z overlaps one of the xs.
Both of these concepts are defined using only logical vocabulary and the concept of
parthood. The standard notion of composition can now be introduced:
D3 : the xs compose y =df. y is a sum of the xs.
Since the concept of composition can be defined in this way, it is hard to see how there
can be room for a plurality of fundamental composition relations, given that there is
only one fundamental part-whole relation.
Mierav’s strategy is to argue that D3 does not capture the intuitive notion of
composition. Instead, D3 emerges as a special case of a more general notion of
composition. According to Mierav, there are two different species of this more general
notion of composition. Mierav claims that the more general notion of composition is
captured by the following definition:
D4: the xs compose y at t =df. (i) each of the xs is a part ofy at t and (ii) the
existence of all of the xs and their having the features they do at t is a
sufficient condition for the existence ofy at t. [Mierav (2000): 332].
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Mierav notes that the conjunction of D4 and the following assumption is
equivalent to D3:
Al:
^
is a sum 0f the at ' if and only if (0 each of the xs is a part of y (at
t) and (n) the existence of all of the xs and their having the features
they do (at t) is a sufficient condition for the existence of v (at tl
[Mierav (2000): 333],
'
Accordingly, Mierav denies Al. In its place, Mierav recommends:
A2: Ify is a sum of the xs at t, then (i) each of the xs is a part of y (at t)
and (ii) the existence of all of the xs and their having the features they do
(at t) is a sufficient condition for the existence of y (at t). [Mierav (2000) -
Mierav claims that the general notion of composition is captured by D4 and A2.
He then introduces two species of composition, each of which falls under this more
general notion:
D5: The xs compose] y (at t) =df. (i) the xs compose y (at t) and (ii)
necessarily, for all u, (for all f), if u is of the same sort asy (at f), then
for any zs such that the zs compose u (at f), u is a sum of the zs (at f).
D6: The xs compose2 y (at t) =df. (i) the xs compose y (at t) and (ii) possibly,
for some u, (for some f), u is of the same sort as y (at f ), and for some zs,
the zs compose u (at f), and u is not a sum of the zs (at f). [Mierav
(2000): 335].
Next, Mierav notes that the conjunction of D5 and A2 is equivalent to the
following:
A3: the xs compose] y (at t) =df. y is the sum of the xs (at t). [Mierav
(2000): 336],
Accordingly, the standard definition of composition emerges as a special case of
composition given Mierav’s account.
Mierav claims that MCP can help answer what he calls the question of non-
unique composition, which is:
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What difference between the respective features of the two wholes is
consistent with the assumption that they are superposed, that is,
composed of precisely the same parts? I shall call this “the question of
non-unique composition”. [Mierav (2000): 323],
One answer to the question of non-unique composition, which Mierav dismisses
right away, is that the superposed objects differ with respect to their temporal or modal
properties. Mierav writes:
The familiar answer tells us that continuants superposed at t in the actual
world might differ from one another in respect of features current at
another time or in another possible world. It is silent, however, on the
question whether, and how, such continuants might also differ from one
another in respect of features current at t and in the actual world. The
latter question, however, is an obvious corollary to the question of non-
unique composition, and should be addressed in any account that aims to
be satisfactory.
Indeed, someone who upholds the familiar answer is committed
to providing an answer to the corollary as well, unless he or she is
prepared to assume that distinct continuants can be indiscernible (at
times in which they are superposed). This assumption, however, is
highly paradoxical. [Mierav (2000): 325],
In other words, differences in the modal or temporal properties of objects must be
grounded in the non-modal or non-temporal properties of objects. Mierav argues that
when objects are superposed, the non-modal/non-temporal difference between the two
superposed objects is the way in which they are composed of their parts.
My main objection to MCP is that D4 does not capture our intuitive conception
of composition. There are cases in which composition clearly occurs, but the right-hand
side of the biconditional is not satisfied. D4 plays a central role in Mierav’s theory,
since it is supposed to be a general account of composition, from which composition]
and composition emerge as special cases. So, if D4 goes, then MCP goes as well.
Recall D4:
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D4: the xs compose y at t =df. (i) each of the xs is a part of v at , and fin the
existence of all of the xs and their having the features they do at t is a
sufficient condition for the existence ofy at r. 15
I will present two counter-examples to D4. First counter-example-. Sally is a
human person. Human persons are material objects and hence are made out of
fundamental particles. Call the class of fundamental particles that compose Sally on her
1 6 birthday the Sally Class. Sally’s 1
6
th
birthday occurs on 7-30-2004. So, at 7-30-
2004, the elements of the Sally Class compose Sally.
Let us consider another possible world w at which each of the elements of the
Sally Class exists. However, at 7-30-1988 these elements compose nothing interesting
and certainly don t compose a newborn baby. The elements of the Sally Class continue
to compose nothing particularly interesting until 7-30-2004. Prior to this date, the
particles have been scattered widely apart. But now, due to chance or divine plan, at a
precise moment on 7-30-2004, the particles coalesce into the shape of human person
who is an intrinsic duplicate of Sally. These particles have the same intrinsic properties
and stand in the same spatial and causal relations to each other in w as they actually do.
No human being was even remotely near the region where these particles
coalesced. An outside observer employing a very powerful telescope would see a pretty
much empty area followed by the sudden appearance of a human-shaped thing. But the
thing that these particles compose in w is not Sally. Plausibly, Sally has her origins
essentially. At the very least, Sally is not the kind of thing that could come into
existence in this way. It is even doubtful whether the thing in w is a human being or a
person. But presumably Sally is essentially either a human being or a person. So it is
possible for some xs to compose ay at a time and yet for it not be the case that the
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existence of all of the xs and their having the features they do at t is a sufficient
condition for the existence ofy at /.
Second counter-example
: suppose that at t, a collection of bricks compose a
house. Let’s call the class of bricks that compose the house, the Brick Class. The house
would have existed had it contained one less brick in the chimney. Let us go to a world
W at whlch a11 of the bricks in the Brick Class are arranged in exactly the same way as
they actually are, save for a missing brick. Let us call the class of bricks that compose
the house at this world, the Brick Minus Class. At w, the elements of the Brick Minus
Class compose the house. But, at the actual world, the elements of the Brick Minus
Class do not compose the house, even though all of its members exist and stand in the
same relations as they do in w. So the existence of all of the bricks in the Brick Minus
Class and their having the features they do at t is not a sufficient condition for the
existence of the house at t, even though the bricks do compose the house at t at world w.
We have a second counter-example.
Since D4 is central to Mierav’s project, and since D4 is not an adequate analysis
of composition, I conclude that Mierav has failed to demonstrate that there are two
fundamental kinds of composition.
Persistence and Categorical Pluralism
An interesting argument for a different kind compositional pluralism -
categorical pluralism - can be developed based on the claim that objects persist through
time by enduring. Here, I discuss this argument and attempt to undercut it.
It is uncontroversial that objects persist through time. I believe that I have
enjoyed 27 years of life; I hope to enjoy at least twice as many years more. Neither my
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belief nor my hope would be warranted if objects did not persist through time. The
interesting question is how objects persist through time.
Here is a rough characterization of the territory; in a moment, I will introduce a
more precise account of the positions discussed. Perdurantists hold that objects persist
through time in the same way that objects extend through space. According to
perdurantist, just as an object is extended in space in virtue of having spatial parts, so
too is an object extended in time in virtue of having temporal parts. Endurantists deny
the analogy between persistence through time and extension in space. Endurantists hold
that objects persist through space by being wholly present at different times. In short,
persisting objects enjoy multiple locations in spacetime without having proper parts
corresponding to these locations.
Perdurantism and endurantism are contrary positions. But they do not exhaust
logical space. I will argue that there are intermediate positions that are available for
consideration once we distinguish several questions .
16
Specifically, we should
distinguish the question of what parthood relation is defined on material objects from
the question of what sort of regions of spacetime material objects can reside in. I
address the former question here. Is the fundamental parthood relation defined on
material objects a two-place atemporal parthood relation x is a part ofyl Or is the
fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects a three place time-indexed
parthood relation x is part ofy at fl The perdurantist holds that the fundamental
parthood relation defined on material objects is an atemporal relation. On the other
hand, the endurantist asserts that it is a three-place relation.
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The reason the endurantist does this is straightforward. Recall that one of my
presuppositions is that eternalism is true. Roughly speaking, eternalism is the doctrine
that all times (and their contents) are ontologically on a par; past and future times exist
in just the same sense as present times exist . 17 The worry is that endurantism
- given
eternalism - is committed to mereological constantism. 18 According to mereological
constantism, if an object has a part at one time, then it has that part at every time that
the object is present. Suppose that the fundamental part-whole relation is the two-place
relation x is apart ofy. Since this is a non-temporally indexed parthood relation and it
is the parthood relation, the temporal relativizations on ascription of parts to an object
simply drop off. If an object has a part at a time, it has that part simpliciter. And.
accordingly, we have mereological constantism. Nothing ever changes parts
Mereological constantism is often viewed as being wildly counter-intuitive. So
there is pressure to reject one of the premises in the argument that leads to mereological
constantism. There is a wide range of potential targets. But the target that most
endurantists aim at is the assumption that the fundamental part-whole relation that
applies to material objects is an atemporal part-whole relation. Instead, most
endurantists opt for the view that the fundamental part-whole relation that applies to
material objects is a temporally indexed part-whole relation: x is a part ofy at t
20
Actually, though, there are good reasons for the endurantist to take the
fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects to be a spatiotemporally
indexed parthood relation, not merely a temporally indexed parthood relation. That is,
instead of taking the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects to be x
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is apart ofy at t, the endurantist should take it to be x is a part ofy at R, where R is a
region of space-time
.
21
The main reason the endurantist should take the fundamental parthood relation
defined on material objects to be indexed to space-time regions and not to times is
special relativity
.
22
Given special relativity, strictly speaking, there are no such things
as times, or at least, there are no things that perfectly match our concept of what it is to
be a time
.
23
Instead, there are equivalence classes of regions of space-time that may be
thought of as times according to an inertialframe ofreference. Since the three-place
relation x is simultaneous with y relative toframe F is well-defined, we can say that a
time relative to F is a maximal class of spacetime points pair-wise simultaneous to each
other relative to F. Of course, the endurantist could say that the fundamental parthood
relation defined on material objects is indexed both to a time and a frame of reference.
But these times (and frames of references) are hardly fundamental entities - they are
paradigmatic instances of logical constructions - and so it would be strange to index a
fundamental relation to entities that are clearly not fundamental constituents of the
world. A far more natural move for the three dimensionalist to make is to take the
fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects to be spatiotemporally
indexed and then analyse the parthood relation x is a part ofy at t at frame F in terms of
it .
24
Fortunately, we can do this. We begin by taking our primitive parthood relation
to be x is a part ofy at R, where R is a region of spacetime. If we wish, we can restrict
the candidate regions to those that are maximally continuous three-dimensional slices of
spacetime, i.e., hyper-planes. Three-dimensional slices of spacetime are the sorts of
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things that enduring objects can be wholly present at, allowing us to adopt the following
axiom: x is a part ofy at R only if both x and y are wholly present at R. We next
introduce the notion of being a time at a reference frame: times at reference frames are
fusions of spacetime points such that each point is simultaneous with the others at that
reference frame. Finally, we introduce a defined time and frame indexed parthood
relation: x is a part ofy at / at F if and only if there is an R such that x is a part ofy at R
and R is t at F 25
Note that this sort of definition will also be available for use in spacetimes in
which a two-place notion of absolute simultaneity is well defined. As above, the
fundamental spatiotemporal entities are spacetime points. However, in these spacetimes
we can identify times with maximal fusions of simultaneous spacetimes points, which
are simply hyper-planes of simultaneity.
So the endurantist should hold that the fundamental parthood relation defined on
material objects is spatiotemporally indexed. However, since nothing that follows in
this section turns on this complication, I will ignore it for now. The important point is
that endurantists have good reason to commit themselves to the claim that the parthood
relation defined on material objects is a three-place relation.
I have argued that the endurantist should claim that the fundamental parthood
relation defined on material objects is a three-placed relation x is a part ofy at t.
Must the endurantist who takes this route also be a compositional pluralist? There are
powerful reasons to say that she must. For the endurantist believes in intervals of times.
And it is undeniable that part-whole structure applies to these entities. However, what
is deniable - and what ought to be denied - is that the fundamental part-whole relation
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that is defined on temporal intervals is the relation x is a part ofy at t. It seems clear
that the fundamental parthood relation defined on temporal intervals is a non-temporally
indexed parthood relation, but in case an argument for this is required, consider the
following. Suppose that the fundamental parthood relation defined on temporal
intervals is x is a part ofy at t. At what time is 12:30 a part of the interval beginning at
12:00 and ending at 1 :00? Given the principle that an object x is part of another object^
at time / only ifx and y are both wholly present at t, there is no time at which 12:30
could reasonably be said to be a part of the interval (12:00, 1 :00). This is because (i)
this interval is not wholly present at 12:30 and (ii) 12:30 is only wholly present at itself.
So the advocate of three dimensionalism and Eternalism should not say that the
parthood relation defined on times is the temporally indexed parthood relation x is a part
ofy at t.
So the endurantist should believe that the fundamental parthood relation defined
on intervals of times is the non-temporally indexed relation x is a part ofy. However,
in order to avoid mereological constantism, the three dimensionalist should believe that
the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects is the temporally
relativized relation x is a part ofy at t. It should be clear that these two parthood
relations are not identical, since their adicity differs; x is a part ofy is a two-place
relation, whereas x is a part ofy at t is a three-place relation. So the endurantist should
be a compositional pluralist.
So the endurantist should say that the concept of parthood is not univocal.
There are two ontological categories such that the parthood relations defined on those
categories are not identical. Endurantists should endorse compositional pluralism.
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The Case for “x is a part of y”
I will now present an argument for the claim that the fundamental parthood
relation defined on material objects is a two-place atemporal relation x is a part ofy.
The argument is not terribly original; the bulk of the argument is based on the work of
Theodore Sider.
The first premise is that the best way to solve the problems of temporary
material coincidence, conventional identity, and vagueness is by appealing to temporal
parts. The second premise is that the ontology of temporal parts is acceptable only if
the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects is a two-place atemporal
relation x is a part ofy. Given these two premises, we should believe that the
fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects is a two-place atemporal
relation x is a part ofy.
Since Theodore Sider has already provided an extended defense of the first
premise - he devotes two chapters of Sider (2001) to this task - I will concentrate on
the second premise.
Two preliminary points are in order. First, even the advocate of the claim that
the fundamental parthood relation is a three-placed temporally relativized relation can
believe in temporal parts. For the doctrine of temporal parts can be stated in terms of
this relation in the following way:
X is an instantaneous temporal part ofyatt =df. (1) x exists at, but only at, t, (2)
x is a part ofy at t, and (3) x overlaps at t everything that is a part ofy at t.
(DTP1): For any object x and time t such that x exists at t,x has an
instantaneous temporal part at t. [Sider (2001): 59].
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It will be useful to have a slightly stronger version of DTP available as well. Let us
introduce the notion of an extended temporal part'.
Xisjm extended temporalpart ofy at interval T=df. (1) * exists at every instant
in T and at no instant not in T, (2) for each rin T, x is a part ofy at t and x
overlaps everything that is a part ofy at t.
(DTP2): For any object x and interval T such that x persists through T x has an
extended temporal part at T 26
I note that DTP2 entails DTP1, but that the converse does not hold unless we assume
universal fusion of temporal parts, which may be regarded as unintelligible by the
endurantist. I will focus on DTP2 in what follows.
Second, if the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects is the
relation x is a part ofy, we can and should introduce a defined temporally-relativized
parthood predicate x is a part ofy at t. The definition is simple, given that there are
temporal parts:
(PatT): x is a part ofy at t =df. x and y each exist at t, and x’s instantaneous
temporal part at t is a part of/s instantaneous temporal part at t. [Sider (2001V
57].
Since the doctrine of temporal parts can be stated using a three-place parthood
predicate, the endurantist can believe that objects have temporal parts. And since the
perdurantist can understand this three-place parthood predicate, there is no reason for
her to balk at this formulation of DTP. (Although, as Sider points out, from the
perspective of the perdurantist, this formulation is not maximally perspicuous. See Sider
(2001): 57.)
However, although an endurantist can accept temporal parts, doing so requires
her to accept the possibility of total mereological coincidence as well. Two material
objects suffer from total mereological coincidence given endurantism just in case there
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is a time or times at which both objects have exactly the same proper parts. More
generally, two objects suffer from total mereological coincidence just in case the
fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects relates these two non-
identical objects to the same collection of parts.
To see this, let us turn to one kind of problem for which temporal parts provide
the solution, specifically, the problem of vague persistence. Suppose that it is
indeterminate whether Fred persists from tl to t4. This is because it is indeterminate
whether Fred exists at t4, although it is determinate that Fred persists from tl to t3. The
friend of temporal parts diagnoses this situation as a case of semantic indeterminacy.
There is an object that determinately persists from tl to t4. There is another object that
determinately persists from tl to t3. This latter object is an extended temporal part of
the former object. In this situation, it is indeterminate whether “Fred” refers to the
temporally longer object or the shorter object. It is not indeterminate what things exist.
The friend of endurantism can help herself to this solution. But it requires her to
say that, during tl through t3, there are two non-identical objects that are related via the
fundamental part-whole relation to the same group of objects.
The perdurantist also helps herself to the temporal parts solution, but without
paying the price of genuine coincidence. Since the three-place part-whole relation is a
defined parthood relation on the perdurantist view, that the perdurantist accepts
temporal parts does not imply that she must also accept total mereological coincidence,
for the fundamental parthood relation defined on material objects is a two-place
relation. And nothing in this application of temporal parts to our problem involves
holding that two non-identical objects are related to the same collection of parts via this
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relation. Since total mereological coincidence is to be avoided, the ontology of
temporal parts is acceptable only if the fundamental parthood relation defined on
material objects is a two-place atemporal relation x is a part ofy 27
Parthood and Occupation
The typical endurantist says that the fundamental parthood relation is a three-
place relation and that objects are wholly present at more than one time. The typical
perdurantist responds that the fundamental parthood relation is a two-place relation and
that objects are never wholly present at more than one time. Since the typical
endurantist (or perdurantist) claims about occupation and parthood are not necessarily
equivalent, there is room for other views on the question of how objects persist through
time.
In order to address these questions carefully, I need to introduce some technical
vocabulary. In what follows, I will assume that the fundamental parthood relation
defined on material objects is the atemporal relation x is a part ofy. Recall that the
ontology endorsed in the Introduction contains regions of spacetime and material
occupants of those regions. The primitive relation that material objects bear to regions
of spacetime is the occupation relation. A region occupied by a material object is where
that object is located in spacetime. It is where the object is at. The following “axioms
of occupation” should help the reader grasp the relevant relation. If an object x
occupies a region of spacetime r, then every part of x occupies some part of r.
Example: I occupy a particular region of spacetime and my hand occupies a subregion
of this region. However, ifx occupies a region of spacetime r, it does not follow that x
occupies a proper subregion of r. In fact, this typically will not be the case; instead, in
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the typical case, a proper part of* occupies a proper subregion of r. Example: the
current temporal part of my desk occupies a three-dimensional subregion of spacetime.
It does not occupy the subregion (of that region) that is occupied by the current
temporal part of the leg of that desk. If an object occupies two disjoint regions, it does
not follow that the object occupies the fusion of these regions. (In such a case, the
object enjoys multi-location. Examples of this case are not obvious, but here is a
putative one: a universal is instantiated at by an object at Rl and a different object at R2.
It is not instantiated by the fusion of these objects. Presumably, then, the universal
occupies R1 and R2 but does not occupy their union.)
The following definitions will also be helpful:
x fills region R =df. Either (i) there is some R ’ such that R is a part of R'
and x occupies R ’ or (ii) there is a region R ’ and there are regions, the rs,
such that R ’ is the fusion of the rs, x occupies each of the rs, and R is a
part of R\
x lies within R =df. There is some region R ' such that R’ is a part of R
and x occupies R\
R is empty =df. There is no x such that x fills R and there is no x such
that x lies within R.
X exactly occupies R =df. x occupies R and no region other than R.
x is multi-located =df. There are regions R and X such that (i) R is not
identical with and (ii) x occupies R and x occupies R\
x dominates R just in case (i) x occupies R, (ii) it is not the case that x
occupies some proper sub-region of R, and (iii) no proper part of x
occupies a proper part of R.
The typical endurantist endorses one claim about parthood, specifically that
parthood is a three-place relation, and two claims about occupation. The second claim
made by the typical endurantist is that it is possible for objects to enjoy multi-location.
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For example, on the typical endurantist picture, a point-particle persists hy successively
occupying disjoint regions of spacetime. The third claim is that no object occupies a
region of spacetime that is extended in the temporal dimension.
The typical perdurantist endorses a claim about parthood, specifically that it is a
two-place relation, and two claims about occupation. The second claim made by the
typical perdurantist is that objects do not enjoy multi-location. Every object exactly
occupies some region of spacetime. The third claim is that many objects occupy
regions of spacetime that are extended in the temporal dimension.
However, there are some points of agreement between the typical endurantist
and the typical perdurantist. Suppose a point particle p persists from tl to t2. Call the
one-dimensional spatiotemporal region that it persists through R. Both the typical
endurantist and the typical perdurantist will grant that p fills R. And both the typical
endurantist and the typical perdurantist will grant that p does not dominate R.
So far then we have the following positions:
Typical Endurautism :
( 1 ) Necessarily, parthood is a three-place relation.
(2) Possibly, some objects enjoy multi-location.
(3) Necessarily, no object occupies a temporally extended region of
• 28
spacetime.
(4) Necessarily, no object dominates a temporally extended region of
spacetime.
Typical Perdurautism:
(5) Necessarily, parthood is a two-place relation.
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(6) Necessarily, no object enjoys multi-location.
Some objects occupy temporally extended region of spacetime.
(8) Necessarily, no object dominates a temporally extended region of
spacetime.
Typical Endurantism and Typical Perdurantism are contraries. They do not
exhaust the possible positions on how objects persist. But it should be clear now that
there are many other positions available. As it turns out, I endorse a following position
that is inconsistent with both typical endurantism and typical perdurantism. 29 First, like
the typical perdurantist, I accept that the fundamental parthood relation defined on
material objects is a two-place relation; I argued for this claim in II.5. So I reject (1) but
accept (5). Second, like the typical endurantist, I accept that objects can be wholly
present at multiple regions of spacetime; I defend this view in chapter 3. On one
conception of extended simples - the Parsonian Conception - extended simples are
objects that fill an extended region of spacetime via enjoying multi-location. 30
However, although I accept that Parsonian simples are possible, I provide reasons for
doubting that they are actual in chapter 3. (The argument in II. 5 also provides some
reason to think that temporal Parsonian extended simples are not actual.) So I accept
(2) but reject (6).
Finally, unlike both the typical endurantist and the typical perdurantist, I am
willing to countenance the possibility that all extended regions of spacetime are
possibly dominated by material objects. In chapter 3, 1 argue that spatiotemporally
extended simples are possible. On another conception of extended simples, extended
simples dominate the regions they occupy. Once you accept that some extended regions
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of spacetime can be dominated, it is hard to see how you could argue that some
extended region of spacetime could not be. So I reject (4) and (8).
I have defended compositional monism from attack. I will now turn to the
question of what sort of compositional monism we should adopt. Should we accept that
parthood is universal?
1 .3 Is Parthood Universal?
A concept is strongly universal just in case, necessarily, it applies to everything
there is. There are universal concepts. For example, the concept being self-identical is
universal, since everything is self-identical. Another example of a universal concept is
being such that 2+2=4. A concept is weakly universal just in case there is no
ontological category such that the concept applies to no members of that category. We
will now investigate whether “has parts” is strongly or weakly universal.
By “everything” I mean anything whatsoever, regardless of what ontological
category it belongs to. Mountains, which belong to the category material object , are
self-identical; propositions about mountains are also self-identical, even though they
belong to a different ontological category than mountains. If the concept of parthood is
strongly universal, then, necessarily, everything has parts. If the concept of parthood is
strongly universal, then numbers have parts, classes have parts, material objects have
parts, immaterial objects have parts, and so forth.
Even if the concept of parthood is not univocal, it might nonetheless be strongly
universal. The state of affairs would obtain if, for example, although there are multiple
parthood relations, each ontological category is such that (i) there is a parthood relation
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defined on that ontological category and (ii) every object bears some parthood relation
to some object.
There is a danger of the debate between the universalist and her opponent being
trivialized. Some philosophers stipulate that every object is to be counted as a part of
itself. Given this stipulation, it is trivially true that the concept of parthood is universal,
since identity is universal. The number two definitely has parts, since it at least has
itself as a part! And so forth for objects of other ontological categories. We need to
avoid this danger.
If we stipulate that every entity is to count as a part of itself, it is useful to
introduce a technical term that applies when an object is a part of some whole but not
identical to that whole. It is standard to use the term proper part in this sort of
circumstance. We could avoid the danger of trivialization by asking whether the
concept of proper parthood is universal. But this question, although interesting, is not
the intended question.
We should distinguish the following questions:
Q 1 : Does every entity have proper parts?
Q2: Does every ontological category have at least one member that has a proper
part?
Q1 and Q2 are not the same question; moreover, it might be that it is correct
to answer “no” to Q1 and “yes” to Q2. In order to see that Q1 and Q2 are different
questions, it will be helpful to assume a background ontology. Since it is reasonably
familiar and well developed, let us pretend to accept David Lewis’s ontological scheme.
We can then see how Q1 and Q2 differ given this background, and hence differ
simpliciter.
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Lewis’s ontological scheme is composed of two categories: material object and
class. Properties are identified with classes; propositions are identified with classes of
possible worlds; possible worlds are in turn identified with mereological fusions of
spatiotemporally related objects; events are reduced to properties. [Lewis (1986a): 69-
80.] Lewis is also a mereologist. Since he is a mereologist, he believes in “mixed
entities,” which are composed of material objects and classes. [Lewis (1991): 72-80.]
According to Lewis, there is one fundamental parthood relation that applies to both
material objects and classes. Some material objects have proper parts; so do some
classes. So Lewis would answer 'yes' to Q2.
But Lewis would answer “no” to Ql. According to Lewis, some entities don't
have proper parts. For example, in Parts of Classes . Lewis argues that singleton classes
are mereological simples. Since different answers to Ql and Q2 are possible, this
shows that these two questions are distinct.
Let us consider a third question:
Q3: Let C be an ontological category such that some member of C has proper
parts. Does every member of C have proper parts?
Q3 is not the same question as Ql or Q2. We can see that this is the case if
we construct scenarios in which one could reasonable answer these questions
differently. Consider McLewis. McLewis shares Lewis’s basic ontology, which
consists of material objects and classes.
But McLewis disagrees with Lewis about whether classes have proper parts.
McLewis is a compositional restrictivist; he believes that the fundamental parthood
relation is defined only on material objects. According to McLewis, either Lewis’s
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claim that some classes have proper parts amounts to nothing more than a stipulation
like let us now call the subclasses of a class its ‘proper parts’,” or the claim is
meaningless in the same way that a claim like “The number 2 is in my cellar” is on
some accounts meaningless, or it is just plain false because the parthood relation does
not apply to classes.
McLewis is happy to let Lewis stipulate a new sense of “proper part,”
although he worries that it might be misleading to do so, and he certainly does not think
that doing this cuts any metaphysical ice. McLewis is suspicious of the second option,
since he is inclined to think that the sentence “The number 2 is in my cellar” is false but
not meaningless. So he favors the third option, if he is supposed to understand that
Lewis is making a substantive claim.
So McLewis answers Q2 with a “no”. Classes on his view do not belong to a
category in which some elements of that category have proper parts. For similar
reasons, McLewis answers question Q1 with a “no”.
McLewis also believes in that, necessarily, every material object is atomless
gunk. That is, he endorses the claim that, as a matter of necessity, every material object
has proper parts. Since he also holds that only material objects have proper parts, he
answers Q3 with a “yes”.
McLewis’s metaphysical views might be incorrect, but they are not
unreasonable. And, given McLewis’s metaphysical views, he must distinguish Q3 from
Q1 and Q2. Given Lewis’s metaphysics, he must distinguish Q1 and Q2. So Ql, Q2,
and Q3 are each distinct questions.
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Which question should we concentrate on? If we want to avoid the worry about
our question being trivial, then we should concentrate on question Q2. If Q2 is
correctly answered by a “yes”, then I will say that parthood is universal. Q2 captures
the intended question.
There is some linguistic evidence that we take the concept of parthood to be
universal. Recall the sentences I mentioned earlier:
(1) The first measure is a part of the song.
(2) 12:30 PM is a part of the interval ranging from 12:00 PM to 1:00 PM.
(3) This part of space is curved.
(4) The third inning was the most boring part of the baseball game.
(5) The weakest part of his argument is where he confuses types and tokens.
(6) Part of what he did when he killed the butler was hit him with a candlestick.
As I noted earlier, each sentence seems plausible, even though they seem to ascribe
mereological structure to objects of various ontological categories. However, some
putative ontological categories seem to resist the attribution of part-whole structure to
their members. For example, suppose that numbers form an ontological category.
There are no commonsensical attributions of part-whole structure to numbers. The
sentence “.33 is a part of 3.33” sounds silly. Or consider the putative category
possibilities. The sentence “the possibility that Ben wins the chess match is part of the
possibility that Ben wins the chess tournament” sounds extremely strained. This, of
course, does not show that the concept of parthood is not universal. It might be the case
that there are composites made out of numbers and possibilities, or that numbers and
possibilities are composite objects. Or it may be that neither numbers nor possibilities
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form genuine ontological categories. But the case for parthood being universal would
be stronger if we could produce plausible sounding attributions of mereological
structure to entities of every putative ontological category.
However, even if we do not have an airtight case for universalism, we still seem
to have some reason to reject the kind of compositional restrictivism endorsed by
McLewis. For it seems that each of (l)-(7) could be true and it seems that each of (1)-
(7) attributes part-whole structure to entities of various ontological categories. How
could McLewis respond?
One strategy available to McLewis is to provide paraphrases of each of the
offending sentences. For example, sentence (1), which appears to attribute
mereological structure to types, could be paraphrased as follows:
(1 *) Necessarily, every instance of the song has a part that is an instance of
the first measure.
In other words, talk about the mereological structure of types can be cashed out in terms
of necessity and the mereological structure of tokens of the types. This is the strategy
advocated by Alex Oliver:
We also talk of types of geometrical objects as having parts, so that we
can say that a type of a particular hyperbola has two separate parts. But I
would construe this talk as mere metaphor: the type has metaphorical
parts because any token of the type has real spatial parts. [Oliver (1993):
217]
Likewise, with respect to (7), Oliver recommends treating it as a metaphor.
Classes do not literally have their proper subclasses as proper parts, although the
metaphor that they do is appropriate. The metaphor is appropriate because the
subclass
relation and the parthood relation have similar formal properties. For
example, it is
uncontroversial that both relations are transitive.
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Oliver also notes that, on some theories of types, such as Lewis’s theory of
properties, even if types have mereological structure, they do not have the mereological
structure we expect them to have. 32 For example, according to Lewis’s theory,
properties are classes of actual and possible instances of the property. (I assume that
types are a kind of property.) So a type of song is the class of its actual and possible
instances. According to Lewis, the parts of a class are all and only its subclasses. But
any subclass of a class of songs is itself a class of songs. It is not a class of proper parts
of that song. So, on Lewis’s theory, a sentence like (1) is false.
So even someone like David Lewis, who believes that there is just one
fundamental parthood relation and that this relation is universal, should not take some
of these sentences at face value. For another example, (5) also seems amenable to
paraphrase. Instead of saying “the weakest part of his argument is where he confuses
types and tokens,” we could say:
His argument has many premises. In one of his premises, he confuses
types and tokens. This premise is the weakest premise of his argument.
And this sort of paraphrase might be reasonable or even mandatory depending on what
we take arguments to be. If we take arguments to be sequences of sentences, as many
introductory logic textbooks do, then the premises of an argument are not literal parts of
the argument. Instead, they are “elements” of the sequences.
So the linguistic evidence for compositional universalism seems weak. Let us
see what additional considerations could motivate us to hold that composition is
universal.
One might appeal to the thesis that composition is identity. Many feel a strong
attraction to the hard to adequately characterize but nonetheless alluring thesis that
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composition is identity
.
33
Consider a table and its parts. In some sense, the parts of
this table just are the table. The table just is its top and legs.
It composition is identity, then, since identity is universal, then so too is
parthood. And even if composition is not literally identity but instead merely analogous
to identity, a case might be made that parthood is universal. For the more analogies
between composition and identity we discover, the more analogies between them we
should expect to discover.
How analogous is parthood to identity given typical endurantism? The answer
is: not very analogous at all. There are at least two fundamental kinds of parthood;
there is only one kind of identity. The parthood relation defined on material objects is
temporally relative; the identity relation does not obtain relative to times . 34 Every
object is always identical to itself; however, the xs that compose ay at t need not be
identical with the zs that compose y alt’. The typical endurantist should deny that
composition is identity.
So if we hold that compositional pluralism is true, and that the parthood relation
defined on times is not the parthood relation defined on material objects, the thesis that
composition is identity is problematic and cannot motivate the claim that there are
parthood relations defined on each ontological category. We might wonder why only
certain ontological categories have parthood relations defined on them, but perhaps the
compositional pluralist can provide an explanation: perhaps only those objects that can
occupy space or time in some intimate way, such as material objects, events, spatial or
temporal regions, can have parts.
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However, the typical perdurantist is not in this position, for she need not accept
compositional pluralism. Suppose that compositional pluralism is false, and that the
parthood relation that events bear to each other, that material objects bear to each other,
and that regions of spacetime bear to each other, is the same in each case. Then we
would feel some pressure to think that, for example, the relationship between classes
and their subclasses is also that parthood relation. For one thing, the subclass relation is
formally analogous to the parthood relation. Since the parthood relation appears in four
other ontological categories, the hypothesis that this formal analogy is not merely a
formal analogy would be very tempting. But clearly it is not required.
So the typical endurantist probably has no reason to hold that parthood is
universal, and may have some reason to think it is not. But the typical perdurantist is
not in the same position; she may hold that parthood is universal, but the evidence we
have looked at does not mandate this conclusion.
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Notes
1
I follow the convention that “part” denotes a reflexive relation.
2
Peter Simons stresses this point throughout Simons (1987).
On standard mereology and other interesting variations of it, see Simons
(1987). Simons is, of course, no compositional monist; Simons (1987) provides a
powerful defence of compositional pluralism. Peter van Inwagen appears to endorse
compositional pluralism in van Inwagen (1990a): 18-20. One famous monist is, of
course, David Lewis. See Lewis (1991): 75-82.
4 One could hold the stronger view that there are multiple parthood relations
within each particular ontological category. But I can’t see how one could motivate
such a view. Accordingly, I will not address it in what follows.
5 On the ’unmereological composition’ of states of affairs, see Armstrong
(1986), and Lewis (1986b).
For arguments against states of affairs, see Lewis (1986b).
7
This question is clearly related to the question Peter van Inwagen calls the
General Composition Question. On this question, see van Inwagen (1990a): 38-51.
8 Of course, we can introduce defined parthood relations that, for example, are
not transitive.
9
However, it might be that, for each ontological category, there is something
analogous to inherited location that we can appeal to. For example, classes inherit their
members from their subclasses.
10
The problem facing the advocate of the thesis that composition of is identity is
analogous to the problem of contingent identity. Counterpart theory can solve the latter
problem, so it may solve the former one as well. See Lewis (1971) and Mericks (1999).
For the record, I reject mereological essentialism.
11
Krecz applies the part/piece distinction to fictional and linguistic objects in
Krecz (1986): 391-394.
12
“There is something arbitrary about a piece of a whole, something
nonarbitrary about a part of it.” [Krecz (1986): 392].
13
Since (4) is arguably incoherent, I ignore it in what follows.
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14
Defenses of constitution can be found in Baker (1997), Baker (2000)
Wasserman (2002), and Wiggins (2001).
15
Mierav [s not c iear on what the relevant features of the parts are. Let us
assume that they are the intrinsic properties of the parts, plus the various spatiotemporal
and causal relations obtaining between them.
I am indebted to the work of cody Gilmore in what follows. Some of the
remarks made here are similarly to those in Gilmore (forthcoming).
1
7
For an interesting discussion about etemalism see chapter two of Sider (2001)
and Markosian (1994).
1
8
No surprise here, since Lewis is the author of both arguments See Lewis
(1986): 202-205.
Sometimes this relation is called an atemporal part-whole relation.
20
Another popular target is eternalism. Many philosophers instead endorse
presentism, which is the doctrine that the only things that exist are those things that
presently exist. On presentism, see Bigelow (1996), Markosian (1994), and Sider
(2001).
2
1
Hud Hudson presents a more developed account of a view that indexes the
part-whole relation to regions in Hudson (2001): 62-70.
22
Perhaps it is not the only reason. Recently, Hud Hudson has argued that
indexing the part-whole relation to regions of spacetime also solves the pressing
problem of the many. See Hudson (2001): 45-71. Additionally, Theodore Sider has
suggested that the three dimensionalist should index parthood to regions of spacetime in
worlds in which time travel into the past is possible. See Sider (2001): 104-105.
I am heavily indebted to Theodore Sider for what follows here.
24
See Sider (2001): 84-85. Phillip Bricker has pointed out to me that we can
also say that an entity is a time just in case it is a three dimensional spacelike hyper-
plane. Let us call the entities that I call times in the body of the text ‘ 1 -times’ and the
three dimensional spacelike hyper-planes ‘2-times’. On this proposal, 2-times simply
are certain spatiotemporal regions, specifically, those regions that are fusions of the
elements of some 1-time. Note that on this proposal, indexing parthood to a time
simply is indexing parthood to a region, since every time is a region of spacetime.
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This procedure is a modification of a proposal made by Theodore Sider in
Sider (2001): 84-85. According to Sider’s proposal, we begin by taking the notion x
overlaps y at spacetime point R as our mereological primitive. We then introduce a
time-frame indexed notion of parthood as follows:
X overlaps y at t at F - df. there is a spacetime point p in t at F such that x
overlaps y at p.
X is a part ofy at t at referenceframe F =df. everything that overlaps x at t at F
overlaps y at t at F.
I prefer my account of part at t at F over Sider’s account because it seems clear that
ordinary objects cannot be wholly present at spacetime points.
Since the perdurantist believes in an atemporal parthood relation, she can
provide definitions of these concepts that are (from her perspective) more perspicuous:
Xis an extended temporal part ofy at interval T =df. (1) x exists at every instant
in T and at no instant not in T, (2) x is a part ofy, and x overlaps everything that
is a part ofy' and that exists at t in T.
27
For arguments against coincidence, see Sider (2001): 140-208.
28
It may be that some endurantists wish to deny this; perhaps they hold that if
some object occupies regions rl and r2, then it occupies the union of these regions as
well. This additional claim seems gratuitous, and is certainly not an essential part of the
view.
29
This appears to be Lewis’s position as well. See Lewis (1997b): 227.
30
For a defense of Parsonian extended simples, see Parsons (2000).
31
Although Lewis is willing if need be to admit in his ontology either tropes or
universal, he is officially neutral on whether they exist. See Lewis (1997a).
T9
Alex Oliver stresses this point throughout Oliver (1993).
33
Although it is hard to adequately characterize this view, it is clear what some
of its implications are. One clear consequence of this view is that it is impossible for
two non-identical things to be made of the same parts. On composition as identity, see
Lewis (1991): 81-87, Sider (forthcoming), and van Inwagen (1994).
34 One way to save the claim that composition is identity is to hold that identity
is also temporally relative. On this view, see Gallois (1998).
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CHAPTER 2
A DEFENSE OF THE BRUTAL VIEW OF SIMPLES
2.1 Introduction
An object is a simple if and only if it has no proper parts, (x is a proper part ofy
just in case x is a part ofy but x is not identical to y.) This is a definition of the word
“simple,” not a substantive criterion for being a simple. The Simple Question asks
“under what circumstances is an object a simple?” 1 An answer to the Simple Question
is an informative instance of the following schema:
Necessarily, x is a simple if and only if .
In other words, an answer to the Simple Question must provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for being a simple, and it must not employ a mereological term on
the right-hand side of the biconditional. An answer to the Simple Question is a
substantive criterion for being a simple.
I will argue that there is no correct, finitely stateable, and non-circular answer to
the Simple Question. There is no non-mereological criterion for being a simple. I call
this view the Brutal View.
My argument for the Brutal View is indirect and hence somewhat shaky. I argue
that every reasonable answer to the Simple Question faces serious objections.
Consequently, the Brutal View is the only view left standing. In section 2.2, 1 motivate
the quest to answer the Simple Question and briefly describe the space of possible
answers. In sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, 1 present arguments against the competitors
of the
Brutal View. In section 2.6, 1 respond to arguments against the Brutal View.
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2.2 The Simple Question
Why care about the Simple Question? First, issues involving the nature of
simplicity are not independent of other concerns in the metaphysics of material objects.
Philosophical puzzles concerning material constitution have received a deserved share
of the attention of contemporary philosophers; much of it focused on what Peter van
Inwagen has dubbed the Special Composition Question, which is: what are the
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that some objects must meet in order to
compose a single object? Ned Markosian, the philosopher to whom we owe gratitude
for raising the Simple Question, notes the connection between these two questions in the
following passage:
simples are the basic building blocks that, when combined in various ways,
make up all other objects. Thus it is natural to think that what we say about the
nature of simples will have considerable bearing on what we say in response to
the Special Composition Question. [Markosian (1998a): 214].
To see that Markosian is correct, let us consider a radical answer to the Special
Composition Question called Nihilism
3
Nihilism is the view that, necessarily, nothing
is a composite object. Nihilism obviously conflicts with common sense concerning
what objects exist, since one consequence of Nihilism is that there are no such things as
tables, rocks, and living human organisms.
4
But the advocate of Nihilism at least agrees
with common sense that there are material objects. However, given Nihilism, these must
be mereological simples. If it turns out that nothing could satisfy what it takes to be a
simple, or even if nothing in fact does satisfy what it takes to be a simple, then Nihilism
is refuted.
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That the Special Composition Question is an interesting question is established
by the fact that so many metaphysicians are interested in it. Since answering the Simple
Question could shed light on the Special Composition Question, we should be interested
in it as well.
Second, an answer to the Simple Question could help us decide whether
atomless gunk is possible. An object is gunk just in case every part of it has proper
parts. There are longstanding debates about whether gunk is possible. The question of
the possibility of gunk is also relevant to answering the special composition question;
recently, Theodore Sider has argued that certain answers to the Special Composition
Question are false because they rule out the possibility of gunk. [Sider (1993)].
Additionally, Dean Zimmerman has argued that certain theories about the nature of
masses are ruled out given the possibility of atomless gunk. [Zimmerman (1995)]. If
gunk is impossible, then these arguments have no force. An answer to the Simple
Question may help us assess these arguments.
Another strange and putatively possible kind of object that has attracted its share
of defenders is the extended simple. An object is an extended simple just in case it is
extended in space (or spacetime) and yet lacks proper parts.
5
Speculation about the
possibility of extended simples is not confined to philosophy. In a recent article, Mark
Scala presents evidence that Isaac Newton believed that the fundamental objects of this
world are extended simples. [Scala (2002): 394].
6 And, more recently, in a popular
book on string theory, the physicist Brian Greene seriously entertains the possibility that
fundamental physics will imply the existence of extended simples:
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What are strings made of? There are two possible answers to this question. First,
strings are truly fundamental- they are "atoms", uncuttable constituents, in the truest
sense of the ancient Greeks. As the absolute smallest constituents of everything, they
represent the end of the line. .. From this perspective, even though strings have spatial
extent, the question of their composition is without any content. Were strings to be
made of something smaller, they would not be fundamental. [Greene (1999): 141],
If we had an answer to the Simple Question, this presumably would help us determine
whether extended simples are possible. (In chapter three, I provide an extended defense
of the possibility of extended simples.)
So we should agree with Markosian that an examination of the Simple Question
is relevant to an examination of the Special Composition Question. Moreover, it is an
interesting question in its own right. Markosian should be commended for raising it.
I will argue that there is no correct, finitely stateable, non-trivial answer to the
•y
Simple Question. I call this view the Brutal View ofSimples.
It is not part of the Brutal View that there are no informative necessary
conditions on being a simple. In fact, I believe that there are. But there are no
informative conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for being a simple. I
distinguish the Brutal View from the claim that, for any simple S, it is a brute fact that S
is a simple. We can call the latter view the Brutal View ofFacts about Simplicity
(BFS). If there are informative sufficient conditions for being a simple, then BFS is
false. But, as long as these sufficient conditions are not necessary conditions, then the
8
Brutal View is unthreatened by the falsity of BFS.
It is also not part of the Brutal View that there are no features that are
contingently correlated with being a simple. It is my hope that there are. But, whatever
they are, it is up to empirical science and not a priori philosopy to discover
them.
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Still, it is unfortunate that the Brutal View is true. For the Brutal View sheds no
light on the question of whether atomless gunk is possible, whereas other answers to the
Simple Question appear to. And the Brutal View provides us with no help with the
question of whether extended simples are possible, whereas other answers to the Simple
Question have something to say about the possibility of extended simples. The Brutal
View does not tell us that atomless gunk or extended simples are possible, and it does
not tell us that they are impossible.
Although the Brutal View of Simples is a dissatisfying answer to the Simple
Question for these reasons, I believe that there is a compelling reason to embrace it: the
competitors to the Brutal View face problems serious enough to warrant rejecting them.
If this is the case, the Brutal View is the only game in town.
What are the competitors to the Brutal View? As I see things, the other main
players are the following:
(a) spatial accounts
( 1 ) The Pointy View ofSimples (PV)
(2) The Maximally Continuous View ofSimples (MaxCon)
(b) fundamentality accounts
(3) The Instance ofa Fundamental Property View ofSimples (Instance)
(4) The Independence View ofSimples (Independence)
(c) indivisibility accounts
(5) The Physically Indivisible View ofSimples (PIV)
(6) The Revised Metaphysically Indivisible View of
Simples (MIV)
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In section 2.3, 1 present and argue against the spatial accounts 9 In section 2.4,
1
present and argue against the fundamentality accounts. In section 2.5, 1 present and
argue against the indivisibility accounts.
2.3 Spatial Accounts of Simplicity
2.3.1 General Objections to the Spatial Accounts of Simplicity
As the name suggests, spatial accounts of simplicity appeal to spatial features to
provide a criterion of simplicity. The two most promising spatial accounts are:
The Pointy View of Simples (PV): necessarily, x is a simple if and only if x is a point-
sized object.
The Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon): necessarily, x is a simple if
and only if x is a maximally continuous object. 10
According to the Pointy View, simples are all and only point-sized objects. If
you want to make a simple, create a point-sized object. (Don’t ask me how to do that!)
The Pointy View is probably the traditional view of the nature of simples.
The Pointy View has two interesting features. First, if material objects without
point-sized parts are possible, then the Pointy View implies that gunk is possible.
[Markosian (1998a): 216], Second, the Pointy View clearly implies that extended
simples are impossible.
MaxCon is not for traditionalists! Given MaxCon, if you want to make a
material simple, here is the recipe you should follow. First, pick the region of space that
you want the simple to exactly occupy. Let us call that region “R”. If R is a continuous
region of space, then proceed to the next step. Otherwise, start again. Assuming that R
is a continuous region of space, completely fill R with matter; make sure that there is no
subregion of R where matter cannot be found. Finally, make sure that R is not part of
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some larger continuous region of space that is also filled with matter. If it is not, then R
now contains a material simple.
Presumably, R can be any size or any shape; the only constraint on R is that it be
occupiable by a material object. Given MaxCon, there can be extended simples of any
shape or size .
11 What about gunk? If MaxCon is true, then gunk is impossible
.
12
MaxCon is a stunningly unorthodox answer to the Simple Question.
Note that spatial accounts of simplicity at most provide an account of when
objects that can have spatial properties, such as material objects or regions of space, are
simples. But, as noted in chapter one, we seem to ascribe parts to other kinds of
objects as well. We ascribe part-whole structure to events : the third inning was the best
part of the baseball game; to arguments : the weakest part of the argument is where he
confuses numerical and qualitative identity; to intervals of time: this morning was the
best part of the day. Moreover, it seems as though we can conceive of simple
immaterial objects. For example, many theists believe that God is immaterial and
simple. It seems that this position is coherent. Similarly, Descartes argued that he is an
immaterial substance without parts.
If one accepts that the concept of parthood is univocal and universal, then one
might hope for a unified account of what it is to be a simple, one that simples from
every ontological category could meet. Although it would be nice to have a non-
disjunctive account of simplicity that could apply to entities from every ontological
category, I suspect that this is too much to hope for, even given that the concept of
parthood is univocal and universal. The Pointy View could explain why some regions ol
space or spacetime are simples, in addition to why some material objects are simples,
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possibly it could also explain why certain events are simples. But the Pointy View has
no clear application to other categories. MaxCon is hopeless as an account of the
simplicity of spatial or spatiotemporal regions, and it is implausible if it is expanded so
as to apply to events. At best, MaxCon provides a criterion of physical simplicity. 14
So, for now, we restrict the scope of our inquiry. Let us focus on the question of
when a material object is a simple. If some answer to the Simple Question seems
capable of providing a non-disjunctive account of simplicity simpliciter
,
we will note
that.
The main argument against spatial accounts of simplicity is based on the
possibility of co-located point-sized objects. 15 Two objects are co-located if they
exactly occupy the same region of space (at the same time). 16 The argument is as
follows: (1) co-located point-sized objects are possible; (2) if co-located point-sized
objects are possible, then mereologically complex point-sized objects are also possible.
i n
But then both the Pointy View and MaxCon are false.
There are several ways someone could motivate the premises of this argument.
First, there is the argument from speculative ontology: one might claim that even point-
sized objects have their properties as parts. D.M. Armstrong distinguishes two
conceptions of particulars: a “thin” conception, according to which a particular is
“bare”, and a “thick” conception of particulars, according to which particulars are
“clothed.” [Armstrong (1997): 60, 94-96]. According to the thick conception of
particulars, particulars literally have their properties as constituents. On this conception
1
8
of particulars, even point-sized thick particulars have parts.
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Armstrong’s views on particulars and properties are controversial, and 1 don’t
want to rest my case on them. Accordingly, let us consider a second reason to believe
premise one, which is the argument from conceivability. We can form a clear and
distinct conception of co-located material objects; they are conceivable. This gives us a
reason to believe that they are possible.
19
For example, we can imagine two different
kinds of matter that are capable of interpenetrating.
We need not base the case for the conceivability of co-located objects on the
strange thought experiments of a philosopher. There is an interesting debate in the
philosophy of quantum mechanics about whether bosons
,
a kind of fundamental
particle, are counter-examples to the Identity of Indiscemibles. 20 Bosons are
counterexamples to this law only if two or more of them can be at the same place at the
same time. Peter Simons, in a recent paper on the bundle theory of objects, makes the
point nicely:
Fermions, which include electrons, are characterized by [properties] which obey the
Pauli Exclusion Principle : no two fermions can be in exactly the same state. Thus the
reason that a helium atom may have two electrons in its innermost shell is that their
spins are in opposite directions, so they differ in one [property] (maybe a second-order
[property]: spin-direction). ... The other sort of particles are bosons. They do not
obey the Pauli Principle, and so two or more bosons can be in the same state at the
same time, in particular they can be in the same place at once and not differ in any
[property] at all. If electrons were bosons, they could all three occupy the same space
around a lithium nucleus. The most familiar bosons are photons, and it is their
superposability in large numbers that makes lasers possible. [Simons (1994): 379-
380].
21
I am no expert on quantum physics, so I am unable to evaluate Simons’s claim
here. But I am not trying to argue that co-located objects are actual. What this example
shows is that co-located material objects are conceivable, and even play a role in certain
physical theories. And this provides a reason to think that they are metaphysically
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possible. It may be that at the end of the day speculative physics will postulate co-
located material objects. It seems to me that we should not disregard this possibility a
priori. That both spatial accounts of simplicity do eliminate this possibility a priori is
problematic.
Finally, there is the argument from systematic modal metaphysics: the mere
metaphysical possibility of co-located objects follows from familiar Humean principles
involving the denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. Suppose two
point-particles are approaching each other at a rapid clip. If co-located material objects
are impossible, then they must swerve out of each other’s way. Or they must stop dead
in their tracks. Or one of them must spontaneously disintegrate. Some event must
occur in each world that prohibits them from occupying the same space. There is a de
re necessary repulsion between these two objects. The price of denying the possibility
of co-located objects is accepting brute de re modal facts like these. The price is too
high.
22
The state of affairs in which an object x occupies a particular region of space R
(at t) is distinct from the state of affairs in which an object y occupies the same region
(at the same time). From the fact that the first state of affairs obtains, we can infer
nothing about the location ofy. Both states of affairs obtain contingently. If any
recombination of distinct, contingent states of affairs yields a genuine possibility, as I
am inclined to hold, then there are possible worlds at which both x and y occupy R (at
t)
23
Why believe premise (2), which says that if co-located objects are possible, then
so are objects composed of them? Suppose that in some possible world two
point-sized
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objects occupy the same region of space. Then it also seems possible that there be a
thing made out of those objects. For example, suppose the two objects always move
together because they are held by a fundamental physical force. Surely there are
possible worlds in which the laws of nature guarantee this sort of interaction. If this
scenario arose, we would be tempted to say that the two objects were “joined together,”
“bonded,” or “fused.” In such a case, one would be hard pressed to say that they do not
compose something. I suspect only the mereological nihilist could resist this pressure.
But, if the objects do compose something, then this composite object is a counter-
example to the spatial accounts of simplicity.
24
One more remark on co-location before I move on. I am inclined to accept that
the following is a sufficient condition for being a simple: being point-sized and not co-
located with any other point-sized object. Given this, some point-sized objects might be
simples in virtue of having this property.
25
But it is not a necessary condition on being a
simple. For the two co-located simples that composed the counter-example to the
spatial accounts are still simple, despite their being co-located.
2.3.2 Special Problems for MaxCon
MaxCon is an interesting view. It faces interesting objections over and above
those facing the Pointy View. I will now discuss a series of these objections.
2.3.3 MaxCon in a Relativistic Setting
MaxCon was first introduced and defended by Ned Markosian in Markosian
(1998a). We should note that when explicating MaxCon, Markosian presupposed a
controversial view about how objects persist through time, endurantism.
Recall that,
roughly, endurantism is the view that material objects persist
through time by being
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wholly present at each instant at which they exist. According to the standard account of
endurantism, the parthood relation has an extra “argument place” for times .26
Accordingly, given endurantism, the primitive parthood relation is x is a proper part of
y at t.
But, as I argued in chapter one, strictly speaking, the endurantist should index
parthood to spacetime regions, not to times, because of considerations stemming from
special relativity. How does this fact change our evaluation of MaxCon?
The formulation of MaxCon given in the previous section employs the notion of
a continuous region of space. But some scientists and philosophers have argued that
one consequence of the special theory of relativity is that space and time as commonly
conceived simply do not exist; there is no enduring manifold of spatial points. Strictly
speaking, there are no times or spatial points; the zero-dimensional entities at our world
are space-time points. If these scientists and philosophers are correct, how are we to
understand MaxCon? And are there special difficulties facing the MaxConist stemming
from special relativity?
It is beyond my competence to answer the second question authoritatively. Here
I present and discuss what I take to be the two obvious ways of formulating an analogue
ofMaxCon in a relativistic setting. Let us begin by asking what counts as a continuous
region of space given special relativity. Nothing simpliciter. But there may be
continuous regions of space according to a referenceframe, where continuous regions
of space may be thought of as follows. Relative to some reference frame, all points
of
space-time divide into equivalence classes that may be thought ot as times (since
simultaneity is a three-place relation between two events and a frame of
reference). Any
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subset of any of these equivalence classes of space-time points (at some reference
frame) may be thought of as a region of space (at that reference frame). A continuous
region of space, relative to frame F, may then be thought of as any continuous region of
spacetime, such that every member of the region is simultaneous with every other,
relative to F. We can now formulate a relativistic version of MaxCon:
SR-MaxCon: Necessarily, x is a simple at t according to reference frame F if
and only if x is a maximally continuous object at t according to reference frame
F.
This formulation of MaxCon seems consistent and available to the MaxConist.
It is admittedly strange that being a simple (and accordingly, the parthood relation) is
relativized to both a time and a frame of reference, but perhaps this is merely another
consequence of grafting the endurantist perspective of persistence through time onto this
philosophical account of the theory of special relativity. It is, however, worrisome that
parthood is being indexed to “times” and “frames of reference” in this fashion, since
both kinds of entity are not fundamental.
The second way to modify MaxCon to accommodate special relativity is to take
a maximally continuous object to be one that occupies a continuous region oi space-
time. We define what it is for an object to be maximally continuous as follows:
x is a maximally continuous object —df x is a spatiotemporally continuous object
and there is no continuous region of space-time, R, such that (i) the region
occupied by x is a proper subset of R, and (ii) every point in R falls within some
object or other.
We now state the spatiotemporal analogue of MaxCon:
4DMaxCon: Necessarily, x is a simple if and only if x is a maximally
continuous object.
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Although 4DMaxCon is the more natural way for the MaxConist to
accommodate special relativity, it is in some ways more problematic. I have two
worries about 4DMaxCon. First, let me introduce the concept of a spanner. Roughly, a
spanner is a spatially continuous object that persists through a continuous interval of
time. Less roughly:
An object x is a spanner =df (i) for any reference frame F, the set of times at F at
which x is present is a non-instantaneous continuous interval and (ii) x is a
spatially continuous object at every time at F for which x is present.
My first worry about 4DMaxCon is that it may be that the fundamental physical
particles studied by physicists, e.g., the electrons, quarks, etc, are spanners. Even if they
are not, there clearly are possible worlds where the fundamental physical particles are
spanners. According to 4DMaxCon, spanners are simples. Assume for a moment a
generous mereology, such that for any collection of objects, the xs, there is ay such that
y is the mereological fusion of the xs. Even granting such a generous mereology, there
is no room for human persons in worlds in which the fundamental physical particles are
spanners and have lifetimes relevantly similar to those in the actual world. There are
only particles and fusions of particles; there are no particle slices, i.e., proper
(spatio)temporal parts of particles, to compose shorter-lived human persons or persons
relevantly similar to human ones in these worlds, since the temporally extended
fundamental particles are simples. Since some of the close possible worlds containing
spanners (perhaps including the actual world) also clearly contain human persons,
4DMaxCon must be false.
Here is my second worry about 4DMaxCon. Let us pick an arbitrary reference
frame F according to which there are times tl and t2. Imagine that at time tl two
81
homogenous portions of the same kind of matter fill continuous non-overlapping spatial
regions. The two portions of matter move closer together until at t2 the union of the
spatial regions occupied by the portions of matter is spatially continuous. After t2, the
portions of matter go their separate ways, never to intersect again. Surely we would
describe a possible world in which this occurred as one that contained (at least) two
objects. However, if4DMaxCon is correct then there is only one object in the story,
since the spatiotemporal region occupied by the portions of matter in the story is
continuous. Since this seems false, there is reason to worry that 4DMaxCon is not the
correct account of what a simple is.
These worries are reasons to prefer SR-MaxCon to 4DMaxCon. However,
given that I do not see any serious worries for SR-MaxCon over and above the worries
that I will raise concerning MaxCon, I will henceforth ignore the more complicated
relativistic formulations ofMaxCon and instead address their simpler and more intuitive
• 28
cousin.
2.3.4 The Problem of Spatial Intrinsics
As I see things, the main philosophical objection facing MaxCon is an argument
that I call the Problem ofSpatial Intrinsics. Suppose that there are two extended
simples, A and B, such that they both occupy non-overlapping cubical regions of space.
A and B have the same volume.
Let us say that a property P isfundamental just in case there are no other
properties or relations such that P is instantiated in virtue of those properties being
instantiated. A and B are not qualitative duplicates, for A has a fundamental intrinsic
property, which I will call redness , whereas B has a different fundamental intrinsic
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property, which I will call blueness. Suppose that A and B move closer together until at
time t they come into perfect contact . 29 Now the union of the regions of space occupied
by A and B is a continuous region. (Suppose also that this region is not a subregion of a
larger, continuous, matter-filled region.) If MaxCon is true, then at time t, A and B are
destroyed, and a new simple, which I will unimaginatively call “C”, comes into being.
Why do I describe the case this way? If either A or B survive, then the survivor
must be identical with C. It is not the case that both A and B survive for their doing so
would imply a denial of the transitivity of identity. It would be highly arbitrary for the
MaxConist to claim that one survives and not the other. Could the MaxConist claim
that A, B, and C each exist at t but that C does not have A and B as parts? This seems
highly implausible. First, if either A or B exists at t (and is not identical to C), then
TO
given MaxCon, they now have an infinity of parts.
What is C like? What are C’s properties? There is pressure to say that C is blue
at some subregion R and red at a distinct region, R * It seems reasonable to talk like
this, provided that the spatial indexes on the instantiations of blueness and redness are
reducible. That is, we could make sense of the idea of an object having a property at a
region if we could analyze this as follows:
X has F at R just in case there is some y such that y is a part of X, y
exactly occupies R, and y has F.
But this analysis is not available to the advocate of MaxCon. In the case just told, C is a
qualitatively heterogeneous extended simple. It does not have a part where it is blue;
instead, it is just blue there. How then should we understand the claim that C is blue at
R?
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This is the problem of spatial intrinsicis. It is analogous to the problem of
temporal intrinsics. Objects can enjoy different intrinsic properties at different times;
they enjoy temporal qualitative variation. Similarly, objects can enjoy spatial
qualitative variation by having different intrinsic properties at different regions of
space. They typically do this by having different spatial parts that have these properties
simpliciter. But an extended simple does not have spatial parts.
Markosian argues that the MaxConist should claim that, even though no object
survives in the contact case just mentioned, persisting matter or stuffdoes survive, and
this stuff instantiates these intrinsic properties. Markosian argues that the MaxConist
needs to appeal to stuffanyways, in order to accommodate other intuitions we have.
Recall that, when two maximally continuous objects come into contact, one of them
must be destroyed. This seems strange. Markosian writes:
the matter that constitutes each of the original [maximally continuous
objects] does not go out of existence simply because the two [objects]
have bumped up against each other. Thus here. . . it will be important for
the MaxConist to distinguish talk of objects from talk of matter, and
appeal to the latter in satisfying certain intuitions that cannot otherwise
be reconciled with them. [Markosian (1998a): 226].
However, I am suspicious about certain applications of this strategy. Given
MaxCon, not only is it possible that there be simples of strange shapes and sizes
(imagine a planet-sized simple), but there can be simples of terrific complexity as well.
Not mereological complexity, since simples have no proper parts, but MaxCon does not
rule out the possibility of a simple exactly occupying a region filled with a vast
multitude of stuffs of various kinds. Consider: although persons are not constituted by
continuous stuffs, surely such persons are possible provided the arrangement ol the
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matter that fills the regions occupied by such persons is suitably complex and
functionally integrated. Thus, given MaxCon, it is possible that there be persons who
are mereologically simple. Suppose that two of these simple people come into contact.
Given our earlier discussion, we should believe that at least one of these persons is
destroyed (perhaps both are). I find that my intuition that such persons are not destroyed
by contact to be so strong that it is not satisfied with the claim that the matter that
formerly filled the regions occupied by them is not destroyed. Perhaps the two persons
are concluding what has been a heated philosophical debate; surely, these persons could
safely shake hands and say ‘good bye’ without also saying their last good-byes. So it is
not clear to me that appealing to matter or stuff always helps. 31
How might an appeal to matter or stuff help with responding to the problem of
spatial intrinsics? Markosian holds that, given a commitment to irreducible stuff, we
can analyze claims of the form x is F at region R in terms of the properties of this stuff:
x is F at R just in case either (i) x has a part, y, such that y is located at R
and y is F or (ii) there is some stuff that constitutes x and some portion of
that stuff is located at R and is F.
Adopting this analysis will allow the MaxConist to avoid the problem of spatial
intrinsics. However, in a very strict sense, the spatially indexed properties had by
extended simples are had in virtue of properties had by no things at all?
1
An object exactly occupies some region of space. Some matter exactly fills that
same region of space. What is the relationship between the matter that fills a region and
the object that occupies that region?
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I say that the object just is the matter that exactly fills the region it occupies. (On
this issue, see McDaniel (2003a).) Matter as Markosian conceives it seems to be very
thing-like, it can fall under different kinds, instantiate properties, change position in
space, persist through time, and undergo change; moreover, matter always comes in
thing-like portions. In order for talk about matter to do the work that Markosian wants
it to do, we need the resources of quantification over portions of matter. Why don’t they
count as things?
However, a thing/stuff dualism is exactly what the MaxConist seems compelled
to endorse. We have seen that the MaxConist is committed to claiming that talk about
matter is not always translatable into talk about things. 33 But, if the truth-value of
statements about the persistence through time of matter can vary independently from the
truth-value of statements about the persistence through time of the objects that exactly
occupy the same region filled by the matter, then it must be that the reason that talk
about matter is not translatable into talk about things is that matter and thing are
independent ontological categories, irreducible to each other.
It is this kind of dualism that was rejected in the introduction. The world is a
world of things, not a world of stuff and things. So I find this way of dealing with the
problem of spatial intrinsics unacceptable.
However, there are other possible responses to dealing with the problem of
spatial intrinsics. Let us now turn to them.
One possibility is to claim that the instantiation relation is actually a three-place
relation between an object, a property, and a place. This strategy is analogous to the
first kind of adverbalist strategy discussed and rejected in the introduction. I reject it as
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well. A better way to implement this strategy is to hold that there are many distinct
instantiation relations. There is no single relation of instantiation; there is more than
one way in which an object can have a property. Some objects, such as extended
simples, have their properties in a spatial kind of way; other entities, such as numbers,
have their properties in an aspatial way. Both of these kinds of instantiation relation
will need to be taken as irreducible, since it is clear that the MaxConist cannot analyze
talk of instantiation-at-a-region in terms of ‘just plain instantiation’, parthood and
location. So, on this view, for each region of space R, there is a relation instantiates-at-
R?4
This is analogous to the second way of being an adverbalist. And, as before, my
main complaint with this view is that I do not understand it. I reject this claim as well.
Fortunately, there is another way to understand the claim that C is F at R. We
could take this claim to be an attribution to C of a relational property, being such as to
stand in the F relation to R. Alternatively, we could take this claim to assert that a two-
place relation, Fness
,
obtains between C and R. On the first account, we are attributing
a property to C, but it is a relational property. On the second account, we are claiming
that a relation, not a property, obtains between C and R. On either account, we are not
mentioning the property that we mentioned when we said that, at tl, A has F. I will
address the latter option in what follows, although I don’t think much turns on this
choice.
Recall our example. A is red at tl, B is blue at tl
,
and at t2, A and B come into
perfect contact. They are destroyed at t2 and replaced by C. At t2, nothing is blue and
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nothing is red. But C exists, and it bears the red-at relation to R1 and the blue-at
relation to R2. 35
One worry about this strategy is that, since the relation of being red-at is not
identical to the property of being red, we might worry whether the relationalist is
allowed to give them such similar sounding names. Why is the relationalist justified in
calling the blue-at relation by that name, when it is not identical to the property of being
blue?
I do not think that this is a major problem for the view. If the relation being red
at plays a role in the laws of nature that is similar to the role that is played by the
property being red, then the relationalist is justified in giving them similar-sounding
names. For example, suppose that, whenever we see a red object in conditions S, we
have a particular kind of perceptual experience E. Moreover, whenever we see an
object that is red-at a region while in conditions similar to S, we have a token of E.
(And this is what explains why C looks like it has a red part, even though it does not.)
If enough of these similarities exist, then it is not unreasonable that the relationalist
gives them similar- sounding names. The relation and the property behave in very
similar ways.
The relationalist’ s strategy is coherent. I think I understand how it works, since I
understand instantiation, and I believe in relations, regions of space, and material
objects. So I have no problem understanding how there could be relations between a
material object and a region that figure in the laws of nature in the way that the
relationalist’s strategy requires. My main worry is that the relationalist’ s story does
not save MaxCon from the worry I raised at the beginning of this section.
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Let us distinguish those intrinsic properties that are qualitative from those that
are, broadly speaking, geometrical. An example of a qualitative property is charge
;
an
example of a geometrical property is being shaped like a box. On the assumption that
the shape properties of material objects are intrinsic properties, then there is some
change of intrinsic properties whenever two objects come into contact, since when that
occurs, different shape properties become instantiated
.
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But it is not obvious that there
must be some change in whichfundamental qualitative intrinsic properties are
instantiated when two objects come in contact.
Imagine a possible world in which two objects that differ with respect to their
fundamental qualitative intrinsic properties approach each other until they stand in
perfect contact. Let us consider intrinsic properties A and B which are such that it is
nomologically impossible that they are instantiated by the same object. You can do this;
I described a scenario in which this occurs at the beginning of this section. Now
consider a possible world in which the laws of nature are such that merely bringing two
objects into perfect contact with one another is not sufficient to bring about either the
instantiation of a new fundamental qualitative intrinsic property or the non-instantiation
of a fundamental qualitative intrinsic property that was previously instantiated. I think
that you can do this as well. But, if MaxCon is correct, there is no such world.
For when the things bearing A and B come into contact, there is nothing to bear
A or B. Given MaxCon, the original objects that bore A and B no longer exist, since
they have been destroyed by coming into contact with each other. The resultant object
cannot instantiate both of these properties, since, by hypothesis, they are nomologically
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incompatible. And these properties cannot be instantiated without being instantiated by
something!
My intuition that there are possible worlds of the sort just described - and ruled
out by MaxCon - is not satisfied by the claim that, in the worlds in which contact
occurs, relations between objects and regions - relations that figure in laws similar to
those that governed the properties that are dissipated by contact - are suddenly
instantiated. I grant that this could happen; there are worlds in which it does.38 But
none of those worlds is the one that I was imagining, and it is also a possible world.
Since MaxCon implies that it is not, I reject MaxCon.
2.4 Fundamental Accounts of Simplicity
Both of the views that I wish to discuss here tie simplicity to some ultimate
feature of objects. They are:
The Instance of a Fundamental Property View of Simples (Instance): x is a simple
if and only if* instantiates a perfectly natural property. 39
Th-e Independence View of Simples (Independence): x is a simple if and only if it is
metaphysically possible that jc is the only material object that exists.
I will examine Instance first. In order to properly state Instance, I need to invoke
some controversial metaphysical machinery. I assume the existence ofperfectly natural
properties .
40
It is these properties that ground objective similarity, if two things
instantiate the same perfectly natural property, then they are objectively similar in that
respect; duplicates are objects such that there is a 1-1 correspondence between their
parts that preserves perfectly natural properties (and perfectly natural relations).
Whether two things are objectively similar is metaphysically independent of our
interests, desires, beliefs, or classificatory schemes.
41
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Once we have the concept of a natural property, we can define other useful
concepts. [Lewis (1986): 62-63]. Intrinsic properties are properties that never differ
between duplicates; ifA and B are duplicates and A has intrinsic property F, then so
does B. External relations do not supervene on the qualitative character of their relata;
however, they do supervene on the qualitative character of the fusion of the relata.
External relations should be contrasted with extrinsic relations, which do not even
supervene on the qualitative character of the fusion of their relata. An example of an
extrinsic relation is ownership. Ownership does not supervene simply on the qualitative
character of the owner and the owned; instead, it supervenes on that character taken
along with the various social facts that accompany it.
The perfectly natural properties (and relations) are those that are both required
and jointly suffice to provide a complete description of the world. [Lewis (1986): 60],
The distribution of every other property supervenes on the distribution of the perfectly
properties (and relations); the perfectly natural properties (and relations) are the minimal
supervenience base of every world. 42
Instance ties together the concepts of simplicity and naturalness. According to
Instance, an object is a simple if and only if it instantiates a perfectly natural property.
There is an initial worry about Instance that I want to mention and then ignore.
Recent work in the metaphysics of properties has caused a revival of interest in so-
called bundle theories of particulars, according to which particulars are bundles of
properties. There are two natural ways to understand the bundling relation: we can
identify bundles with sets of properties or with mereological fusions of properties. If
the bundle theory of particulars is true, then fundamental particles are not simples.
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Instead, they have properties as parts. The best candidates for being simple on this view
are the fundamental properties themselves
.
43
This is an interesting worry about
Instance, but, as I said, I want to table this worry. For we would need to resolve a long-
standing debate between advocates of the bundle theory of particulars and defenders of
the substance-attribute view of particulars in order to address this worry
.
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This would
be a task too large for this chapter .
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Instance is a theory about the nature of material simples that is also in principle
capable of answering the fully general Simple question, which is: under what
circumstance is an entity (of any ontological category) a simple? As I discussed earlier,
for any category of entity we care to include in our ontology, it makes sense to divide
the entities in that category into those that are simple and those that are complex.
Accordingly, it would be nice to have a unified and fully general account of what it is to
be a simple simpliciter. Theories that characterize simples in terms of spatial (or
spatiotemporal) concepts cannot provide a unified account of the nature of all simples.
This is because not every entity has spatial or spatiotemporal features. Similar remarks
apply to accounts that characterize simples in terms of indivisibility.
However, the concept of having a natural property is not a concept that
necessarily applies only to material objects, for it is possible that there are natural
properties that are had by non-physical objects. For example, certain psychological
properties might be perfectly natural. (In fact, I hold that this is the case.) Cartesian
spirits, which are paradigmatic examples of non-physical objects, could have these
properties. Accordingly, Instance is in a better position to provide a unified account of
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simplicity than spatially based accounts. In this respect, Instance is superior to spatially
based accounts like the Pointy View or MaxCon, or divisibility accounts.
The main case for Instance is based on the intuition had by many that the
properties of wholes are strongly dependent on the properties and relations of their
proper parts. For some properties of wholes, that there is this kind of dependence is
obvious, e.g., the shape of a complex material object is fixed by the shapes of its parts
and the spatial relations obtaining between those parts. But some people have the
intuition that this kind of dependence holds for every intrinsic property of a whole. The
following principle is a way of formally stating this kind of dependence:
(PWD): For every object* and all objects ys such that* is the fusion of theys,
and for all worlds wl and w2, if each of theys has the same intrinsic properties
in wl as it has in w2, and the ys stand in the same relations to each other in wl as
they do in w2, then * has intrinsic property F in wl if and only if* has F in w2 46
In other words, given PWD, a whole cannot enjoy intrinsic variation across possible
worlds unless either one of its proper parts enjoys intrinsic variation across possible
worlds or its proper parts change with respect to the relations that they bear to each
other.
I will now argue that, if you like PWD, you have some reason to like Instance.
My first premise is a Humean principle to the effect that there are no necessary
connections between the instantiations of the perfectly natural properties of contingent
beings.
47
For example, if (1) * is not identical withy, (2) * has F and y has G, (3)* and
y are contingently existing material objects and (4) F and G are perfectly natural
properties, then there is a possible world in which both * and y exist, but in which * has
F and y does not have G. More generally, the instantiation of any perfectly natural
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property or relation by contingently existing beings is metaphysically independent of the
instantiation of any perfectly natural property or relation by other contingent beings.
Suppose that there is a complex material object x that instantiates a perfectly
natural property F. Because F is perfectly natural, its instantiation is independent of the
instantiation of other perfectly natural properties (for the Humean reason just given). So
there is a possible world in which all ofx’s proper parts have the same perfectly natural
properties and stand in the same perfectly natural relations, but in which x does not
instantiate F. Since F is perfectly natural, F is also an intrinsic property. Since x’s
proper parts all have the same perfectly natural properties and stand in the same
perfectly natural relations to each other, all ofx’s parts have the same intrinsic
properties. So there is a possible world in which all ofx’s proper parts have the same
intrinsic properties and stand in the same relations as they do in the actual world, but in
which x differs intrinsically. So our assumption that a complex object has a perfectly
natural property has led us to the conclusion that PWD is false.
So, at the very least, there is an argument from PWD for the claim that
instantiating a perfectly natural property is sufficient for being a simple. One can also
produce an argument for the claim that having a perfectly natural property is necessary
for being a simple. Its premises are straightforward. First, every object, whether simple
or complex, must have some intrinsic properties. Suppose that a simple x has an
intrinsic property P. Either P is itself a perfectly natural property, or it supervenes on
the perfectly natural properties and relations had by objects that are not identical with x,
or P supervenes on the perfectly natural properties had by x. If the first disjunct is true,
then x has a perfectly natural property. The second disjunct cannot be true, for if it
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were, then P would not be an intrinsic property; P would be an extrinsic property.48
This leaves the third disjunct. Obviously, if the third disjunct is true, then x has a
perfectly natural property. So, if every material object must have some intrinsic
properties, then having a perfectly natural property is necessary for being a simple. If
we conjoin these two results, we arrive at Instance: an object is a simple if and only if it
instantiates a perfectly natural property.
So an interesting case can be made for Instance. However, I reject the main
principle employed in the arguments above. Specifically, I reject PWD. Moreover, my
reason for rejecting PWD is also a reason for rejecting Instance.
I think that it is possible for mereologically complex objects to instantiate
perfectly natural properties. I think this because I think that some mereologically
complex objects actually instantiate perfectly natural properties. Specifically, I think
that I am a mereologically complex material object who instantiates perfectly natural
properties. I hold that certain mental properties, such as having a blue sensation or
being in pain, are perfectly natural properties, or, at the very least, supervene on
perfectly natural properties had by complex objects.
The argument that some phenomenal properties are perfectly natural is
reasonably straightforward, but, of course, very controversial. The first premise is that
there is a zombie world. A zombie world is a possible world that satisfies the following
conditions: (1) every fundamental particle that exists in the actual world exists in the
zombie world, (2) no fundamental particle exists in the zombie world that does not exist
in the actual world, (3) every fundamental particle has the same intrinsic properties in
the actual world as it has in the zombie world, (4) the fundamental particles stand in the
95
same external relations to each other in the zombie world as they do in the actual world,
and (5) nothing experiences episodes of phenomenal consciousness, such as having a
blue sensation or feeling pain, in the zombie world 49 I accept the first premise, because
I seem able to conceive of a situation in which everything is just alike at the microscopic
level, but in which no one enjoys qualitative experiences. (I also note that I am
presupposing that every fundamental particle is a mereological simple and that there are
no non-physical mereological simples such as Cartesian spirits.)
The second premise is that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties. I do
not know how to argue for this claim; it seems intuitive to me, although I acknowledge
that there is some controversy about whether it is true. 50
These two premises imply that PWD is false. If they are true, the case for
Instance has been undercut. Moreover, when supplemented with a third premise, they
provide a reason to reject Instance. The third premise is this: if zombie worlds are
possible, and phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties, then phenomenal
properties are perfectly natural properties or supervene on perfectly natural properties
had by mereologically complex objects. Since phenomenal properties are had by
complex wholes, these three premises imply the falsity of Instance.
Why believe the third premise? Recall that the distribution of every qualitative
property supervenes on the distribution of the perfectly natural properties and relations.
So there can’t be two worlds that differ qualitatively without differing with respect to
some perfectly natural property or relation. A zombie world is a world that differs
qualitatively from our world. So it must differ with respect to some perfectly natural
property or relation. But it does not differ with respect to any of the perfectly natural
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properties or relations that are instantiated by the fundamental particles. So it must
differ with respect to the perfectly natural properties had by some composite object. 51
So some composite object in the actual world must have a perfectly natural property that
is not had by a composite object in the zombie world. So a composite object in the
actual world has a perfectly natural property. This state of affairs is a counter-example
to Instance.
I have presupposed that mereologically complex material objects are the bearers
of phenomenal properties. But one could maintain Instance if one rejected this claim.
The existence of perfectly natural properties is not a problem for Instance if there exist
mereological simples that instantiate them. In fact, one could argue for the existence of
simple immaterial substances from the premises that (1) Instance is true, (2) being in
pain is a perfectly natural property, (3) something is in pain, and (4) no material simple
instantiates being in pain.
In general, Instance rules out the possibility of genuinely emergent properties.
This is a reason to be concerned. Independently of concerns stemming from the
philosophy of mind, it seems to me that we can conceive of situations in which perfectly
natural properties are instantiated by mereologically complex objects. Suppose, for
example, that physicists discover that bodies that appear to be particle-per-particle
duplicates nevertheless behave differently when in the presence of a third kind of thing.
That is, although A and B have the same sub-atomic structure, when in the presence of a
third object clearly qualitatively different from A and B, effect El is produced when A
is present, whereas effect E2 is produced when B is present. Suppose that these
physicists observe a large number of instances of this occurring. From a microphysical
97
perspective, all of these bodies appear to be duplicates. It is reasonable to think that
something else accounts for the difference in their behavior. 52 So, since nothing yet
discovered at the level of microphysics does, that difference must be a difference at the
macrophysical level. Some bodies must have a feature that others lack. In this kind of
case, scientists would be justified in postulating natural properties that are had by
macrophysical wholes, not their parts. Instance rules this kind of case out a priori.
A second argument against Instance involves the possibility of co-located
material objects. The argument is as follows: First, as I argued in section 2.2, co-
located point-sized material objects are possible. Second, an object composed of two
co-located point-sized objects is itself a point-sized object. This premise is obviously
true.
Third, being point-sized is a perfectly natural property. This is controversial.
Some philosophers think of points of space as a kind of logical or mathematical
construction. On their view, points of space may be identified with sequences of nested
spheres that “approach” them. In other words, on this view, points are limits of regions,
not real parts of space. Accordingly, no material object can exactly occupy them. I take
this worry seriously, but I can’t address it here. So I will simply assume that being
point-sized is a possible size for a material object to be and accordingly reject this
reason for denying premise three.
These premises straightforwardly imply that it is possible for a composite object
to have a perfectly natural property. This in turn implies that Instance is false.
Unfortunately, I cannot accept this argument as it stands. I will argue in chapter
three that the spatiotemporal properties of material objects are derivative of the
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spatiotemporal properties of the regions of spacetime they occupy. On this picture
being point-sized is a perfectly natural property of regions of spacetime. Objects are
point-sized in virtue of occupying point-sized regions. The argument just given doesn’t
work if this picture is correct. However, the picture itself is controversial, and if it must
be rejected, we can comfort ourselves by noting that we have a second argument against
Instance.
A related worry stems from the fact that many, if not all, of the fundamental
properties at the actual world are determinables. 54 For example, consider mass. It is
reasonable to think that mass is a fundamental property. However, objects such as my
body, this table, and the planet have mass. Should I conclude then that all of these
things are simples? Clearly not.
Strictly speaking, I hold that it is the determinates of mass that are the best
candidates for being perfectly natural. So perhaps this worry arises only if some, but not
all, of the determinates of mass are perfectly natural. We could call these determinates
thefundamental quantities of mass if we liked. If the fundamental quantities of mass
are had only by physical simples, whereas the non-perfectly natural determinates of
mass are had by complex material objects, then this particular version of the objection
would be circumvented.
There are two problems with this maneuver. First, it is not certain whether there
are fundamental quantities of mass in this sense. So this move is risky. Second, and
more damaging, it seems that this sort of maneuver does not work in other cases.
Consider, for example, charge. Being -1 charged is a fundamental quantity of charge if
any is. An electron, which is arguably a simple, has a charge of -1 . However, consider
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a negatively charged isotope that has a charge of
-1 because it has an extra electron. It
has a fundamental quantity of charge and hence instantiates a perfectly natural property.
This isotope is clearly not a simple. 55
Perhaps a way around this problem is to claim that the isotope has a charge of-1
derivatively, i.e., in virtue of the charge of its parts, and so on for the other quantities.
Likewise, in some sense, I inherit the mass that I have from the mass ofmy parts; my
mass is supervenient upon the mass of these objects, and likewise for the charge of the
isotope. We could revise Instance so that it takes account of this intuition:
Instance*: x is a simple if and only ifx instantiates a perfectly natural property
non-derivatively.
However, to say that an object has a property derivatively is to say that it has the
property in virtue of its parts having that property. So Instance* is actually circular; it
violates one of the constraints on being an answer to the Simple Question. (And, even if
there is a way around this worry, Instance* would still face the previously discussed
problems.)
Perhaps instead of moving to Instance*, the friend of Instance should instead
distinguish the property of having a net charge of -1 from the property of having a
charge of-1
.
56 An object has a net charge of -1 just in case the sum of the quantities of
charge of its proper parts is equal to -1 . According to this strategy, the isotope has a net
charge of-1 but it does not have the property of having a charge of-1 . If this strategy
is viable, this kind of counter-example to Instance fails. It’s not clear to me, however,
that the composite object does not have the property of having a charge of -1 as well
as the property of having a net charge of -1 . So I am unsure whether this move is
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successful. (And even if it is. Instance would still face the previously discussed
objections.)
This completes my case against Instance. I will now discuss:
The Independence View of Simples (Independence): x is a simple if and only if itis
metaphysically possible that x is the only material object that exists.
The idea that simples can be fully recombined finds its clearest statement in the
work of D.M. Armstrong in A Combinatorial Theory ofPossibility. In that book,
Armstrong develops an account of modality that implies that any simple can coexist
with any other simple. More relevantly, the theory developed there implies that, if
something is a simple, then it is metaphysically possible for it to exist alone. [Armstrong
( 1989): 37 -48 , 61 -62 ],
I endorse the Humean program in modal metaphysics, so I will not challenge the
claim that, if something is a simple, then it is metaphysically possible that it is the only
material object that exists. However, this is not to say that the claim will be acceptable
to all. Many philosophers claim that objects have their origins essentially. Suppose that
an electron was created as a result of the big bang. Suppose that the big bang would not
have happened had there not been an initial singularity, i.e., a point-sized object of
enormous density. If objects have their origins essentially, then our electron could not
have existed unless that singularity also existed. But nevertheless the electron is still an
excellent candidate for being a simple.
My first worry about Independence is that it seems that some composite objects
could satisfy the right hand-side of the biconditional. For consider a composite object
that could have been a simple. If this object could have been a simple, then it, like
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other simples, could have been the only material object in existence. 58 But then it
satisfies the right-hand side of the biconditional. But, since it is not actually a simple.
Independence is false.
The advocate of Independence can avoid this worry by revising her view as
follows:
Independence*: x is a simple if and only if there is a possible world w at which
(1) x is the only existing material object and (2) x instantiates an intrinsic
property P at the actual world if and only ifx instantiates P at w.
Independence* avoids the counter-example that plagued its ancestor. Perhaps a
composite object could have been a simple. But any object has a different intrinsic
character in worlds in which it is a simple than in worlds in which it is complex.
I am inclined to think that Independence* is true. I think that Independence*
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for being a simple. My worry is that
Independence* violates the non-circularity requirement on being an answer to the
Simple Question. Independence* appeals to the notion of an intrinsic property, and this
concept is partly mereological. Recall the definition of “intrinsic property”: a property
is intrinsic if and only if it never differs between duplicates. Now recall that the
analysis of duplication also appealed to the concept of parthood: x and y are duplicates if
and only if there is a 1-1 correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly
natural properties and relations. So Independence* may provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for being a simple, but Independence* is consistent with the Brutal
View. 59
This completes my case against Independence.
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Indivisibility Accounts of Simplicity
As the name suggests, Indivisibility accounts appeal to the concept of
indivisibility when answering the Simple Question. Markosian distinguishes two
accounts, which he calls:
The Physically Indivisible View of Simples (PIV): * is a simple if and only if it is not
physically possible to divide x.
The (Revised) Metaphysically Indivisible View of Simples (MIV): x is a simple if
and only if it is not metaphysically possible to divide x without first changing x’s
intrinsic properties. [Markosian (1998a): 220-221]. 60
My first worry about the Indivisibility accounts is that they appear to violate the
non-circularity condition on being an answer to the Simple Question. It seems that the
concept of divisibility cannot be explicated without appealing to mereological concepts
in the explication. Consider the following analysis of divisibility.
(Dl): x is divisible if and only if it is possible that there are objects y and z such
that (1) x is composed ofy and z and (2) the union of the regions occupied byy
and z is discontinuous.
Dl has two interesting features. First, it does not imply that divisible objects have
proper parts, but it does imply that divisible objects possibly have proper parts. Second,
Dl implies that divisible objects can survive division. A different account of divisibility
that does not have these features is:
(D2): x is divisible if and only if there are objects y and z such that (1) x is
composed ofy and z and (2) it is possible that the union of the regions occupied
by y and z is discontinuous.
D2 implies that divisible objects have proper parts, but it does not imply that divisible
objects can survive division.
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Notice that both accounts of divisibility employ mereological concepts. So any
account of simplicity that employs the concept of divisibility and then explicates this
concept along the lines of D1 or D2 violates one of the conditions on being an answer to
the Simple Question by appealing to mereological concepts in the right-hand side of the
answer.
61
Without a non-circular account of divisibility, the divisibility accounts are not
competitors to the Brutal View.
Second, the physical divisibility account seems to be a non-starter. My primary
worry stems from the fact that being physically indivisible seems to be an extrinsic
property. An object might be physically indivisible in world w and yet be physically
divisible in a world with different natural laws. Yet that object may have the same
intrinsic nature in both worlds.
But being a simple is not an extrinsic property. It is provably an intrinsic
property. Suppose that x and y are duplicates and that x is a simple. Since x and y are
duplicates, there is a 1-1 correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly
natural properties. But then there is a 1-1 correspondence between their parts. So jy is a
simple. So simplicity is preserved by duplication. So being a simple is an intrinsic
property.
If two properties are necessarily co-extensive, then one of them is an intrinsic
property if and only if the other property is. Proof, assume P and Q are necessarily co-
extensive. Then P never differs between duplicates if and only if Q never differs
between duplicates. Intrinsic properties are properties that never differ between
duplicates. So P is intrinsic if and only ifQ is intrinsic.
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Since being physically indivisible is an extrinsic property and being a simple is
an intrinsic property, and since it is impossible for an extrinsic property to be necessarily
co-extensive with an intrinsic property, PIV is false.
I will now discuss the Revised Metaphysically Indivisible View of Simples.
Markosian writes this about MIV:
Unfortunately, [MIV] is equivalent to the Pointy View of Simples. For it seems clear
that all and only pointy objects would satisfy the right-hand side of the bi-
conditional.... Thus the above objections to the Pointy View of Simples would also •
apply equally well against this view. [Markosian (1998a): 221],
I think that this is mistaken, although it is hard to tell, since we do not have a clear
account of the notion of metaphysical divisibility. However, even if we operate only
with intuitive grasp of this concept, I think we agree that some possible point-sized
objects are metaphysically divisible. Consider a point-sized object that is composed of
two other point-sized objects. (I argued that this kind of case is possible in section 2.2.)
This object seems to be divisible, for it is possible for its parts to be in distinct regions
of space. The Pointy View incorrectly implies that this object is a simple; MIV does not
have this implication. MIV and the Pointy View are not equivalent. 62
So Markosian’s reason for rejecting MIV doesn’t work. Nonetheless, I think
there are good reasons to reject MIV. My first worry is that MIV faces the circularity
worry in a second guise. In addition to appealing to the concept of divisibility, MIV
also appeals to the concept of an intrinsic property. And this concept is partly
mereological, as I argued in the previous section. So MIV is guilty twice-over of
sneaking mereological concepts into the analysis of simplicity.
This completes my case against MIV.
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Arguments Against the Brutal View of Simple
I have presented a lengthy argument for the Brutal View of Simples, based on
the fact that its rivals face serious objections. Here, I present, discuss, and defeat
arguments against the Brutal View. This will complete my defense of the Brutal View.
2.6. 1 Unacceptably Fragile Simples?
In a recent paper titled “Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple?”, Kathryn
Hawley presents an argument designed to show that anyone who rejects a moderate
answer to the Special Composition Question also should reject a moderate answer to the
Simple Question. 63
I endorse compositional universalism according to which, necessarily, every
collection of objects composes a whole. Compositional universalism is a non-moderate
answer to the Special Composition Question. However, the Brutal View is a moderate
answer to the Simple Question. If Hawley’s argument succeeds, I will have some
reason to abandon one of these views.
Let us say that a moderate answer to the Special Composition Question is an
answer to that question that implies that there are situations in which some objects
compose a whole and there are situations in which some objects do not compose a
whole. Similarly, let us say that a moderate answer to the Simple Question is an answer
to that question that implies that some possible objects are simples and some possible
objects are not. The Brutal View is a moderate response to the Simple Question; strictly
speaking, the Brutal View is not an answer to the Simple Question, since it is not of the
right form to count as an answer. But it is nonetheless a view that implies that some
possible objects are simples and some possible objects are not simples. 64
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Many philosophers reject moderate answers to the Special Composition
Question because they hold that any such answer will imply that it is sometimes a vague
matter whether a particular thing exists. Accordingly, these philosophers endorse an
extreme answer to the Special Composition Question. The two extreme answers to the
Special Composition Question are compositional nihilism, according to which
composition never occurs, and compositional universalism, according to which any
collection of objects composes a whole.65
A third response is to deny that the Special Composition Question has an
informative answer. According to this response, there is no finitely stateable, non-
trivial answer to the Special Composition Question. This view, which has been
developed and defended by Ned Markosian, is called the Brutal View ofComposition.
[Markosian (1998b)]. The Brutal View of Simples is formally analogous to the Brutal
View of Composition, and was in fact inspired by this latter view.
In her forthcoming paper, “Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple?”, Hawley
argues that anyone who rejects a moderate answer to the composition question because
of concerns about vagueness in existence should also reject moderate answers to the
Simple Question. [Hawley (forthcoming)]. In a similar vein, she argues that anyone who
rejects the Brutal View of Composition should also reject the Brutal View of Simples.
Since I accept an extreme answer to the Special Composition Question, namely
compositional universalism, but embrace the Brutal View of Simples, Hawley’s
argument is especially worrisome. Fortunately, I believe that the argument can be
resisted. I will argue first that the argument presented against the Brutal View of
Composition is not persuasive. So, even if Hawley is right that anyone who rejects the
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Brutal View of Composition for the reason she gives should also reject the Brutal View
of Simples for similar reasons, no one should reject the Brutal View of Composition for
these reasons.
The bulk of Hawley’s argument appears in the following passages:
If simplicity is brute, then there could be two extremely similar objects
which differed in whether or not they had proper parts. If this seems
objectionable, then, as in the case of composition, it is perhaps because it
makes existence seems unbearably fragile: if this object had been ever so
slightly different then its proper parts just would not have existed, and if
this plurality had been ever so slightly different, then its sum just would
not have existed (other things being equal, that is). Prima facie, this
fragility concern seems to apply symmetrically to brute composition and
to brute simplicity. [Hawley (forthcoming): 7],
My reconstruction of Hawley’s argument is this:
(1 ) If the Brutal View of Simples is true, then it is possible for there
to be a simple object and a composite object that are extremely
similar to each other.
(2) It is not possible for there to be a simple object and a composite
object that are extremely similar to each other.
(3) So the Brutal View of Simples is not true.
Hawley’s argument is valid. Let us turn to the premises.
The first issue that arises is that it is not obvious whether mereological simples
can be extremely similar to mereologically complex objects. The notion of “extreme
similarity” is very fluid. In some contexts, one might be willing to say that a rhino is
extremely similar to a hippo. In other contexts, one might not be willing to say this.
We need to understand what standards we are to employ when assessing premises that
invoke the notion of extreme similarity.
108
To see how fluid this notion really can be, consider the following case. Consider
a mereologically complex object ol that is composed of two mereological simples.
Although the region of space R1 exactly occupied by ol is a discontinuous region, the
two proper parts of Ol are very, very close to each other in space. Both parts occupy
open regions of space and are separated by nothing more than a two-dimensional plane.
In short, the distance between the two simple parts of Ol is zero, although the region of
space R1 that Ol exactly occupies is not continuous. R
1
is an almost-spherical region
of space with a radius of one millimeter. Let us say that each of OFs parts has 5 grams
of mass and no other interesting features and let us also say that Ol has 10 grams of
mass in virtue of this fact.
Consider now 02. 02 is an extended simple that exactly occupies a continuous
region of space R2. R2 is also a spherical region of space with a radius of one
millimeter. 02 has 10 grams of mass and no other perfectly natural properties.
Despite the fact that Ol is a complex object and 02 is a simple, I think that in
some contexts we would be willing to say that these two objects are extremely similar.
Is this the kind of context that Hawley is invoking?
Let us note that the Brutal View of Simples does not imply that this case is
impossible. The Brutal View of Simples also does not imply that it is possible. More
interestingly, other views of simples seem to imply that this case is possible. Consider,
for example, MaxCon. Recall that, according to MaxCon, something is a simple just in
case it exactly occupies a maximally continuous matter-filled region of space. MaxCon
implies that the thought experiment just discussed is possible. So, if Ol and 02 count
as being extremely similar to each other, the MaxConist must hold that it is possible for
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a simple to be “extremely similar” to a complex object. The MaxConist should not find
the argument against the Brutal View of Simples persuasive, since he must reject the
second premise of the argument, if we are invoking the intended notion of extreme
similarity. (If we are not invoking the intended notion of extreme similarity, then we
need to be told by Hawley what that standard is.)
Perhaps the advocates of other theories also should reject premise (2). Let us
consider the Pointy View
,
according to which an object is a simple just in case it is
point-sized. Consider a continuous series of objects, a b, such that every object in
the series is slightly smaller in size and less massive than its predecessor, a is
extremely small; a is enjoys 1 millimeter of length, b is point-sized. Let us assume that
the mass of the objects in the series is a function of its length: mass(x) in milligrams =
length(x) in millimeters plus 10A-10. Accordingly, b enjoys 10A-10 units of mass.
Perhaps b is extremely similar to some of its predecessors in this series. If this is the
case, then the advocate of the Pointy View of Simples should also reject premise (2).
I suspect that this is true of many of the other plausible theories concerning the
nature of simples. So premise (2) seems to be an ineffective weapon against the Brutal
View of Simples, at least when wielded by the advocate of MaxCon or the Pointy View.
For on at least some reasonable interpretations of “extreme similarity,” the advocates of
these positions must reject premise (2) as well.
Of course, it is possible that I have been employing standards for being
extremely similar that are laxer than those that Hawley employs. If this is the case, we
need to know what Hawley’s standards are.
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Why does Hawley endorse (1)? Why does she think the friend of the Brutal
View must say that there is some pair of possible objects such that, although they are
extremely similar to each other, one is a simple and one is not? The Brutal View of
Simples does not imply that (1) is true in any straightforward way.
How could rejecting (1) land the friend of the Brutal View of Simples in
trouble? Perhaps Hawley holds the following claim:
(LINK): For any two possible objects ol and o2, there is an ordered tuple of
possible objects O such that:
(i) ol is the first member of O,
(ii) o2 is the last member of O,
(iii) every element of O is extremely similar to its
predecessor in the series.
Suppose LINK is true. Suppose the Brutal View of Simples is true. Suppose (1)
is false. We can now derive a contradiction. (We will hold fixed some interpretation of
“extreme similarity” throughout this argument.) Since the Brutal View of Simples is
true, there are some possible objects that are simples and some possible objects that are
complex. Call the possible simple S and the possible complex object C. Given LINK,
there is a series of objects beginning with S and terminating with C. Each element in
the series is extremely similar to its predecessor. Since we are rejecting (1), an element
in the series is a simple if and only if its predecessor is a simple. But then every element
in the series is a complex object. But then S is a complex object. We have successfully
derived a contradiction. One way to get out of the contradiction is to endorse (1) instead
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of rejecting ( 1 ). Perhaps this is Hawley’s rationale for ( 1 ). (It is hard to tell from the
text.)
But why endorse LINK? Suppose you have two simples x and y. x enjoys mass
but has no other perfectly natural properties, y enjoys the perfectly natural ninj but has
no other perfectly natural properties. What chain of “extremely similar” objects could
link them together? It is hard to see what it could be like.
I conclude that Hawley’s argument against the Brutal View of Simples fails.
2.6.2 Unknowable Simples?
A commonly told tale goes something like this: we used to think that chemical
atoms were also atoms in the original sense, i.e., mereological simples. But then we
discovered that atoms are not mereological simples: we discovered that atoms are
composed of a nucleus and the electrons in the outer-shells surrounding the atom.
Perhaps there is further structure yet to be discovered? As Jonathan Schaffer writes:
Indeed, the history of science is a history of finding ever-deeper
structure. We have gone from “the elements” to “the atoms” (etymology
is revealing), to the subatomic electrons, protons, and neutrons, to the
zoo of “elementary particles,” to thinking that hadrons are built out of
quarks, and now we are sometimes promised that these entities are really
strings, while some hypothesize that the quarks are built out of preons (in
order to explain why quarks come in families). Should one not expect
the future to be like the past? [Schaffer (2003b): 503].
There are two related worries that this picture seems to generate for the Brutal
View. First, it seems that we often discover that certain objects are not simple. We
might worry that, if the Brutal View of Simples is true, then we could not discover
whether these objects were simple. What criterion could we use to rule that some object
is not a simple if the Brutal View of Simples is true?
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Second, it seems as if the search for the fundamental physical objects, by which I
mean material mereological atoms, is one of the large projects in the history of physics.
But it is hard to see how we could hope to succeed in this endeavor - even ifthe world
does divide without remainder into mereological atoms - if the Brutal View of Simples
is true.
Many answers to the Simple Question do not face these worries. For example,
consider MaxCon. We have discovered that the nucleus of, e.g., a hydrogen atom is
actually some distance apart from the electron. This means that a hydrogen atom is not
a maximally continuous object. So MaxCon correctly implies that a hydrogen atom is
not a simple. Moreover, MaxCon can guide us in our search for the fundamental level:
if we wish to find out which objects are mereological atoms, we should find out which
objects are maximally continuous.
Similarly, the Pointy View can guide us in our search for the fundamental level:
if we wish to find out which objects are mereological atoms, we should find out which
objects are point-sized. Many of the other answers to the Simple Question seem to have
this feature as well. Instance, for example, implies that the fundamental physical
objects are also the basic bearers of perfectly natural properties. So, once we discover
those properties on which all else supervenes, we will have discovered the true atoms of
the world as well.
But it seems that the Brutal View of Simples cannot provide any guidance in our
search. How then, given the Brutal View of Simples, could we ever know that our
search had come to a conclusion? Perhaps some objects really are the true elements of
the world. But the Brutal View of Simples won’t tell us that they are. How then could
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we know that they are? We might be tempted to say that discovering what objects are
the actual mereological simples is the job of scientists, not philosophers, but without
some idea of what they are looking for, how will they know when they have found it?
It is true that the Brutal View of Simples does not provide this sort of guidance.
But this does not mean that the Brutal View of Simples is inconsistent with other
principles that could provide us with aid in our quest to discover the true atoms of the
world. As I noted in the previous chapter, the Brutal View of Simples is consistent with
the existence of necessary conditions on being a simple, provided that these conditions
are not both sufficient and informative. Similarly, it is consistent with the Brutal View
of Simples that there are sufficient conditions for being a simple; as long as these
sufficient conditions are not both also necessary and informative, the advocate of the
Brutal View of Simples need not do without them.
In the next chapter, I will discuss one informative necessary condition for being
a simple: lack of qualitative heterogeneity. This necessary condition eliminates
potential candidates for being simples, but this condition is completely consistent with
the Brutal View. It is possible that we will be able to discover other conditions as well
that will aid us with our search. The Brutal View’s failure to do this work does not
reflect poorly on it.
2,7 Closing Remarks
The Brutal View is a somewhat unsatisfying answer to the Simple Question.
But, if the most plausible alternatives to the Brutal View fail, a reasonable hypothesis
why they fail is that simples per se have no nature.
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Many of the premises employed in the arguments against the Brutal View’s
rivals are controversial. And, since the direct argument for the Brutal View is an
argument via elimination, the case for the Brutal View is somewhat shaky. Specifically
I am aware that some of the modal principles I cherish and employ throughout this
chapter - specifically, recombination principles conceived in a broadly Humean spirit -
are not cherished by all.
In the closing remarks of the paper in which he first raised the Simple Question,
Markosian makes this observation:
Many of the above reasons in support of MaxCon, as well as the arguments I have
given against MaxCon's rivals, are based on appeals to intuitions about what should be
said concerning various possible cases. Such "modal intuitions" are notoriously
difficult to defend. I understand that many philosophers who read this paper will not be
convinced by my arguments, precisely because they do not share my modal intuitions
about the relevant cases. But this is a common phenomenon, especially in discussions
of fundamental metaphysical issues, and it would be a mistake to expect anything else.
I hope that the arguments of the paper will nevertheless be valuable even to those who
do not share my modal intuitions. For it can be worthwhile to see what there is to be
said for a given view, and what are the consequences of that view, even if one does not
share the intuitions that motivate the view. [Markosian (1998a): 227],
I do not share Markosian’ s modal intuitions. But I share his sentiments about
the value of arguments that employ modal intuitions. Although arguments employing
them will not persuade those who do not share them, it is worthwhile to see how far
these views can be pushed.
Second, since the case for the Brutal View is an argument via elimination, I must
acknowledge the possibility that I have failed to consider other possible answers to the
Simple Question. My only defence is that I am unable to think of what they might be. I
would be happy if someone else is able to produce a new plausible answer to the Simple
Question. As Markosian noted, the Simple Question deserves more attention.
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Notes
The Simple Question was first raised by Ned Markosian in Markosian (1998a).
2
The Special Composition Question was first raised by Peter van Inwagen in
van Inwagen (1990a).
The name “Nihilism” was coined by Peter van Inwagen in van Inwagen (1990)
Strictly speaking, this is a consequence of Nihilism only given certain facts
about the actual world. It is a fact about the actual world that, if there are tables, chairs,
etc., then these objects have parts.
5
Friends of extended simples include Ned Markosian [Markosian (1998a)], Neil
McKinnon [McKinnon (forthcoming)], Josh Parsons [Parsons (2000)], Mark Scala
[Scala (2002)], and Theodore Sider [Sider (forthcoming)].
6
Here is the quote from Newton’s Opticks that Scala discusses: “It seems
probable to me that God in the Beginning formed Matter in solid, massy, hard,
impenetrable moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other
Properties; and in proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which he formed
them; and as these primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any
porous Bodies compounded out of them; even so very hard as never to wear or break in
pieces; no ordinary Power being able to divide what God himself made in one first
creation.”
7 The Brutal View is inspired by a related view that answers the Special
Composition Question: the Brutal View of Composition. On this intriguing position,
see Markosian (1998b). I discuss the Brutal View of Composition in section 2.6.
o
I thank Ben Caplan and Cody Gilmore for helpful discussion on this point.
9
Markosian also presents several arguments against the Pointy View in
Markosian (1998a): 216-219.
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MaxCon is the view that Markosian endorses in Markosian (1998a)
Markosian employs the following definitions in the explication of his view:
1 . Object O occupies region R =dfR is the set containing all and only those
points that lie within O.
2. O is spatially continuous iff O occupies a continuous region of space.
3. R is continuous =df R is not discontinuous.
4. R is discontinuous = df R is the union of two non-null separated regions.
5. R and R' are separated = df the intersection of either R or R' with the closure
of the other is null.
6. The closure ofR — df the union of R with the set of all its boundary points.
7. p is a boundary point of R = df every open sphere about p has a non-null
intersection with both R and the complement of R.
8. R is an open sphere about p = df the members of R are all and only those
points that are less than some fixed distance from p.
9. The complement ofR = df the set of points in space not in R.
10. x is a maximally continuous object =df x is a spatially continuous object and
there is no continuous region of space, R, such that (i) the region occupied by x
is a proper subset of R, and (ii) every point in R falls within some object or
other.
Markosian borrows (2)-(9) from [Cartwright 1987], (Richard Cartwright uses
“connected” and “disconnected” instead of “continuous” and “discontinuous.”)
1
1
More cautiously, MaxCon does not imply that there are restrictions on the
shape or size of extended simples. There might be other restrictions on the shape or size
of material objects that are consistent with MaxCon.
12 Hudson argues this in Hudson (2001):84-87.
13 And only one of the spatial accounts is plausibly when applied to regions of
spacetime. The Pointy View seems to accurately account for when spatiotemporal
regions are simples. MaxCon, on the other hand, is incorrect, for it implies that if
spacetime is continuous, it is one big extended simple.
14
Markosian explicitly states that the question that he is interested in the
question of what makes a material object a simple. See Markosian (1998a): 214,
footnote 10.
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I thank Ryan Wasserman for pressing me on this point. See [Wasserman
(forthcoming)] where he also discusses this objection. Markosian acknowledges this
worry, which he credits to Theodore Sider. See Markosian (1998a): 217, footnote 20.
16 Two points should be stressed. First, co-location in this sense must be
distinguished from complete mereological overlap. Two objects completely overlap
each other if and only if the two objects have exactly the same parts. Second, regions
and material objects form distinct ontological categories. If we drop this assumption,
the argument from co-location is undercut. There is no way to make sense of co-located
regions of spacetime. I think that this is a reason to reject the reduction of material
objects to spacetime regions, but others may differ. I thank Carl Matheson for helpful
discussion of this point.
17 *
Since MaxCon implies that any point-sized material object is a simple, the
possibility of mereologically complex point-sized objects also refutes MaxCon.
18 For example, David Lewis writes:
Wherever there is a charged particle, there the universal of charge, or
else one of the topes of charge, is present. It is located there, just as the
particle itself is. Indeed, it is part of the particle. ... If there are
universal, we can say that the particle is composed partly of its several
universal.
. . . We can say that the particle consists of its universal
together with something else, something non-recurrent, that gives it its
particularity. [Lewis (1986a): 64-65].
19
Perhaps this is a defeasible reason, if conceivability does not entail
metaphysical possibility. But, nonetheless, it does provide us with (as of yet
undefeated) evidence that they are possible. On the relation between conceivability and
possibility, see the fine collection of papers published in Gendler (2002).
20
For interesting discussions about this issue and the question of whether bosons
violate the Identity of Indiscemibles, see Cortes (1976), Barnette (1978), Ginsberg
(1981), and Teller (1983).
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•
I have emphasized the relevant part of the quote; also, in the original passage,
Simons talks about tropes, whereas I have substituted the word “property” for “trope”
uniformly. I don’t think this change makes a difference in this context.
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In response to this argument, David Robb suggested to me that a Humean
could say that it is analytic that material objects do not interpenetrate; co-located objects
are by definition not material objects. If co-located material objects are impossible for
this reason, we still need to explain why they seem to be conceivable. Perhaps what we
are envisioning is what David Robb called phony matter, non-material objects that have
the same effects on our sensory states as do material objects. I think this suggestion
won’t work, for material object is an ontological category. Ifx belongs to an
ontological category C, then x has the intrinsic property being a C-entity. So every
duplicate of a material object is itself a material object. But our allegedly co-located
material objects are duplicates of genuine material objects. So they themselves are
material objects. So it is not analytic that material objects cannot interpenetrate.
23
’ F°r defenses of these principles, see Armstrong (1989), Armstrong (1997):
148-184, and Lewis (1986).
24
Note that, if composition is unrestricted, then we do not need the additional
supposition that the co-located objects are bonded in order to ensure that they form a
composite object.
25
I thank Ben Caplan for stressing this point.
26
I ignore presentist versions of 3Dism, according to which there is no need to
index parthood and instantiation to times. On presentism and persistence, see Hinchliff
(1996).
27
I owe this suggestion to Hud Hudson.
I thank Ted Sider for help with this section.
29
Let us assume that both A and B have a topologically open and a topologically
closed side. Perhaps the open face ofA comes into contact with the closed face of B.
TO •
Consider A. Given that the region occupied by A is not a maximally
continuous region, it must have proper parts. Now consider any proper part of A; it also
does not occupy a maximally continuous region, so it also must have proper parts. How
can bringing two simples into contact create an infinity of material objects?
31 We might worry that, once the MaxConist accepts arbitrary portions of matter,
the notion of an object becomes simply an honorific bestowed on certain portions of
matter. (This seems to be Michael Jubien’s view; see Jubien (1993) for details.) So it is
important to note that the MaxConist holds that matter and material object are different
ontological categories. A material object, on this view, is not identical with the matter
that resides in the region it occupies.
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32
SeeMarkosian (1998a): 223-226. Cody Gilmore argues in Gilmore
(forthcoming) that no plausible account of the nature of matter can be of use to theMaxConist in solving this problem.
33
See Markosian (1998a):225, footnote #27.
34
The advocate of this strategy should probably introduce polyadic instantiation-
at-R relations as well, since extended simples can, I assume, stand in relations to other
objects at various regions as well as have-at-a-region properties. Alternatively, the
advocate of this strategy could embrace a multigrade instantiation-at-a-region relation
This strategy is inspired by Johnston (1987).
35
Recall that, in the case I described, the properties that I called “redness” and
blueness are fundamental intrinsic properties. So it’s no fair for the relationalist to
say that they were really relations all along. This move is tantamount to saying that
every apparent intrinsic property of an extended simple is really just a relation to a
region. I find this unacceptable.
36
In fact, I advocate a similar strategy in the next chapter in order to save
extended simples from certain objections.
37
Let us say that the shape of an object includes all of its geometrical properties.
Accordingly, the size of an object is a part of its shape.
38
I am happy to grant that there are worlds in which this does happen and in
which it happens to extended simples.
39
For the most part, I ignore questions concerning the nature of the properties in
what follows, such as whether the properties are repeatable universal or are themselves
particulars, i.e., tropes. On the issue of tropes vs. universal, see Lewis (1997b) and
Simons (1994).
40 On naturalness in Lewis’s sense, see Lewis (1997a), Lewis (1997b), Lewis
(1986): 60-61, Schaffer (forthcoming), Sider (2001), and Sider (1995).
41 More generally, since objective similarity also comes in degrees, the degree to
which a given property is natural is independent of our beliefs, desires, or interests.
42
The fundamental qualitative properties I discussed in section 2.2 form a subset
of the perfectly natural properties.
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43
For arguments that the most plausible versions of the bundle theory of
particulars are those in which only perfectly properties and relations are elements of the
bundles that constitute particulars, see Armstrong (1997): 115-1 16 and Lewis (1997b).A version of the bundle theory that is consistent with Fundamental is develoned in
McDaniel (2001).
44
According to the Substance-Attribute view, there is more to a particular than
its properties; there is also the substance in which these properties inhere. Ordinary
objects might be identified with the fusions of their properties and the substances in
which they inhere. Alternatively, one might argue that ordinary objects do not have
their properties as parts; instead ordinary objects are the substances that instantiate the
properties. We need not settle this dispute here, for regardless of how it is settled, we
need a criterion to determine when a substance is a simple substance or a complex
substance. Instance provides this: a substance is a simple if and only if it instantiates a
fundamental monadic property.
45
For arguments against the bundle theory of particulars, see Armstrong (1997):
96-99 and Hawthorne (2002).
46 When I speak of relations here, I mean external relations.
47
See Armstrong (1989) and Armstrong (1997).
48 Since x is a simple, any object to which x bears a relation is not a proper part
ofx.
49 On the possibility of zombies, see Chalmers (1996): 94-99. I note that the
defender of the irreducibility of phenomenal properties to physical properties need not
reject Instance, if she is willing to embrace a form ofpanpsychism, according to which
phenomenal properties supervene on proto-psychical properties. For more on this
interesting issue, see Chalmers (1996): 26-127.
50 On this issue, see Merricks (2003) and Sider (2003).
51
Strictly speaking, there is another alternative: the worlds may differ with
respect to some perfectly natural relation instantiated by composite objects, upon which
the phenomenal properties supervene. These composite objects would have to be parts
of the objects that have the phenomenal properties on pain of these properties being
extrinsic. On this alternative, zombie worlds do not provide a counter-example to
Instance. However, I suspect that anyone who takes the possibility of zombies seriously
will not be tempted by this alternative.
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_Although perhaps we are not required to think this. An alternative
explanation is that the laws of nature at this world are indeterministic. (I thank C L
Hardin for bringing this point to my attention). Of course, we are not required to think
this either. My point is that there are possible situations in which one is justified in
positing genuinely emergent properties.
53
Suppose the advocate of Instance rejects the third premise of my argument for
the reason just described. Then the advocate of Instance must hold that either (1 ) no
perfectly natural properties are instantiated or (2) there are extended simples. If a
perfectly natural property is instantiated in a world without points, then it is instantiated
by an extended object. Either that extended object has parts, or it does not. If it has
parts, then Instance is false. So, given Instance, if a perfectly natural property is
instantiated, it must be instantiated by an extended simple.
54
1 thank Jonathan Schaffer for the following argument.
55 A third worry is that this move seems to violate an intuitive principle
governing determinates and determinables: p and q are determinates of the same
determinable only ifp and q are equally natural properties.
56
I owe this suggestion to Phillip Bricker.
57
Markosian discusses the inverse of this, specifically, the possibility that a
simple become a composite in Markosian (1998a): 221. Admittedly, it is controversial
whether these alleged possibilities are genuine. For example, mereological essentialists
will deny that these possibilities are genuine.
r o
I assume here a modal logic at least as strong as S4.
59
It is worthwhile to see a second attempt to salvage Independence. Consider
Independence **, according to which an object jc is a simple if and only if there is a
possible world w at which (1) x is the only existing material object and (2) x instantiates
a perfectly natural P at the actual world if and only ifx instantiates P at w. (This version
was suggested to me by Ben Caplan.)
Since the concept of a perfectly natural property is not a mereological concept,
Independence** is not circular. However, I think we can construct a possible
counterexample to Independence**. Consider a possible world w in which a composite
object o does not instantiate any perfectly natural properties. Suppose that o could have
been a simple such that for any property p it instantiates, there is a property q such that q
is more natural than p. In such a world, o does not instantiate a perfectly natural
property either. If such a case is possible, then Independence** implies that o is
actually a simple, which is false.
60 Markosian also discusses an unrevised version of MIV; since I believe the
argument he makes against it is sound, I will not discuss it here.
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Perhaps we could appeal to the concept of matter when giving an account of
divisibility. (Markosian argues that the MaxConist needs to appeal to the persistence of
matter in order to account for the qualitative heterogeneity of extended simples in
Markosian (1998a): 223-226. Perhaps the advocate of the indivisibility accounts should
as well.) Consider the following account of divisibility:
(DM): x is divisible if and only if there is some matterM such that M “makes
up” x and it is possible thatM occupies a discontinuous region.
I reject DM because I hold that talk about matter is reducible to talk about things; see
McDaniel (2003a) and the Introduction. DM either collapses to D1 or D2, or DM is
incoherent.
62
This example also shows that it is not the case that something is divisible if
and only if it is extended in space.
63
See Hawley (forthcoming).
64 Suppose that, necessarily, every object is a simple. Then there is a finitely
stateable and non-trivial answer to the Simple Question: necessarily, x is a simple iff x
exists. Suppose that, necessarily, no object is a simple. Then there is a finitely stateble
and non-trivial answer to the Simple Question: necessarily, x is a simple iff x is not self-
identical. The Brutal View of Simples says that there is no finitely stateable and non-
trivial answer to the Simple Question, and hence implies that some possible objects are
simples and some possible objects are not simples.
65
See Rosen (2003) for a defense of compositional nihilism.
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CHAPTER 3
A DEFENSE OF EXTENDED SIMPLES
An extended simple is an object that occupies a larger than point-sized
connected region of space (or spacetime) and yet has no proper parts. 1 Here I argue that
we should take the possibility of extended simples seriously, identify three challenges
that the advocate of extended simples faces, and present a solution that dissolves each
of the three challenges.
The three challenges are as follows. First, there is the worry that any extended
object must have parts. Second, there is the worry that, if extended and yet simple
material objects are possible, then extended and yet simple regions of space are also
possible. Finally, there is the worry that, if extended simples are possible, then a
plausible principle of recombination is subject to counter-examples. I discuss in detail
these challenges in section 3.2.
Although these challenges are distinct, I believe they can be met by a single
solution. Briefly, the solution involves distinguishing two kinds of shape properties:
intrinsic and extrinsic shapes. The solution is to hold that the shapes of extended
simples are extrinsic. I present this solution in section 3.3 and apply it in sections 3.4-
3.6.
3.1 Extended Simples
Why worry about the possibility of extended simples? First, speculation
about the possibility of extended simples is not confined to philosophy. In a recent
article, Mark Scala presents some evidence that Isaac Newton believed that the
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fundamental objects of this world are extended simples. Here is the quotation from
Newton’s Opticks that Scala discusses:
It seems probable to me that God in the Beginning formed Matter in solid
massy, hard, impenetrable moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and
with such other Properties; and in proportion to space, as most conduced to the
end for which he formed them; and as these primitive Particles being Solids, are
incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded out of them; even so
very hard as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary Power being able to
divide what God himself made in one first creation. [Scala (2002): 394],
And, more recently, in a popular book on string theory, the physicist Brian Greene
seriously entertains this hypothesis as well:
What are strings made of? There are two possible answers to this question.
First, strings are truly fundamental — they are atoms,” uncuttable constituents,
in the truest sense of the ancient Greeks. As the absolute smallest constituents
of everything, they represent the end of the line.... From this perspective, even
though strings have spatial extent, the question of their composition is without
any content. Were strings to be made of something smaller, they would not be
fundamental. [Greene (1999): 141].
So extended simples have played a role in a fundamental physical theory and
might once again play such a role. Surely, if something plays a role in a fundamental
physical theory, that provides a (possibly defeasible) reason to think that it is
metaphysically possible. Although we no longer believe that the spacetime of the actual
world is Newtonian, the fact that absolute simultaneity played a key role in previous
physics certainly provides us with evidence that there are possible worlds in which
absolute simultaneity is well defined. Even if we were to discover tomorrow that the
actual world is really governed by causally deterministic laws, we would not relinquish
the claim that an indeterministic world is a real metaphysical possibility. The fact that
extended simples have been taken seriously by the theories of fundamental physics
likewise provides a (possibly defeasible) reason to believe that they are possible.
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Second, certain philosophical theories about the nature of simples imply the
possibility of extended simples, and other theories about the nature of simples at least
do not eliminate this possibility. An example of the first kind of theory is the
Maximally Continuous View ofSimples (MaxCon), according to which an object is a
simple if and only if it fills a continuous region of space that is not a proper sub-region
of a larger continuous matter-filled region of space. MaxCon implies that extended
simples are possible, since continuous matter-filled regions of space (that are not
subregions of some larger continuous matter-filled region of space) are clearly possible.
An example of the second kind of theory is the Brutal View ofSimples, according to
which there is no non-mereological criterion for being a simple. The Brutal View does
not entail that extended simples are possible, but it does not eliminate this possibility
either.
Third, embracing the possibility of extended simples allows the advocate of
endurantism to save the analogy between space and time. [Parsons (2000)]. The
endurantist thinks that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each
moment they occupy. However, the endurantist also holds that objects fill regions of
space (at a time) by having parts that occupy (at a time) the subregions of those regions.
If objects can be wholly present at different times, but it is not possible for them to be
wholly present at different spaces (at the same time), then the analogy between space
and time is greatly weakened. The way objects can occupy space is radically different
from the way objects can occupy time.
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One conception of extended simples - the Parsonian Conception - holds that
extended simples are objects that are wholly present across different regions of space
.
2
Here is a formal definition of a Parsonian Simple:
x is a Parsonian extended simple =df. (i) there is an extended continuous region
R such that for some rs, R is the fusion of the rs and x occupies each of the rs,
and (ii) x has no proper parts.
On this conception of extended simples, the analogy between space and time holds. If
extended simples are possible, then it is possible that objects be wholly present across
space as well as time. Parsonian extended simples fill extended regions by occupying a
series of subregions of those regions.
There is another reason that endurantists should be sympathetic towards
extended simples: some enduring objects are spatiotemporally extended simples.
Consider an enduring point-particle . 3 It cuts a path through spacetime. This path is
extended. Since the particle occupies an extended region of spacetime, it is an extended
simple. Admittedly, this region is composed of timelike separated points. But, once the
endurantist grants that some simples are extended in spacetime, she will have a hard
time arguing against the possibility of extended simples that occupy regions composed
of spacelike separated points.
One reason is that granting the possibility of extended simples that occupy one
kind of spacetime region, namely, those that are composed of spacetime points that are
timelike separated, but denying that extended simples can occupy spacetime regions
that are composed of spacelike separated points involves accepting an unmotivated
restriction of a very attractive principle of recombination. I will now briefly explain
why this is so.
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Material occupants and regions are members of different ontological categories,
but they can bear one important and special relation to each other: the occupation
relation. This relation is an irreducible relation that links objects of distinct ontological
categories. It is also, if endurantism is true, a one-many relation: one object can
occupy many regions of spacetime.
It is a plausible hypothesis that spacetime points have the same intrinsic
character.
4
In that case, any two regions of spacetime that have the same structural
properties (such as size and shape) have the same intrinsic character. Consider now a
world in which enduring objects persist through a homogenous Newtonian spacetime.
Suppose a point-sized object o is wholly present at spacetime points rl through r2. The
region these points compose is a continuous region of spacetime, which is extended in
the “temporal” dimension but unextended in the three “spatial” dimensions. 5 Let us call
this region R. Consider now a region R ’ that is intrinsically just like R but is instead
extended in one of the spatial dimensions and unextended in the temporal dimension.
Since (i) o can be wholly present at the various parts of R, (ii) R is intrinsically just like
R ’, and (iii) the occupation relation is a fundamental external relation, we should
conclude that (iv) it is metaphysically possible for o to be wholly present at the various
parts of R ’. 6 But then Parsonian extended simples are possible.
A third reason to believe in the possibility of Parsonian extended simples stems
from considerations involving time travel. Consider a time-traveling point-particle o. o
persists by enduring from tl to t2. At t2, o enters a time-machine, which returns o to tl
but in a different spatial location, o time-travels in this fashion “many times” so that, at
tl, the union of the spatial regions occupied by o is continuous.
7
Let us call this
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continuous region R. At tl, o is a Parsonian extended simple. So, if the endurantist
accepts the possibility of time-travel, then she should accept the possibility of Parsonian
extended simples.
I do not think that the only kind of extended simples that are possible are
Parsonian ones. I also wish to defend the possibility of extended simples that are spread
out in space without enjoying multi-location. 8 Such extended simples would dominate
the regions they occupy. David Lewis entertains (but does not endorse) the hypothesis
that singleton sets might be this sort of extended simple. He writes:
Perhaps, indeed, every singleton is just where its member is. Since
members of singletons occupy extended spatiotemporal regions, and
singletons are atoms, that would have to mean that something can
occupy an extended spatiotemporal region otherwise than by having
parts that occupy different parts of the region, and that would certainly
be peculiar. But not more peculiar, I think, than being nowhere at all. .
.
[Lewis (1991): 32].
And later in the same book, Lewis writes:
Finally, if something occupies a region, mereology per se does not
demand that each part of the occupied region must be occupied by some
part - proper or improper - of the occupying thing. If not, that’s a
second way for a singleton atom to be where its extended member is.
[Lewis (1991): 76],
I will call simples of this type toughies, and offer the following definition of them:
x dominates R just in case (i) x occupies R, (ii) it is not the case that x occupies
some proper sub-region of R, and (iii) no proper part ofx occupies a proper part
of R.
x is toughie =df. There is an extended continuous region R such that x dominates
R.
I think the arguments I advance in this paper provide a defense of both kinds of
extended simples.
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12 Three Puzzles Involving Extended Simples
There are good reasons to believe that extended simples are possible
Nonetheless, there are three challenges that the advocate of extended simples must face.
3.2.1 First Puzzle
The history of philosophy has not been kind to extended simples. It is this
argument, or something very similar to it, that leads many philosophers to reject the
possibility of extended simples:
( 1 ) If there were an extended simple, then it would have two halves.
(2) If it had two halves, then the simple would have proper parts.
Hence, there can’t be any extended simples.9
Let us understand (2) so that it is analytically true. That is, let us understand talk about
halves in such a way that a half of an object is literally a part of that object. If we
understand (2) in this fashion, the main premise in the argument is (1). What can be
said in its defense?
Let us note that (1) is not analytic. It is no contradiction to deny premise (1).
Moreover, (1) is neither an axiom of standard mereology, nor does it follow from any
set of axioms of standard mereology. A defense of (1) must appeal to principles that go
beyond the province of pure mereology.
One way of arguing for (1) is via an appeal to a more general principle that
entails (1). The principle that I have in mind is the Doctrine ofArbitrary Undetached
Parts (DAUP):
(DAUP): Necessarily, for every material object M, ifR is the region of space
occupied by M, and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there
exists a material object that occupies the region sub-R and which is a part of
M 10
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But simply appealing to DAUP will not settle the issue. For the defender of the
possibility of extended simples will simply reject DAUP. And then we will have
reached an argumentative stalemate. In order to prevent this from happening, it is
important to first determine what can be said in defense of DAUP. The next step, in
order to prevent argumentative gridlock, is to figure out if the advocate of extended
simples can reasonably reject some part of the case for DAUP without begging the
question. This is the first challenge facing the defended of extended simples.
3.3.3 Second Puzzle
The second puzzle facing the advocate of extended simples concerns the
possibility of simple yet extended regions of space. In order to see that this a genuine
worry for the advocate of extended simples, we need to first see what the possibility of
extended simples implies about the nature of space.
I believe that an advocate of extended simples ought to embrace a view about
space called substantivalism. Substantivalism is the conjunction of the following
theses:
(1) There exist spatial points and spatial regions.
11
i 'y
(2) Points are particulars, not properties. Points are simples, not
mereologically complex wholes.
(3) Points or regions are not reducible to constructions made out of their actual
or possible occupants. So, for example, points or regions are not
propositions, sets, ordered tuples, or possibilities of location. (Forbes 1987).
(4) Regions are mereological fusions of points.
(5) The structural features of a region, such as its shape, are intrinsic features of
• 13
the region.
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I assume that the advocate of extended simples will want to talk about the
points, lines, or surfaces lying on or within extended simples. Moreover, the advocate
of extended simples will want to provide an account of continuity, spatial
connectedness, and other geometrical or topological features that extended simples can
have. If the advocate of extended simples has a sufficient number of point-sized objects
in her ontology, she can provide the standard accounts of these concepts. For example,
the advocate of extended simples can say that an extended simple is continuous if and
only if it occupies a continuous region of space, where the concept of a continuous
region of space is cashed out in the standard way . 14 This provides an excellent reason
for the advocate of extended simples to embrace substantivalism
.
15
Given substantivalism, what is the status of the material contents of spatial
regions? There are two possible answers. Either material objects are identical to the
regions that they occupy or material objects are distinct from the regions of space they
occupy. Let us call the latter view the container view. Worlds at which there exist
extended simples must be worlds at which the container view is true. To see this, let us
assume that there exists an extended simple, which I dub “Big Ed.” The region
occupied by Big Ed has proper parts, since it is an extended region and extended
regions are fusions of points. But Big Ed does not have proper parts, so Big Ed cannot
be identical to the region at which Big Ed exists. An interesting conclusion! If
extended simples are possible, then we cannot identify these simples with the regions of
space that they occupy .
16
So the advocate of extended simples has a reason to believe in regions of space
and a reason to believe that regions of space and occupants of regions form distinct
132
ontological categories. But then the question facing the advocate of extended simples is
pressing: why not also endorse the possibility of extended yet simple regions of space?
This challenge is especially worrying, since the advocate of extended simples could
undercut the argument just given by accepting that extended yet simple regions of space
are possible.
It seems that extended yet simple regions of space are absurd. But it also seems
that extended yet simple material objects are strange. Once we let one kind of crazy
entity - extended yet simple material objects - in our ontology, doesn’t consistency
require us to let in the other kind - extended yet simple regions of space - as well? This
is the second challenge facing advocates of extended simples.
3.2.3 Third Puzzle
Material occupants and regions are members of different ontological categories,
but they can bear one important and special relation to each other: the occupation
relation. The occupation relation has two interesting features: it is perfectly natural and
it is external. Natural properties and relations are ontologically basic in this sense: the
pattern of instantiation of the perfectly natural properties and relations determines the
pattern of instantiation of every other qualitative property and relation. The notion of
naturalness can be used to define other interesting concepts: objects are intrinsic
duplicates if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between their parts that
preserves perfectly natural properties and relations; a property is intrinsic if and only if
it never differs between duplicates.
17 (A property is extrinsic just in case it is not
intrinsic.) External relations do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the things
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they relate; however, they do supervene on the intrinsic properties of the whole
composed of the things they relate.
The occupation relation does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of its
relata. Consider an occupant O and the region R that O occupies. Both O and R have
the same shape; but so do many other regions besides R. If space is infinitely extended
and topologically and metrically homogenous, then there will be infinitely many regions
that are duplicates of R and hence have the same intrinsic properties as R. But O does
not occupy those regions as well as R.
However, although the occupation relation does not supervene on the intrinsic
properties of its relata, it is constrained by some of the properties of its relata,
specifically the shape properties of its relata. For it is impossible for an extended
simple to occupy a single point of space, i.e., to be completely there and nowhere else.
That is, necessarily, if something is an extended simple, then it does not occupy a single
point. Given that the occupation relation is a fundamental external relation, how could
it be constrained by the intrinsic properties of its relata in this fashion?
The principle that any material simple can occupy any simple region of space is
extremely compelling. If extended simples are not possible, then this principle is free
from counter-example. However, it appears that, if extended simples are possible, then
this principle must be restricted. So, if extended simples are possible, then an intuitively
plausible recombination principle seems to be false. This is the third puzzle facing the
advocate of extended simples.
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M A Solution to the Puzzles: the Extrinsic Theory of Shapp
Although these challenges are distinct, I believe that a single solution suffices to
defeat each of them. Briefly, the solution involves distinguishing two kinds of shape
properties: intrinsic and extrinsic shapes. The solution requires saying the shapes of
extended simples are extrinsic.
Allow to me to clarify what I mean by ‘shape’. I use ‘shape’ to refer to the sum
of those features of an object that are determined by its topological, geometrical, and
metrical features. Accordingly, the size of an object is a part of its shape. Given this
admittedly somewhat non-standard definition of ‘shape’, two cubical regions of
Euclidean space that differ only with respect to their volumes have different shapes.
However, given this definition of ‘shape’, incongruent counterparts, such as perfectly
symmetrical left and right hands, have the same shape. Whether an object is a left or
right hand is not determined solely by the topological, geometrical, or metrical
properties of that object, but is rather determined by those properties and the relations it
i o
bears to other things.
The intrinsic shape of an object is the shape that an object has in itself,
independently of any relations it bears to other things. Its shape is an intrinsic property
of the object. If a material object has an intrinsic shape, then its shape is metaphysically
independent of the relation that it bears to a region of space that it occupies. Let us call
the theory that all shape properties of material objects are intrinsic properties the
Intrinsic Theory (IT).
The Intrinsic Theory seems obvious to many .
19
But it is not clear to me why this
is so. What is obvious is that material objects have shape properties. But why believe
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that the shape properties of material objects are intrinsic properties? Perhaps instead
material objects inherit their shapes from the regions of space that they occupy. Let us
call the hypothesis that the shape of a region of space is an intrinsic property of that
region, whereas the shape of a material occupant of that region is an extrinsic property
the Extrinsic Theory (ET). According to the Extrinsic Theory, a material object has its
shape in virtue of the fact that it bears the occupation relation to a region with that
shape. The shape of a material object, on this view, is not metaphysically independent
of the relations the object bears to other entities. Rather, the fact that material object
has a shape is constituted by the fact that it bears a relation to a region of space that has
that shape. In a world without substantival space, no material object has a shape.
For the sake of completeness, I mention a third option, the superimposition
theory, according to which the shape properties of an occupant are intrinsic, whereas the
shape properties of a region are extrinsic. I do not discuss the superimposition theory in
what follows. There is an even more outlandish option: shape is extrinsic to occupants
and regions. But then whence comes shape? I will ignore this theory as well.
The Extrinsic Theory may seem strange since it implies that the shape of a
material object is actually an extrinsic, derivative feature of that object. However, there
are precedents for this position. Ignore worries about extended simples for a moment
and consider the various distance relations that obtain between point-sized material
objects. Graham Nerlich has recently argued that the spatial relations that obtain
between material objects obtain in virtue of the spatial relations that obtain between the
regions they occupy. [Nerlich (1994): 19-43]. If this is the case, then the distance
relations obtaining between these material objects are extrinsic, i.e., they depend on the
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properties of objects other than the relata of the relation. 23 This in turn entails that the
shape of the fusion of the point-sized occupants is an extrinsic property of that fusion. 24
This does not yet give us the extrinsic theory, since it is consistent with Nerlich’s
position that the property of being point-sized is an intrinsic property of material
objects. But it certainly takes us a large step closer to ET, since, on this view, the shape
of any composite material object is an extrinsic property.
Similarly, Theodore Sider has claimed that in order for the endurantist to
accommodate special relativity, “the endurantist should say that spatiotemporal
relations hold primarily between points of spacetime. Fundamental particles then stand
in spatiotemporal relations derivatively by occupying points of spacetime that stand in
those relations.” [Sider (2001): 81]. This is a version of the Extrinsic Theory.25
Finally, if we adopt the Parsonian Conception of extended simples, we might be
required to endorse ET. Recall that, according to the Parsonian Conception, extended
simples are objects that are wholly present at multiple spatial regions. In short,
extended simples enjoy multi-location. But any advocate of multiply located objects
should embrace something like the extrinsic theory. For the friends of multi-located
objects face the Paradox ofMulti-Location, which is best solved by appealing to
something like the Extrinsic Theory.
In a recent paper, Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe argue that multi-location is
impossible.
26 An object enjoys multi-location just in case it is wholly present at more
than one (distinct) space-time region. One popular view that is committed to multi-
located objects is endurautism, which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by
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being wholly present at each time they are located
.
27
So, if Barker and Dowe are right,
endurantism is in big trouble.
Here is a brief summary of Barker and Dowe s argument. Endurantists say that
enduring objects are not extended in time, which suggests that they are three-
dimensional entities .28 Consider an enduring object O that is wholly present at each
three-dimensional spacelike hyperplane of spacetime region R. So, for each such r, O
occupies r. So O completely fills a four-dimensional region of spacetime. Moreover,
for any r c R, O has a part at r. But then O is actually a four-dimensional entity. But
nothing can be both three-dimensional and four-dimensional. So endurantism is false.
Recall that the shape of an object is the sum of that object’s topological,
geometrical, and metrical properties. An object’s dimensionality is one part of an
object’s shape. Barker and Dowe’s argument can be thought of as instance of a more
general problem, the problem of determining what the shape of a multi-located object
is. For example, Barker and Dowe consider an enduring time-traveler who comes in
physical contact with himself. How big is this person at the moment at which he
enjoys spatial bi-location? What is the shape of this person at that moment?
The endurantist should respond to Barker and Dowe’s paradox by distinguishing
between two kinds of shape properties. First, an object can have an intrinsic shape. An
object has a shape intrinsically if it has that shape in virtue of the way that object is in
itself. Second, an object can have an extrinsic shape. An object has a shape
extrinsically if it has that shape in virtue of the way that it relates to regions of
spacetime. Arguably, standard endurantism is committed to spacetime substantivalism,
and to claiming that enduring objects are not identical to the regions of spacetime that
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they occupy.
30 So standard endurantism is committed to at least two ontological
categories: spatiotemporal regions and enduring objects that occupy those regions.
Objects and regions are brought together by the occupation relation. An object can
have a shape extrinsically in virtue of occupying a region of spacetime that has that
shape intrinsically. The extrinsic shape of an object is the intrinsic shape of the region
of spacetime that it fills.
Suppose that O is an enduring solid ball. What shape is O intrinsically? O’
s
intrinsic shape is spherical. What shape is O extrinsically? Since O occupies a
successive series of spherical regions of spacetime, the region of spacetime that O fills
is not spherical. Instead, the shape of the region of spacetime filled by O is the four-
dimensional analogue of a cylinder. This is O’s extrinsic shape. So O’ s extrinsic shape
is not spherical. But no contradiction is entailed by the fact that O’s intrinsic shape
differs from O’s extrinsic shape. Nothing can have two different intrinsic shapes, but O
does not have two different intrinsic shapes.
Consider two persisting solid balls 01 and 02 such that, at each time that they
exist, 01 and 02 are qualitatively indiscernible. Let us assume that each object has the
same properties at any time that it is present, i.e. neither object undergoes qualitative
change. Suppose that 01 persists from tl to t3, whereas 02 persists from tl to t4. 02
enjoys a longer lifespan than 01, but given how I have set up the case, no endurantist
should think that 02 differs intrinsically from 01. Ol and 02 are qualitative
duplicates; 02’ s lasting longer than 07is an extrinsic difference, not an intrinsic one.
There is a sense in which Ol and 02 have a different shape; this is because they differ
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with respect to their extrinsic shapes. But we can still say, if we wish, that they have
the same intrinsic shape; both Ol and 02 are intrinsically three-dimensional spheres.
Since claiming that the shapes of extended simples are extrinsic properties is not
unprecedented or unreasonable, this is an acceptable move for the advocate of extended
simples to make if it helps solve the puzzles confronting the advocate of extended
simples.
3.4 How the Extrinsic Theory Solves the First Puzzle
Recall that, in order to avoid an argumentative deadlock, we need some reason
to believe DAUP. I think an interesting argument for DAUP can be made. The
argument for DAUP has two premises. The first premise is a general principle that I
call the Principle ofQualitative Variation (PQV):
(PQV):For any object x, regions R+, Rl, and R2, and intrinsic properties FI and
F2, if (i) x occupies R+, (ii) Rl and R2 are non-overlapping proper
subregions of R+, (iii) FI is not identical to F2, (iv) x instantiates FI at
Rl
,
and (v) x instantiates F2 at R2, then there are two objects xl and x2
such that (a) xl is not identical to x2, (b) xl and x2 are non-overlapping
proper parts of x, and (c) xl instantiates FI and x2 instantiates F2. 31
Informally, PQV states that, whenever an object has intrinsic properties
distributed within the region it occupies, it has parts corresponding to the locations
where its qualities are distributed. Here is an example ofPQV in action. Assume that
colors are genuine properties of objects. Now consider a sphere such that the top half of
the sphere is blue and the bottom half of the sphere is yellow. Given PQV, the sphere
140
must have proper parts corresponding to the region at which it is blue and the region at
which it is yellow.
The adverbial phrase "at R” modifies the copula, not the predicate. The phrase
“x has F at R” does not indicate that x bears a relation, specifically, the F-at relation, to
a region R. Instead, the phrase indicates that x has-relative-to-F the property Fness.
One could reject PQV and instead accept spatial adverbalism
,
according to which the
instantiation relation that links objects to their properties is really a three-place relation
between an object, a property, and a region of space. The strategy is analogous to
adopting temporal adverbalism in order to avoid the problem of intrinsic change over
time. (On this issue, see Johnston (1987) and McDaniel (2003a).)
PQV implies that, in cases in which F is a genuine property, propositions of the
form x is F at location R have the same truth-values as propositions of the form y is F. 32
In cases in which F really is a property, and not a disguised relation that an object bears
to a region, this implication is plausible. Given PQV, indexing properties to regions has
no deep metaphysical significance. The instantiation relation that links objects to their
properties is a two-place relation.
It is important to distinguish the following two situations: (1) the situation in
which x has-relative-to-region-F the property Fness and (2) the situation in which x has
Gness, where Gness is an extrinsic property that x has in virtue of bearing a relation to a
region of space. In the first situation, x has a property relative to a region. In the
second situation, x just plain instantiates Gness; x does not instantiate Gness relative to
any region of space. Here is a concrete example of the second sort of situation:
suppose x is five feet from a region of space R. Then x has the extrinsic property being
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five feet from R. But x does not have this property relative to any region of space; x just
plain has the property. In this case, PQV does not imply that x has a property at R.
A case can be made for PQV simply by attending to the consequences of
denying it. Suppose PQV is false. Consider a sphere-shaped extended simple that is
blue at one proper sub-region of the region it occupies (call this region ‘Bluefilled’) and
yellow at a distinct sub-region (call this region ‘Yellowfilled’). If this sphere is an
extended simple, then strictly speaking it does not have a top-half that is blue, even
though the sphere is blue at Bluefilled. But what just plain instantiates the property of
being blue? Nothing does! 33
If we abandon PQV, then it is very hard to see why we should believe that any
object has parts. And even the advocate of extended simples believes that some objects
have proper parts. In his recent book, Four-Dimensionalism, Theodore Sider discusses
three reasons to posit proper spatial parts. [Sider (2001): 87-92], First, some objects are
extended. Obviously, the advocate of extended simples cannot agree that extension
implies the possession of proper parthood. So this reason to posit proper parts is
unavailable to the advocate of extended simples.
Second, some objects are qualitatively heterogeneous, that is, they have
properties at various sub-regions of the regions that they occupy. If we accept that we
should posit parts whenever an object is qualitatively heterogeneous, then we accept
PQV. Accordingly, I do grant that the defender of extended simples should not claim
that heterogeneous extended simples are possible. So, as I see things, only qualitatively
homogenous extended simples are possible.
Sider also discusses a third reason to posit spatial parts:
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Call the left half of the region of space occupied by the desk ‘R\ R and
its material contents might have been, intrinsically, exactly as they
actually are even if the rest of the world had been eliminated. In that
case an object occupying R would have existed. But then we should
postulate an object in actuality that occupies R. For surely the
elimination of the rest of the world outside of R would not bring a new
object into existence; but what other actual object could this object be.
other than a part of the desk that actually occupies the region R? [Sider
(2001): 89-90],
Suppose we have before us a putative extended simple O and the region R that it
occupies. Let us assume that the object is qualitatively homogenous. Let us call the
left-hand region of space that is a proper part of region occupied by O, Lefty. Lefty
could have been the only region of space that exists. Moreover, according to Sider, all
of the intrinsic properties that are instantiated by O at Lefty could have been instantiated
by something at Lefty even if Lefty and what it contains were the only things in
existence. In this case, Sider suggests that we should posit a part of O that exists
exactly at Lefty.
Sider’ s argument for the existence of spatial parts seems to presuppose that the
shape properties of material objects are intrinsic, which the advocate of extended
simples can deny. (This is because this presupposition is needed to rule out O being the
one material object at the counterfactual world we are considering.) Suppose that she
does deny this. In this case, the advocate of extended simples should say that (1) in the
counterfactual world w that Sider considers, O exists, (2) O occupies Lefty at w, (3) the
set of intrinsic properties instantiated at Lefty in world w is identical to the set of
intrinsic properties instantiated at Lefty in the actual world, and (4) the set of intrinsic
properties instantiated by our extended simple in world w is identical to the set of
intrinsic properties instantiated by our extended simple in the actual world.
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Sider’s modal argument is very similar to the argument from PQV to DAUP
Assume that an object has an intrinsic property at a sub-region of the region it occupies.
Given PQV, it has a part at that subregion. So wherever an object enjoys intrinsic
variation, it has proper parts. Sider tells us to focus on this subregion and then consider
a world in which it and its contents are the only things there are. Since nothing new
has been created by subtracting the rest of reality, there actually is a proper part of the
object that occupies this subregion. So wherever an object enjoys intrinsic variation, it
has proper parts. Given the similarities between the two arguments, I will focus on the
argument from PQV to DAUP.
PQV does not by itself imply DAUP. We can see this if we consider that the
conjunction ofPQV and the Extrinsic Theory is consistent with the denial of DAUP.
(More on this in a moment.) However, the conjunction ofPQV and the claim that the
shape properties of material objects are intrinsic entails DAUP. Suppose that a material
object o occupies a cubical volume of space R. Then the property of being a column
will be instantiated by o at the bottom half of R (call this region Bottom) and at the top
half of R (call this region Top). If shape properties are intrinsic properties, then being a
column is an intrinsic property. And so, given PQV, there is a part of o that occupies
Bottom and a part of o that occupies Top.
Suppose space contains point-sized parts. On this supposition, being point-sized
will be instantiated by o at every point of space in R. And so, given PQV, o will have
infinitely many point-sized parts. If shapes are intrinsic properties, there is as much
pressure to claim that o has parts at every sub-region ofR as there is to claim that the
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sphere has a part where it is blue. If the shape of a material object is intrinsic and PQV
is true, then DAUP is true.
Another example may be helpful. Suppose you are in a room with an open door.
Suppose that workers are moving a large statue through the door. From what you can
see, you are inclined to say to that you see something shaped like a human arm.
(Because of the angle from which you are viewing the statue and the wall between you
and the hallway, you can’t see the statue in its entirety.) Let us call the region of space
that the statue currently occupies R. R overlaps the region occupied by the room you
are in; R also overlaps the region occupied by the hallway. R is shaped like a statue. R
is a region of space, and it does have an arm-shaped sub-region R-. Let us call the
shape of this subregion being arm-shaped. The statue is arm-shaped at R-. If the
Intrinsic Theory is true, then being arm-shaped is a property that material objects have
intrinsically. But, then, given PQV and the Intrinsic Theory, the statue has an arm-
shaped part that occupies the arm-shaped region.
It makes sense to talk about the properties that an object has at a particular place.
But, given PQV, this sort of claim must be analyzable in terms of talk of “just plain
instantiation,” parthood, and occupation.
34
If the Extrinsic Theory is true, then the shapes of material objects are really
derivative features. Talk about shapes had by an object at a region is analyzable in
terms of shapes had by the region itself and the occupation relation. We can say that an
object o is 5-shaped at R just in case either (i) o or a part of o occupies R and R is 5-
shaped or (ii) o or a part of o occupies some region R+ such that R is a subregion of R+
and R is 5-shaped. Given ET, when we say that an object is 5-shaped at a region, we do
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not ascribe a particular quality to that object. Instead, we say something about the
region that the object occupies. This is why the conjunction of PQV and ET does not
imply DAUP, even though the conjunction ofPQV and the Intrinsic Theory does.
No one should be tempted by the following principle: if o bears a relation F to
rl and a different relation G to r2, then o has a proper part located at rl and a proper
part located at r2. If this principle were true, then extended simples would be
impossible. Given the Extrinsic Theory, having a shape at a region consists in bearing a
relation to a region with that shape. So extended simples would have parts
corresponding to the regions of space that they occupy. But this principle is far too
strong. For it also implies that a point-sized simple that is four feet away from region rl
and five feet away from r2 has parts at rl and r2. The moral we should draw is this: the
mere fact that an object bears different relations to different regions of space is not a
reason for holding that the object has proper parts at those regions of space. And, if the
Extrinsic Theory is true, having a shape at a region simply consists in bearing a relation
to a region.
ET provides the resources to undermine the argument for DAUP. If the shape of
an extended simple is not intrinsic, then the pressure to split up an extended simple
simply because it is extended is entirely eliminated. We are justified in positing parts in
accordance with PQV, but if the shape properties of material objects are not intrinsic,
PQV simply does not apply. Since the advocate of extended simples can justifiably
endorse ET, the argumentative stalemate is broken. The advocate of extended simples
can reject DAUP without begging the question. The first challenge has been met.
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How the Extrinsic Theory Solves the Second Puzzle
There are two sorts of worries one might have about the notion of an extended
yet simple thing. First, there is the worry that the notion of an extended yet simple
thing is incoherent. One might have this worry if one thought that the notion of the
shape of an entity must be analyzed in terms of the distance relations obtaining between
this entity’s proper parts. The Extrinsic Theory shows that this worry is somewhat
misguided, we can make sense of a material object having a shape without appealing to
the distance relations obtaining between its proper parts provided that there is some
other entity - a region of spacetime - that it occupies, has the same shape as, and is such
that the region’s shape can be analyzed in terms of the distance relations obtaining
between the region 's proper parts.
There may, however, be an analytic connection between having a shape
intrinsically and having proper parts that bear distance relations to each other. If this is
the case, then the friend of extended yet simple regions of spacetime has a conceptually
impossible position. For the friend of extended yet simple regions of spacetime needs
to assume that it makes sense to talk about the shape of a region of spacetime
independently of our ability to analyze these notions in terms of parts of the region. She
needs to be able to say, for example, that a particular region of space is box-shaped and
has a cubic volume of 30 meters even if that region of space is an extended simple.
It is actually to the advantage of the advocate of extended material simples if
this assumption is false. For, without this assumption, we have no way to account for
how a region of spacetime could have extension even though it is simple. But we still
have a way, via the Extrinsic Theory, of accounting for how an extended material object
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could be a simple. So we would lose the reason to hold that if extended material
simples are possible, then extended yet simple regions of spacetime are possible. The
alleged parallel between these two putative possibilities would not hold. So it may be
that the concept of an extended yet simple region of spacetime is incoherent, even if the
concept of an extended yet simple material object is not incoherent.
My second worry about extended yet simple regions of spacetime is similar to
the worry about extended yet simple material objects discussed in section 3.4. Recall
that the worry in section 3.4 was centered on the claim that if something is extended,
then it has proper parts. In section 3.4, 1 argued that this inference is good only if the
extended thing is intrinsically extended. However, according to the Extrinsic Theory,
some or all of the shape properties of extended material simples are extrinsic.
However, all of the shape properties of regions of spacetime are intrinsic. Shapes are
genuine qualities of regions, qualities that these regions have independently of the
relations they bear to other (non-overlapping) regions. It is this difference that grounds
the fact that extended yet simple regions of spacetime are not possible even if extended
yet simple material objects are possible.
The strategy to break the alleged parallel between extended yet simple regions
and extended yet simple material objects is clear: show that, since the shape properties
of regions of spacetime are intrinsic, a principle similar to DAUP, which has been
formulated so as to apply to regions of spacetime instead of material objects, is true.
However, it is hard to see what the principle should look like. Recall DAUP:
(DAUP): Necessarily, for every material object M, ifR is the region of space
occupied by M, and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R, there exists a
material object that occupies the region sub-R and which is a part ofM.
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We want a principle analogous to DAUP, but which applies to spacetime regions
instead of material objects. DAUP appeals to the notion of an occupiable region, which
does not have a clear analogue to the case of regions of spacetime.
In order to formulate an analogous principle, we will need to appeal to an
abstract model of spacetime, < U, D>, where U is an infinite set of elements, which we
can think of as representations ofpoints ofspacetime, and D is the distance function
defined on U .35 Any non-empty subset ofU accordingly is a representation of a region
whose shape is fixed by the distance relations obtaining between its elements.
Next, we need to be able to say that some representations of regions in our
model represent the shape of real regions of spacetime. When this happens, let us say
that the representation of a region and the real region of spacetime represented have the
same shape.
How does this representation work? If there are no extended yet simple regions
of spacetime, the representation works by structural isomorphism: the real distance
relations between points of spacetime are mirrored by the relations determined by D
that are defined on U. If there are extended yet simple regions of spacetime, we cannot
say that the representation works this way. In fact, it is unclear if we can account for
how it works. This problem is closely related to the first worry about the conceptual
incoherence of extended yet simple regions of spacetime discussed at the beginning of
this section. I suspect that the friend of extended yet simple regions will want to say
that there is simply an additional fact about which subsets ofU represent or correspond
to real regions of spacetime.
We now formulate our principle as follows:
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DAUP-R: Let R be a region of spacetime. Let S be a non-empty subset ofU
sue that S has the same shape as R. Then for any non-empty subset of S S-
there is a region of spacetime R- such that S- and R- have the same shape and R-
is a part of R. F
Now that we have properly formulated the conclusion, we need to attend to
the proper formulation of the premises. The first premise is an even more general
version of PQV:
(PQV )• F°r any entities x, y and z and distinct intrinsic properties FI and F2, if
x instantiates FI at
y
and x instantiates F2 at z, then there are two entities
xl and x2 such that (a) xl is not identical to x2, (b) xl and x2 are non-
overlapping proper parts of x, and (c) xl instantiates FI and x2
instantiates x2.
Intuitively, PQV* tells us that entities can have properties indexed to or at other entities
only derivatively, in virtue of proper parts that have those properties in a non-indexed,
non-derivative manner. There is no irreducible indexing on the having of properties.
Instantiation is fundamentally non-relative. Presumably, the intuitions that supported
PQV provide the same support for PQV*.
Our second premise is this:
(POS-OCC): For any region of spacetime R, there is a possible world w in which
(i) R has the same intrinsic properties in w as it has at the actual world, (ii) R is
occupied by a material object M such thatM is composed of arbitrary
undetached parts. 37
In other words, any region of spacetime could be occupied by a material object that is
made of arbitrary undetached parts. What motivates POS-OCC? The motivation is
straightforward: in general, if an object has the same shape as a region of spacetime,
then it is metaphysically possible for that object (or at least a duplicate of that object) to
occupy that region of spacetime. Suppose that R is a region of spacetime. Then,
necessarily, any material object that is shaped like R could occupy R. Moreover, this is
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true regardless of any qualitative intrinsic properties of the object or the region other
than the shape of the object or region. How could the intrinsic properties of a material
object (other than shape) necessarily prevent it from merely occupying a region of the
same shape? And how could the intrinsic properties of the region necessarily repel
objects of the same shape?
Since the other intrinsic properties of a material object and the intrinsic
properties of a region are no barrier to the object occupying the region if they are the
same shape, the mereological structure of the object or the region are not barriers to the
object occupyrng the regron. So, for example, a mereological complex material object
could occupy a mereologically simple region provided that the two regions have the
same shape.
Consider an empty region R. Suppose that at some world w, there is a material
object o shaped like R that is composed of arbitrary undetached parts that occupies R.
Suppose that R has the same intrinsic properties in w as it actually has. Given POS-
OCC, each of these suppositions is legitimate.
Suppose that o has a proper part that is shaped like a cube. In a case like this,
we intuitively want to say that, in w, R has a proper part that is shaped like a cube.
Where does R have this part? This part is, intuitively, the region that the proper part of o
occupies. But we can’t say that this is the case without conceding that R is not a simple.
What we can say, however, is that the region R is cube-shaped at the part of the
material object that is shaped like a cube.
Likewise, the rest of o is S-minus-a-cube-bit shaped. And so R is S-minus-a-
cube-bit shaped at the part that is the rest of o.
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Our third premise is that regions have their shapes intrinsically. (Recall that this
is one conjunct of the Extrinsic View.) Since regions have their shapes intrinsically,
being cubical is a property that regions of space have intrinsically. And so is being S-
minus-a-cube-bit shaped.
So now PQV* comes into play. Since being cubical and being S-minus-a-cube-
bit shaped are both intrinsic properties that are had at entities, specifically proper parts
of o, PQV* implies that R has proper parts at this possible world. At w, R is not an
extended simple.
But R has the same intrinsic properties at w as R has at the actual world. Since
being a simple is an intrinsic property, R is an extended simple at w if and only if R is
an extended simple at the actual world. So, since R is not an extended simple at w, R is
not an extended simple.
Since our examples were chosen arbitrarily, we are allowed to conclude that any
region of spacetime that is possibly filled by an object composed of arbitrary
undetached parts itself is composed of arbitrary undetached parts. And, since all
regions of spacetime are possibly filled by objects composed of arbitrary undetached
parts, all regions of spacetime are themselves composed of arbitrary undetached parts.
In other words, DAUP-R is true.
Because regions of spacetime have their shapes intrinsically, DAUP-R is true.
Since the advocate of extended simples can say that material objects have their shapes
extrinsically, they can reject DAUP. So the symmetry is broken. The possibility of
extended yet simple material objects does not imply the possibility of extended yet
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simple regions of space. In fact, the very theory that undercuts the first challenge facing
the advocate of extended simples also undercuts the second challenge.
M How the Extrinsic Theory Solves the Third Pnyvlp
The third challenge is generated by the worry that extended simples seem to
violate an intuitive principle of recombination. Let R be a perfectly natural external
relation; let Cl and C2 be ontological categories. The intuitively plausible principle is
this: if some simples of category Cl can bear R to some simples in category C2, then
any simple from category Cl can bear R to any simple in category C2, regardless of
their intrinsic properties.
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If the Intrinsic Theory is true and extended simples are possible, then we do
have a counter-example to the principle of recombination. It is a necessary truth that no
extended simple occupies a point-sized region of space.39 The intrinsic properties of a
material extended simple prevent it from bearing a perfectly natural relation to a simple
region of space that other material simples (with different intrinsic properties) could
bear to that region.
The Extrinsic Theory dissolves this worry. Given the extrinsic theory, the fact
that an object cannot occupy a region with a different shape is no more mysterious than
the fact that siblings must have the same parents. The reason you cannot put a spherical
object in a cubical region is that objects are spherical in virtue of occupying spherical
regions. And so on for other shapes.
Consider an extended simple o. Given ET, o is extended in virtue ofoccupying
a region that is extended. Being extended is not an intrinsic property of o. So o could
have occupied a point-sized region of space without this necessitating a change in o’s
intrinsic properties, o’s intrinsic properties do not prevent it from occupying a point-
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sized region. Given ET, there are possible worlds wl and w2 according to which (1) at
wl, o is extended, (2) at w2, o is point-sized, but (3) for any intrinsic property F, o has F
at wl if and only if o has F at w2. Given ET, extended simples do not generate counter-
examples to the plausible principle of recombination. The third challenge has been met.
H Why There Are No Actual Temporally Extended Simples
So far I have concentrated on the relationship that occupants bear to space. I
have neglected the relationship that occupants bear to time (or to space-time.) It seems
to me that the conclusions of the previous sections have some relevance to the current
debate between so-called endurantists and perdurantists about how objects persist
through time. But, in order to see whether this is the case, we first must readdress two
fundamental questions.
The first question we need to readdress is: what is (or are) the fundamental
mereological relation (or relations) that obtains (or obtain) between objects. As I noted
in Chapter One, many endurantists take the fundamental parthood relation to be a three-
place relation between two objects and a time: x is a part ofy at t. On the other hand,
every perdurantist takes the fundamental parthood relation to be a two-place relation
between two objects: x is a part ofy simpliciter. A related issue concerns what the
fundamental instantiation relation is. Many endurantists take the fundamental property
instantiation relation to be a three-place relation between an object, a property, and at
time: x instantiates F at t, while every perdurantist takes the fundamental instantiation
relation to be a two-place relation: x instantiates F simpliciter.40 This is the kind of
adverbalism rejected in the Introduction. On both of these issues, I side with the
perdurantist.
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Consider now the following account of Four Dimensionalism presented by Ted
Sider in his paper “Four Dimensionalism.” [Sider (1997)].
Four Dimensionalism is the thesis that for any x, and any non-empty non-
overlapping sets of times T1 and T2 whose union is the time span of x, there are
two objects xl and x2 such that the time span of xl is Tl, the time span ofx2 is
T2, and x is the fusion ofxl and x2.
Although I believe that four-dimensionalism is actually true, I deny that four-
dimensionalism is necessarily true, for two reasons. First, I accept the possibility of
Parsonian extended simples that are extended in the temporal region. We could call
these objects endurers. Second, I accept the possibility of spanning extended simples
that are extended in the temporal region. Let us call these objects toughies. It seems to
me that both endurers and toughies are possible and four-dimensionalism as formulated
by Sider in Sider (1997) implies that they aren’t. Toughies are four-dimensional
extended simples; they are objects that are extended in both time and space but lack
both spatial and temporal parts at the sub-regions and sub-durations at which they exist.
They dominate temporally extended spatiotemporal regions.
Given that toughies and endurers are possible, why not believe that they’re
actual? There are three kinds of entity that are candidates for being temporally
extended simples: material objects, singleton sets, and immanent universal.
There are could reasons to deny that most or all material objects are endurers or
toughies. Recall a principle that I employed earlier in this chapter: we ascribe parts to
an object whenever there is an intrinsic variation within that object. Material objects
can undergo intrinsic change, and this counts as a kind of intrinsic variation. It’s this
fact that leads to the so-called problem oftemporary intrinsics
4]
Suppose that Jim is fat
Monday and thin on Tuesday morning. Since Monday is just as real as Tuesday, “Jim is
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fat at Monday” is not analyzable into the timeless “Jim is fat ” However, being fat is an
intrinsic feature, not a disguised relation between a thing and a time. Consequently,
‘Jim is fat at V must be analyzable into a statement in which the temporal index, ‘at
Monday’, does not appear, i.e., into a statement of the form, [x is Fat] 42 Accordingly,
we have excellent reason to think that Jim does have a part - a temporal part - that is fat
simpliciter.
An interesting upshot of this discussion is that the perdurantist can happily admit
that her view is only contingently true without giving up arguments for four-
dimensionalism that are primarily conceptual arguments. The perdurantist could argue
that worlds at which objects enjoy multi-location at different times are worlds in which
nothing undergoes intrinsic change. Since some objects do undergo intrinsic change in
this world, endurantism must be (contingently) false. But since endurantism is
contingently false, four-dimensionalism is contingently true.
However, this sort of consideration does not eliminate the epistemic possibility
that singleton sets are endurers or toughies, or that immanent universal occupying
spacetime via enduring or spanning. So for all that has been said here, there could be
enduring or spanning sets or universals.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
As I see things, there are two morals to draw. I have argued that the three main
reasons to reject the possibility of extended simples fail provided that the advocate of
extended simples adopts the Extrinsic Theory of Shape. Since the Extrinsic Theory is
neither unmotivated nor unprecedented, this is a respectable move for the advocate of
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extended simples to make. So the advocate of extended simples should endorse the
Extrinsic Theory.
The second moral to draw is this: since the Extrinsic Theory is a live option, the
case against extended simples has not been made. And, since there is some as of yet
undefeated evidence for their metaphysical possibility, we should take the epistemic
possibility of extended simples very seriously.
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Notes
1
x is a disconnected region just in case x is the sum of two regions rl and r2
such that rl and r2 are parts of non-overlapping open regions Rl and R2. x is connected
just in case x is not disconnected.
This is Parsons’s conception of extended simples, which he calls entended
objects. Dean Zimmerman seems to hold this conception of extended simples as well.
See Zimmerman (2002): 402. See also Hawley (2001): 28, 49 and Lewis (1991): 76.
I assume that point-sized objects are possible.
4 On the assumption of endurantism, the claim that all spacetime points have the
same intrinsic character is plausible. For given endurantism, material occupants cannot
be identified with the regions they occupy. Since material occupants are distinct from
the regions at which they are located, we can always assign physical properties, such as
being the generator of an electromagnetic field, to material objects. However, the claim
that all spacetime points are intrinsically alike is much less plausible given typical
perdurantism. For the typical perdurantist can (and perhaps should) identify material
objects with the regions that they occupy. Given this ontology, some spacetime points
will differ from others intrinsically, since spacetime points are now the bearers of
physical properties.
5
Accordingly, this object would be a one-dimensional extended simple.
6 See Sider (forthcoming) for a similar argument for the possibility of extended
simples.
7 When discussing time-travel, it is important to distinguish “personal time”
from “objective time”. Roughly, objective time is the time in which objects are
ordered, whereas personal time is something that plays the same role in the history of
the time-traveler as objective time does in the history of a non-time traveler. Let us
assume that o only occupies tl and t2. On this assumption, o enjoys only two moments
of objective time. However, since o is a time-traveler that returns to visit itself often, o
enjoys more than two moments of personal time. In fact, o enjoys infinitely many units
of personal time, since at tl, o occupies a continuous region of space. From the
perspective of o, o has visited tl many, many (personal) times. See Lewis (1976) for a
discussion of these issues.
8 On this kind of simple, see Gilmore (forthcoming).
9
Descartes discusses this argument in Descartes (1985), chapter II, section 20,
p. 231. Markosian discusses it in Markosian (1998): 223-224.
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10 DAUP is discussed in van Inwagen( 1983). (My statement ofDAUP is
slightly different from his.) I assume here that all regions of space - including point-
sized regions - are possibly occupied by a material object.
Every point is a zero-dimensional spatial region.
12
This view is defended in Broad (1946).
13
See Nerlich (1994) for a powerful defense of this claim.
What is the difference between an unoccupied region of space and one that is
occupied by an extended simple? More generally, how can we tell whether there is one
there? Presumably, an extended simple would not be causally inert. So, if an extended
simple is in a region, then, given the existence of appropriate laws of repulsion and
attraction, other material objects could not enter the subregions of the region exactly
occupied by an extended simple.
There are other reasons to believe in the existence of regions of space (or at
least regions of spacetime) that are independent of anything that I say in what follows.
See Nerlich (1994) for an impressive and sustained argument for spacetime realism.
16
Theodore Sider makes a similar point in Sider (2001): 110-119.
17
These definitions come from David Lewis. See Lewis (1986): 59-69.
1
8
Accordingly, I count myself as an advocate of extrinsicism about handedness,
to use the terminology of James van Cleve. See van Cleve (1987) for an interesting
discussion of philosophical problems concerning incongruent counterparts.
19
For example, David Lewis writes, “If we know what shape is, we know it is a
property, not a relation.” [Lewis (1986): 204], The context of this sentence makes it
clear that Lewis holds that we know that shapes are intrinsic properties.
20 Note that the Extrinsic Theory is compatible with the following claims: (1)
necessarily, every object occupies some region of space or other (2) and hence,
necessarily every object has some shape or other.
21 •
This means that we shouldn’t think that the way in which a region bestows
shape on an object is similar to the way a container bestows shape on the liquid poured
into it. In a case like this, the shape of the liquid is causally dependent on the shape of
the container. But the liquid’s shape is not metaphysically dependent on the shape of
the container. The liquid has this shape intrinsically if and only if the container does. I
thank David Robb for this helpful example.
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I know of no philosopher who holds the superimposition theory However
Adolf Grunbaum appears to hold the more radical fourth possibility, which seems to be
a consequence of his view that all metrical features are conventional, and accordingly
non-intrinsic features of the regions. [Grunbaum (1973), chapter 16].
23 A relation is an internal relation iff it supervenes on the intrinsic properties of
its relata, a relation is an external relation iff it does not supervene on the intrinsic
properties of its relata but does supervene on the intrinsic properties of the fusion of its
relata. A relation is an intrinsic relation iff it is either an internal or an external relation;
otherwise, that relation is an extrinsic relation. On these definitions, see Lewis (1986V
’
61-63.
24 On a related issue, see also Bricker (1993): 282-283.
' On this view, some material objects have intrinsic shapes. Specifically, the
fundamental particles still have their shape intrinsically. However, since the
spatiotemporal relations they stand in are extrinsic, any fusion of these particles has its
shape extrinsically.
26
See Barker (2003) and McDaniel (2003b).
27
Endurantism is not Barker and Dowe’s sole target; they also intend to refute
the view that universal enjoy multi-location. For the most part, I will restrict my
attention to the consequences of Barker and Dowe’s argument for endurantism. On the
multi-location of universal, see Armstrong (1997).
28
Peter van Inwagen discusses a rough characterization of endurantism,
according to which it is the view that “persisting objects are extended in three spatial
dimensions and have no other kind of extent.”. Perdurantism is characterized as the
view that “persisting objects are extended not only in three spatial dimensions, but also
in a fourth, temporal, dimension, and persist simply by being temporally extended”.
See van Inwagen (1990b).
29
See Barker (2003): 109-110.
30
See Sider (2001): 110-120.
31
I thank an anonymous referee for this nice formulation of PQV. By
“properties” I mean only one-place properties, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. (In some
circumstances, it is convenient to think of relations as 2+-place properties. This is not
one of those circumstances.)
32
It may be that the objects substituted for x and y are identical; or it may be that
they are not.
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33 _____
There are two other moves available to the advocate of extended simples
neither of which involves rejecting PQV. First, one could accept that distributional
properties, such as being red at RJ while being blue at R2, are ontologically
fundamental and intrinsic. On this strategy, see Parsons (2000). Second, one could
claim that, while no thing instantiates the property of being blue, nevertheless some
stuffor matter instantiates the property of being blue. In general, the denier of PQV
could claim that a property can be exemplified by some stuff without being exemplified
by any particular thing; see Markosian (1998), 223-224 and McDaniel (2003a), 269-274
for a discussion of this strategy. There are problems with both moves.
34
See Hinchliff (1996): 121-122.
35 i •A distance function assigns non-negative real numbers to pairs of points and
obeys the following constraints:
(i) D assigns exactly one number to each pair.
(ii) D assigns n to <p, q> if and only ifD assigns n to <q, p>.
(iii) D assigns 0 to <p, q> if and only ifp is identical to q.
(iv) If D assigns n to <p, q>, m to <q, r>, and l to <p,r>, then n + m>l.
36
Similarly, the friend of gunky spacetime will want to say that not every subset
ofU represents or corresponds to a real region of spacetime. Instead, the friend of
gunky spacetime might want to say that only non-empty (infinitely membered)
continuous sets or unions of non-empty (infinitely membered) continuous sets represent
or correspond with real regions. (And, of course, in this case the friend of gunky
spacetime will need to spell out how representation works if not by structural
isomorphism.)
DAUP-R entails the existence of point-sized regions of space, and hence
eliminates the possibility of gunky space. This might seem problematic. If need be, we
could replace DAUP-R with a weaker principle. Let us say that a subset S ofU is
eligible just in case S is a non-empty continuous set or S is the union of some non-
empty continuous sets. Consider the following principle:
DAUP-R2: Let R be a region of space. Let S be an eligible subset of U such that
S has the same shape as R. Then for any eligible subset of S, S-, there is a region
of space R- such that S- and R- have the same shape and R- is a part of R.
37
In this context, to say thatM is composed of arbitrary undetached parts is to
say that there is a model of abstract space such that a subset S of its domain has the
same shape as M and M has parts corresponding to the non-empty subsets of S.
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38
David Lewis appeals to a principle like this when arguing^i^^Z
ersatzism. See Lewis (1986): 179-183. It is possible that this principle needs to be
qualified. Consider the membership relation, which relates objects to sets. Some
material simples bear this relation to some singletons. Singletons may very well be
simples. (See Lewis (1991) for an interesting development of this claim.) So any
material simple may bear the membership relation to any singleton? Some may balk at
accepting this claim. See van Inwagen (1986): 207-210. I am inclined to accept the
unmodified principle.
39 Two points of clarification: first, the claim that necessarily, no extended
simple occupies a point-sized region of space is not analytic. It would be analytic if this
claim were equivalent in meaning to the claim that necessarily, no extended simple is
point-sized. These two claims are equivalent in meaning only if the Extrinsic Theory is
itself analytic. But although I think that the Extrinsic Theory is true, I don’t want to say
that it is true by definition! Second, I do not endorse the de re claim that every
extended simple is essentially extended. In fact, it should be clear that I reject this
claim.
40
See Sider (2001), sections 3.2-3. 3.
41
See Lewis (1986a): 202-205,210.
42
Note that ‘analyzable’ is not to be equated with ‘translatable’.
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CHAPTER 4
MATERIAL ATOMLESS GUNK
4.1 Preliminaries
In the previous chapters, I argued that there is no non-mereological criterion for
being a material simple and that extended material simples are possible. I now turn to
the question of whether material atomless gunk is possible. I will argue that there is a
reason to think that it is possible. One conception of material atomless gunk - the
Whiteheadian conception - is consistent and conceivable. And there are no good
arguments that this kind of material atomless gunk is impossible.
Although I hold that material atomless gunk is possible, I do not hold that gunky
spacetime is possible. It is commonly thought that any gunky object must occupy a
gunky region of spacetime. I will argue that this is not the case. Let us say that a region
of space (or spacetime) is simple iff that region has no proper parts. A region of space
is gunky iff every part of that region has proper parts. Let us call the maximal fusion of
space (or spacetime) simply space (or spacetime). So spacetime is that region of
spacetime that has all other regions as parts. Let us say that spacetime is simplistic just
in case there are some simple regions, the xs, such that spacetime is the fusion of the xs.
There are three theses I wish to discuss. First, there is the compatibility thesis
(CT):
(CT): There are possible worlds with simplistic spacetime and there are
possible worlds with gunky spacetime. 1
Second, there is the occupation thesis :
(OT): Necessarily, an object is material atomless gunk if and only if it
occupies a gunky region of spacetime.
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Third, there is the gunky thesis:
(MT): Material atomless gunk is possible.
My plan is as follows. First, I will argue that CT is false. Since I place more
credence in the claim that simplistic spacetime is possible than I do in the claim that
gunky spacetime is possible, I infer that gunky spacetime is impossible. However, the
impossibility of gunky spacetime implies that MT is false only if OT is true.
Fortunately, there are good reasons to reject OT as well. So one argument against MT
is undercut at the beginning.
4.2 The Case Against CT
The case against CT is not airtight. In fact, there are a number of ways to
undercut the argument against CT that are not without some initial plausibility.
However, discussing these issues in sufficient depth to close off the ways of
undercutting this argument would require more space than I presently have.
Accordingly, I will do my best to acknowledge the potential weaknesses of the
argument along the way and try not to overstate the case against CT.
The case against CT can be presented as follows:
(1) If a property or relation is natural to degree n, then it is necessary that the
property or relation is natural to degree n.
(2) If CT is true, then there is a property such that (i) it is natural to degree n but
(ii) it is not necessary that it is natural to degree n.
(3) So CT is not true.
The argument is valid. But the premises need a lot of unpacking. Let me
begin by discussing premise (1). In chapter 2, when discussing the view I called
Instance, I assumed that some properties are perfectly natural. Recall the roles that
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natural properties are employed to play: the natural properties and relations are those
that account for objective similarity, if two things share a natural property, then they
objectively resemble each other in that respect; perfect duplicates are objects such that
there is a 1-1 correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly natural
properties and relations.
It is important for this argument that naturalness or objective similarity is not all
or nothing; it is a matter of degree. Being red is a reasonably natural property, being
red or green is much less natural, and there are properties far more unnatural than these.
I assume that there are absolute facts about the degree to which a particular property is
natural at a world and that these absolute facts about naturalness fix the facts about
relative naturalness of various properties that are instantiated at a world. In other
words, the fundamental notion is P is natural to degree n, and not P is more natural
than Q by degree n. Properties that are natural to the maximal degree are called
perfectly natural.
Premise (1) is a claim about the essential properties of properties. Everything,
including properties, has essential properties. For example, the property of being a
prime number has the property being such that 2+2=4 essentially. Premise (1) asserts
that the degree to which a property is natural is an essential feature of that property. So
suppose charge is perfectly natural. It follows from premise (1) that charge has the
property of being perfectly natural essentially. There is no world at which it fails to be
perfectly natural.
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4.2.1 A Defense of Premise ( 1
)
Premise (1) states that, if a property or relation is natural to degree n, then it is
necessary that the property or relation is natural to degree n. Since (1) makes a claim
about the essential properties of properties, it would aid our evaluation of (1) ifwe were
to have a theory about the transworld identity conditions of properties. Let us make our
lives easier by assuming a plurality of possible worlds. We can now ask: do properties
exist at multiple worlds? Or are properties world-bound? And, if properties are world-
bound, is the appropriate semantics for the attribution of modal properties to properties
a kind ofproperty counterpart theory analogous to counterpart theory used to give a
semantics for the attribution of modal properties to individuals? The answers to these
questions will help us decide whether to accept or reject (1).
There are three main theories of properties. What it means to say that properties
are world-bound differs importantly from theory to theory. The first view worth
examining is the view that properties are sets or classes of their actual and possible
instances. According to this view, a property is world-bound just in case there is a
world w such that all of its elements exist at and only at w. A property enjoys
transworld existence on this view just in case it has elements x and y such that x exists
in one possible world and y exists in another possible world.
The second view worth examining is the view that a property is a universal
,
which is somehow wholly present in its instances. A property is world-bound according
to this view just in case there is a world w such that it is wholly present only within w.
A property enjoys transworld identity on this view just in case it is wholly present at
different possible worlds.
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Third, there is the view that properties are tropes
,
where a trope is a
particularizedproperty. On this view, the important notion of world-boundedness
applies not to tropes per se but instead to maximal resemblance classes of tropes. A
class C of tropes is a maximal resemblance class just in case (i) every trope in C
perfectly resembles every other trope in C and (ii) no trope not in C perfectly resembles
some trope in C. We now say that a maximal resemblance class of tropes C is world-
bound just in case there is a world w such that every element ofC exists at and only at
w. A maximal resemblance class C enjoys transworld identity just in case some tropes
in C exist in one world while different tropes in C exist in a distinct world.
If properties are literally present at more than one world, then it is intuitive that
they carry their natures with them from world to world. One aspect of a property’s
nature is its adicity; whether a property is a one-place, two-place, etc. property is an
intrinsic aspect of that property and not a function of its surroundings. The qualitative
aspect of a property is also an aspect of its nature. To deny this seems to strip
properties of the very things that make them properties. Finally, the naturalness of a
property also seems to be a function of its nature and not the circumstances in which the
property finds itself. So, if properties are transworld entities, it is reasonable to think
that properties have the same nature at every world at which they exist. And, if
properties are transworld entities, the way to understand de re modal claims about
properties is via the following schema:
Property P has property Q essentially just in case P has Q at every world
at which P is exemplified.
So, if properties are transworld entities, it is reasonable to think that (1) is true.
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However, those who hold that properties are world-bound entities have reason to
be suspicious of (1). If properties are world-bound entities, then the natural way to
analyze de re possibility claims about properties is via a kind of property counterpart
theory. Although counterpart theory is typically employed only to analyze de re
possibility claims about individuals
,
there is no reason why it cannot be employed to
analyze de re possibility claims about properties as well. A counterpart relation is
simply a relation of similarity; in order to understand how counterpart theory might
work when applied to properties, we simply need to determine what the appropriate
relation (or relations) of similarity is (or are).
As I see things, three factors could reasonably be said to be relevant to
determining the relevant similarity relation. We can think of each factor as determining
a kind of similarity relation. The appropriate counterpart relation for properties might
be a blend of some of these similarity relations; alternatively, and perhaps less
plausibly, each similarity relation could be thought as a counterpart relation.
The first factor that determines a similarity relation among properties is their
natures. Consider the properties of being red, being orange, and being blue. Intuitively,
being orange is more similar with respect to qualitative nature to being red than it is to
being blue. Or consider spin, charge, and being a bachelor. Obviously, spin is more
similar with respect to degree of naturalness to charge than it is to being a bachelor.
Finally, consider being tenfeetfrom, being 10 years before, and being ugly. Being ten
feetfrom is more similar with respect to adicity to being 10 years before than it is to
being ugly. Even if properties are world-bound, it could be that some properties at
world wl are similar with respect to their natures to other properties at world w2.
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Similarity with respect to nature would presumably be a blend of these three kinds of
similarity and might perhaps count as one kind of counterpart relation that properties
bear to each other:
x is a counterpartN ofy just in case x and y are similar with respect to
their natures.
A second factor that could reasonably be thought to determine a counterpart
relation among properties is pattern ofinstantiation. Let w be an arbitrarily chosen
possible world. Let F be the proposition that is the conjunction of every atomic
proposition such that (i) p is an attribution of a fundamental property or relation to
some thing or things and (ii) p is true at w. Let Q be the proposition that is derivable
from F by first systematically substituting the propositional equivalent of free variables
for each object that appears in F and then existentially generalizing over those
variables. We can think of Q as the qualitative description of w. We can say that two
worlds are qualitatively indiscernible just in case their qualitative descriptions are
identical.
Let us consider an arbitrarily selected possible world and its F proposition. Let
S be the proposition that is derivable from F by systematically substituting the
propositional equivalent of second-order free variables for each property that appears in
F and then existentially generalizing over these variables. We can think ofS as the
structural description of w. Let us say that two worlds are structurally indiscernible
just in case their structural descriptions are identical. The structural description of a
world tells us the pattern of instantiation of the properties at that world without telling
us the nature of the properties in that world. Structural descriptions tell us the various
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roles that properties play in the worlds described; moreover, there can be important
similarities between the various structures described by these structural propositions.
We can use this sort of similarity to cash out a kind of counterpart relation:
x is a counterparts ofy just in case (a) x exists at w and y exists at w* (b)
the structure of w is similar to the structure of w*, and (c) the role x plays
in the structure of w is similar to the role that y plays in the structure of
w*.
There is a third sort of similarity relation that the advocate of property
counterpart theory can appeal to: similarity with respect to nomological role. Whatever
laws of nature are, it is clear that they involve properties in some intimate way. For any
world w, let L(w) = the proposition that describes the lawful relations between the
properties that exist at w. Let L*(w) be the proposition derivable from L(w) by
systematically replacing the properties with the positional equivalent of second-order
free variables and then binding those variables with quantifiers. I will call L*(w) the
description ofthe nomological structure of w. Descriptions of nomological structures
tell us the various roles that properties play in the laws of the worlds described; and,
like structural descriptions, there can be important similarities between the various
nomological structures described by these propositions. These structures define a third
sort of counterpart relation:
x is a counterpartL ofy just in case (a) x exists at w and y exists at w*, (b)
the nomological structure ofw is similar to the nomological structure of
w*, and (c) the role x plays in the nomological structure ofw is similar to
the role that y plays in the nomological structure of w*.
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There is no reason to think that these three similarity relations must march in
step, for the following scenario is epidemically possible: there are properties/? and q
that are located in worlds wj and w2 respectively. Properties p and q are similar with
respect to nomological role and hence bear one kind of counterpart relation to another.
However, properties and p and q are not similar with respect to their natures. (For a
more concrete example, consider two worlds in which charge and spin have switched
nomological roles.)3
Suppose the advocate of property counterpart theory identifies the relation
of nomological similarity with the counterpart relation defined on properties. Then the
advocate of property counterpart theory can deny the first premise of the incompatibility
argument. All that is needed is that a property can have a counterpart that differs with
respect to how natural it is. And there is no reason to think that such a case cannot
occur. This kind of property counterpart theorist should probably deny premise (1).
Suppose that the advocate of counterpart theory identifies the counterpart
relation with some similarity relation that is determined by the three similarity relations
that we have discussed. There is no reason to think that this “average” similarity
relation marches in step with the relation of similarity with respect to nature. So
perhaps this kind of counterpart theorist should deny premise (1) as well.
Suppose that the advocate of counterpart theory claims that there are multiple
counterpart relations, some of which correspond to the ones that we have discussed.
She may then wish to say that, in different contexts, we invoke different counterpart
relations; in context C, a statement of the form p is essentially F is true just in case
every property that bears the counterpart relation made salient in C to p is F. On this
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view, there will be some contexts in which the salient counterpart relation is the relation
of nomological similarity. So, on this view, there will be contexts in which premise (1
)
is false.
So those who hold that properties are world-bound and so adopt counterpart
theory have a good reason to be suspicious of (1) as well. On the other hand, those who
hold that properties are transworld objects have a good reason to endorse premise (1).
Although I can’t hope to show that properties are transworld entities here, if I can show
that there is an intimate connection between this issue and the possibility of gunky
space, this in itself will be a significant result. Accordingly, I will now turn to an
examination of the second premise.
4.2.2 A Defense of Premise (2)
One of the background assumptions needed to ensure the truth of premise (2) is
the following:
(PS): Necessarily, r is an atomic region of spacetime iff r is point-sized.
(PS) rules out the possibility of extended yet simple regions of spacetime. But
that’s fine; I argued in chapter 3 that such regions are impossible. (PS) also rules out
the possibility of unextended yet mereologically complex regions of spacetime. This
also seems unobjectionable, although I don’t have an argument against this possibility.
Given (PS), spacetime is gunky if and only if spacetime has no point-sized proper parts.
The advocate of gunky spacetime may want to talk about points of spacetime
even if she does not take them with full ontological seriousness. Points of spacetime
can be modeled by sequences of regions of spacetime. Ersatz points may be thought of
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as an ordered set of regions Rm such that, (i) ifm is less than n, then Rn is a part of Rm,
and (ii) the diameter of Rn approaches zero as n approaches infinity. [Forrest (1996):
128]. These ersatz points aren’t real points, since they do not belong to the same
ontological category as regions.
This point about ersatz points not being real points is important. If we ignore it,
we might think that we have a quick argument for premise (2). This argument would
run like this, if spacetime is simplistic, then it decomposes without remainder into
point-sized parts. These point-sized parts are real parts of spacetime. Presumably, the
geometrical properties of a region of spacetime are fixed by the intrinsic character of
and the relations instantiated by the parts of that region. But this seems to mean that
being point-sized is a perfectly natural property, since the geometrical properties of a
point are not fixed by the intrinsic character of or relations instantiated by its proper
parts, since it doesn t have any. So, if spacetime is simplistic, then being point-sized is
a perfectly natural property.
So far, so good. But the argument proceeds: if gunky spacetime is possible, then
being point-sized is not perfectly natural, since to be point-sized in a gunky spacetime is
to be a certain kind of defined sequence. It is here that we must abandon this argument.
The mistake is straightforward but instructive: in a gunky spacetime, just as there are no
spacetime points, strictly speaking nothing instantiates the property ofbeing point-sized
either. In a gunky spacetime, the property of being point-sized is not had by certain
sequences of regions. Instead, certain sequences of regions have properties that allow
them to “model” or “simulate” points. So the quick argument fails to support premise
(2 ).
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Nonetheless, the mistake is instructive, for it tells us what to look for. In order
to support premise (2), we should find some property or relation that is perfectly natural
in a world with one kind of spacetime but not perfectly natural in a world with a
different kind of spacetime.
The kinds of properties we will look at when defending premise (2) are metrical
features of worlds with simplistic spacetime and worlds with gunky spacetime. Perhaps
similar examples that support premise (2) could be enumerated by attending to the more
abstract projective or topological features of such spaces. I am inclined to think that
there are possible worlds at which spacetime has topological and projective structure
but lacks metrical structure. At such worlds, there are no facts about how distant
objects are from each other. Perhaps there are also worlds in which spacetime has
topological structure but no richer structure. Perhaps some of those worlds are worlds
in which spacetime is gunky, while others are worlds in which spacetime is simplistic.
It may be that, in these worlds, there are properties that could serve to motivate premise
(2). Regardless, I will concentrate on worlds in which spacetime has metrical features as
well.
Plausible candidates for motivating premise (2) are diameter and distance. If
spacetime is simplistic, then the fundamental distance relations are two-place relations
of the form x is n unitsfromy. (Sometimes this relation is called spacetime interval.)
The things that instantiate these relations are spacetime points. In simplistic spacetime,
all facts about the geometry of spacetime follow from the facts about which points stand
in which distance relations to each other and the facts about which points are parts of
which regions. We can, for example, determine the diameter of an open sphere once we
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know the facts about which points are parts of the sphere and the distances these points
bear to each other. The procedure is straightforward: assume that the set of point-sized
parts of the open sphere is S. The diameter of our open sphere is n, where n is the
smallest number such that, for any two members of S, the distance between them is less
than n. Similarly for closed spheres: the diameter of a closed sphere is n, where n is the
smallest number such that, for any two point-sized parts of the closed sphere, the
distance between them is less than or equal to n.
So, in a simplistic spacetime, the various determinate properties of the
determinable being a sphere with a diameter ofn units are not perfectly natural
properties. They are less than fully natural, since they can be defined in terms of
parthood and the distance relations obtaining between points.
What about the distance relations obtaining between non-overlapping regions?
There are two sorts of distance relations between regions that we might be interested in,
both of which can be defined in a straightforward way if spacetime is simplistic. First,
there is the maximal distance relation. For closed regions, regions rl and r2 are
maximally distant by n units just in case rl has a point-sized part that is n units from
some point-sized part of r2, and rl has no point-sized part that is further than n units
from any point-sized part of r2. For open regions, regions rl and r2 are maximally
distant by n units just in case n is the least upper bound of the distance relations
instantiated by point-sized parts of rl and r2. Second, we might be interested in the
minimal distance relation. For closed regions, regions rl and r2 are minimally distant
by n units just in case rl has a point-sized part that is n units from some point-sized part
of r2, and rl has no point-sized part that is closer than n units to any point-sized part of
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r2. For open regions, rl and r2 are minimally distant by n units just in case n is the
greatest lower bound of the distance relations instantiated by point-sized parts of rl and
r2. (Obviously, other similar distance relations between regions can be defined.)
(What if the regions in question overlap? If we like, in those cases, we may say
that both the minimal and the maximal distances between those regions is zero.)
Neither the determinates of rl is maximally distant by n units to r
2
nor the
determinates of rl is minimally distant by n units to r2 are perfectly natural given that
spacetime is simplistic, since both are definable in terms of parthood and the distance
relations obtaining between points.
What if spacetime is gunky? The standard construction of ersatz points
mentioned earlier appeals to the notion of diameter. [Forrest (1996)]. Once we assume
that spherical regions have diameters of various lengths, we can construct ersatz points.
We can even, if we like, assign ersatz distances to the ersatz points, for there are
functions that take ordered pairs of points to real numbers that satisfy the constraints on
being a distance function. But we shouldn’t think that these ersatz distance relations
that ersatz points bear to each other are genuine distance relations. Ersatz points are not
parts of space, nor are they related via real spatial relations to real parts of space.
In fact, it is a kind of a category mistake to suggest that ersatz points are related
to each other via real distance relations. I think that we can see that this is so in a
particularly vivid manner if we attend to the fact that we can “construct” ersatz points
that are equally suitable for our purposes without appealing to set theory. For example,
instead of identifying points with certain ordered sets, we could identify ersatz points
with certain propositions. On this way of “constructing” “points” from regions, points
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may be thought of as propositions that state that there are concentric spheres of ever-
shrinking diameter that are parts of each other. Each point could, if we like, be
“identified” with a proposition that states of some series of regions that they are
concentric, have their predecessors as parts, and are such that the limit of the diameters
of these regions is zero. No one would take seriously the claim that these “points,”,
which really are propositions about regions and their properties, are actually distant
from one another or located in space. No proposition does or can bear any distance
relation to any other. The distance relations that link points to each other in a simplistic
spacetime are not instantiated by ersatz points in a gunky spacetime.
So, when defining minimal and maximal distance between regions in a way that
reveals what is metaphysically significant about gunky spacetime, we shouldn’t make
use of the notion of distance between points. Doing so will not provide us with a
perspicuous account of which metrical features are basic.
It seems that the fundamental metrical facts in gunky spacetime are about the
diameters of certain spherical regions. This is not surprising. Just as in a simplistic
spacetime every region of spacetime decomposes without remainder into points, in a
gunky spacetime every region of spacetime decomposes without remainder into non-
overlapping spherical regions. The various determinables of having a diameter ofn
units seem to be basic in worlds with gunky spacetime, i.e., perfectly natural.
What about the distances between regions? We might hope that we could
account for the various distance relations between regions in terms of the diameters of
larger spherical regions that encompass them. Let us explore whether this sort of
account is satisfactory for the two sorts of distance relations between regions that we
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have discussed, minimal and maximal distance.4 We will start by trying to characterize
the minimal distance relation in a gunky space. As before, we assume the regions in
question do not overlap. (If they do overlap, we can assume that the minimal and
maximal distances between them is zero.) We will need the following notion and
definitions:
Notation:
D(x) = n the diameter ofx is n
x<y x is a proper part of y
xoy x overlaps y
Definitions:
x and y are concentric =df.:
Either: (i) x<y and,
(ii) Let n be the diameter of some sphere S such that S<y but
-Sox and there is no sphere S’ such that D(S’)>D(S) and S’<y
and -S’ ox. Then there are at least two spheres such that the
diameter of these spheres is n, both spheres are a part ofy, and
neither sphere overlaps x.
Or: (i)><xand,
(ii) Let n be the diameter of some sphere S such that S<x but
-Soy and there is no sphere S’ such that D(S’)>D(S) and S’<x
and -S’oy. Then there are at least two spheres such that the
diameter of these spheres is n, both spheres are a part of x, and
neither sphere overlaps y.
Informally, concentric spheres are centered around the same point in spacetime.
A spherical region o barely avoids region r =df. (i) r does not overlap o
and (ii) any sphere larger than, but concentric with, o overlaps r.
Informally, regions that barely avoid each other are touching. The notion of bare
avoidance is accordingly a topological notion.
We can now define minimal distance in a gunky space as follows:
(MinDG): The minimal distance between rl and r2 is n, where n is the
diameter of the smallest sphere that barely avoids both rl and r2.
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In order to define maximal distance in a gunky spacetime, we need the following
additional definition:
A spherical region S barely contains regions rl and r2 =df. (i) rl is a
proper part of 5, (ii) r2 is a proper part of 5, (iii) there is no spherical
region S2 such that S2 is concentric with S, D(S2)<D(S), and rl and r2
are proper parts of S2.
Informally, if a spherical region barely contains a region, then that region is pressed
against the inside surface of the sphere. Were that region any larger, it would burst
forth from the sphere.
Now that we have the notion bare containment, we can introduce the notion of
maximal distance as follows:
(MaxDG): The maximal distance between rl and r2 is n, where n is the
diameter of the largest spherical region that barely contains rl and r2.
When formulating the definitions of minimal and maximal distance, we needed
to appeal to facts only about parthood and diameter. This provides further reason to
think that diameter is the fundamental metrical notion in a gunky spacetime. However,
there is a worry about these definitions that is worth discussing. For, if this worry is
genuine, it may be that the gunky theorist needs to take the facts about relations
minimal and maximal distances as basic metrical facts as well.
The definitions of minimal and maximal distance are acceptable provided that
we have a guarantee that, for any two non-overlapping regions, there is some larger
spherical region that barely contains both. If this is always the case, facts about
minimal and maximal distance can be cashed out in terms of facts about diameter and
parthood in the manner we just explored. But why should we assume that this is always
the case?
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Elsewhere, I have argued that there are certain discrete spaces at which objects
bear directly various distance relations to each other even though there are no
intervening regions of space. [McDaniel (forthcoming)]. For example, there are
possible worlds in which there are exactly two spatial points pi and p2 that are 10 feet
from each other, despite the lack of intervening space. Why not then also allow for
gunky spaces at which various gunky regions of space directly bear various distance
relations to each other? At such a world, two gunky spheres might have a minimal
distance of 10 feet from each other and a maximal distance of 15 feet from each other
even though there are no larger spheres that have both of them as proper parts. They
simply directly bear these distance relations to each other.
If this is possible, then the definitions of minimal and maximal distance are not
adequate. There are worlds at which they give incorrect results. And, if these
definitions are not adequate, then it seems to me that the gunky theorist must take the
notions of minimal and maximal distances as additional primitive notions. But then the
gunky theorist must say that, in gunky space, these notions pick out perfectly natural
relations. For the relations that they pick out are not instantiated in virtue of any deeper
metrical facts.
I have argued that facts about the diameters and distances between regions are
facts about perfectly natural properties and relations in worlds with gunky spacetime but
are not facts about perfectly natural properties and relations in worlds with simplistic
spacetime. So it seems that the distance relations and the diameter properties in worlds
with simplistic spacetime have a degree of naturalness that they do not have in worlds
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with gunky spacetime. If this is the case, then premise (2) is true. I will now look at
possible rejoinders to the argument for premise (2).
Rejoinder one: it is true that the properties had by regions of gunky spacetime
that are instances of the determinable having a diameter ofn units are perfectly natural.
It is also true that the properties had by regions of simplistic spacetime that are
instances of the determinable having a diameter ofn units are not perfectly natural. But
these are not the same determinate properties. In gunky spacetimes, regions enjoy one
kind of diameter property; in simplistic spacetimes, regions enjoy a different kind of
diameter-property. For example, there are exactly two determinate properties that go by
the name having a diameter of 1 0feet. One of those properties is instantiated only in
worlds with simplistic space, the other is instantiated only in worlds with gunky space
And so your argument for premise (2) fails.
Response to rejoinder one: this rejoinder violates a necessary truth about
determinates and determinables. Properties p and q are determinates of the same
determinable only ifp is equally as natural as q. Compare the various determinate mass
properties. Each is as natural as the others. Or consider the various and yet equally
natural determinates of charge. So this rejoinder fails.
Rejoinder two: it is true that the properties had by regions of gunky spacetime
that we call having a diameter of10feet, having a diameter of11 feet, etc. are perfectly
natural. It is also true that the properties had by regions of simplistic spacetime that we
call having a diameter of10feet, having a diameter of11 feet, etc. are not perfectly
natural. But these are not the same properties. Why do we call them by similar names?
The answer is straightforward: because they behave in similar-sounding ways. They are
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similar with respect to their structural role, and this similarity is why it makes sense to
call them by similar names. Note that this rejoinder does not require adopting
counterpart theory for properties.
Response to rejoinder two: Suppose that the properties are similar with respect
to their structure. Then I am happy to let you call these properties by similar names.
But I would have been happy to let you call these properties by similar names even if
they hadn’t been similar with respect to their structure. What’s in a name, after all?
But structural similarity comes cheap. I assume that there are worlds in which mass is
similar with respect to structure to “gunky diameter.” In such a world, mass comes in
continuous quantities. Whenever an object enjoys n units of mass, it has a proper part
that enjoys fewer than n units of mass. Using the mereological notions of parthood and
overlap and the concept of mass, we can define “mass concentricity,” “minimal mass
distance,” etc., if we like. But our doing this does not make mass-distance into genuine
distance. And, more importantly, it does not make the things that it relates regions of
spacetime, although of course you can call these things “regions” if you like. Real
spherical regions have real diameters, not fake diameters that behave similarly with
respect to their structural role. This rejoinder requires us to say that a gunky spacetime
is not a genuine spacetime.
Rejoinder (3): The various properties of having a diameter ofn units are
functional or multiply realizable properties. Functional properties are always realized
by other properties. For example, many philosophers take the property thinking about
blue skies to be a functional property. According to these philosophers, objects of all
sorts can have this property, provided that their parts bear the right sort of functional
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relations to each other. Robots, ectoplasmic spirits, and human beings all can have this
property, although the relational structure that underwrites it differs in each case Call
the various properties of having these relational or functional properties the realizing
properties. The realizing properties can differ with respect to how natural they are and
nonetheless realize the same property. Perhaps being an ectoplasmic spirit in state C is
a perfectly natural property, whereas being a human being enjoying brain state B is a
less than perfectly natural property. It does not follow that the property thinking about
blue skies is more natural in worlds in which the property is realized by ectoplasmic
spirits in state C than in worlds in which the property is realized by human beings
enjoying brain states B .
Similarly, there are various properties that underwrite having a diameter of 10
feet in a gunky spacetime. And there are various properties that underwrite having a
diameter of 10feet in a simplistic spacetime. These properties differ with respect to
how natural they are. But the functional property having a diameter of 10feet
,
which is
instantiated in both worlds, does not differ with respect to how natural it is.
Response to rejoinder (3): If having a diameter of10feet is a functional
property, then it is realized in a world in which mass (or some other property) plays “the
diameter role” in the fashion described in the response to rejoinder (2). But there is no
reason to assume that such a world is a world in which things stand in various distance
relations to each other. Perhaps there are no genuine spatiotemporal relations in that
world.
183
Second, spatiotemporal properties are not functional properties. To think of
them in this way to ignore their qualitative aspects. Following Galen Strawson, I want
to say:
I am tempted to hold up my hands, like G. E. Moore, and to
consider, not my hands, but the space — by which I mean only the spatial
extension — between them, and to say: ‘This is space (spatial extension),
and it is real, and I know its nature, in some very fundamental respect,
whatever else I do not know about it or anything else (e.g. the fact that it
is an aspect of spacetime)
. On this view the ordinary concept of space,
or indeed the concept of spacetime, in which (I claim) a fundamental
feature of our ordinary conception of space survives, has correct non-
structural descriptive content. It does not relate only to ‘what we may
call the causal skeleton of the world’, if to say this is to say that it does
not capture any aspect of the non-structural nature of the world. It has
non-structural content, and can transmit this content to our more general
conception of the non-mental. [Strawson (2003): 57],
It is the spatiotemporal properties themselves that have the qualitative aspect
and not some deeper properties that “realize them.”
Rejoinder (4): Why not simply say that the various diameter properties are
perfectly natural in both worlds with gunky spacetime and in worlds with simplistic
spacetime? That undercuts the argument as well.
Response to rejoinder (4): One worry about this response is that it seems to
require necessary connections between certain perfectly natural properties and relations
instantiated in worlds with simplistic spacetime. Suppose that having a diameter of10
feet is perfectly natural in worlds with simplistic spacetime. Presumably, the various
distance relations instantiated by points in simplistic spacetimes are also perfectly
natural. But then there is a necessary connection between two distinct sets of perfectly
natural properties and relations. For suppose there is a continuous region such that
something is a (point-sized) part of it if and only if it is (a point-sized region) less than
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1 0 feet from some point x. (That is, suppose that this region has parts that stand in
certain perfectly natural relations to each other.) It follows as a matter of necessity that
this region instantiates having a diameter of10feet. Suppose that a region decomposes
without remainder into points and instantiates having a diameter of10 feet. It follows,
as a matter of necessity, that this region has parts that stand in certain perfectly natural
relations to each other.
If rejoinder (4) is correct, then there are necessary connections between perfectly
natural properties and relations. But this sort of necessary connection is unacceptable to
a Humean like myself.
I conclude that premise (2) stands. This completes my argument against (CT). I
will now look at some of the consequences of rejecting (CT).
4.3 Should We Reject Simplistic Spacetimes?
If (CT) is false, then either gunky spacetime is impossible or simplistic
spacetime is impossible. It seems to me that we have reason to give more credence to
the claim that simplistic spacetime is possible. But perhaps this is simply a prejudice.
Perhaps instead there are good reasons to have the opposite preferences. We will now
examine one argument for the claim that we should prefer gunky spacetime.
In a recent article titled “From Ontology to Topology in the Theory of
Regions,”, Peter Forrest argues for gunky space. [Forrest (1996)]. Forrest’s case for
gunky space is based on two assumptions that he discusses at the beginning of the
article. The first assumption is that space is continuous. The second assumption is that
we are to adopt realism about regions of space, points of space, or both. [Forrest (1996):
34]. I will argue later that, if continuous gunky space is possible, then something like
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discrete gunky space is also possible. So the first assumption could possibly be
dropped. (We will return to this issue later.) Since I accept spacetime realism, 1 won’t
challenge the second assumption.
Forrest discusses three possible versions of spacetime realism. First, there is the
points only ontology (POO), according to which there are spacetime points but no
spatial regions. Instead, there are “substitute regions,” which are sets of points of space.
(We can think of any set of spacetime points as a substitute for a region of space.) These
aren t genuine regions of space, since they belong to a different ontological category
than the spacetime points.
Second, there is the regions only ontology (ROO), according to which there are
regions but no spatial points. Instead, there are substitute points,” which are sequences
of successively smaller spherical regions nested around the “points”. (We can think of
these sequences as representing the limits of regions of space.) I assume that,
according to ROO, there are no lines or planes of space either, although Forrest does
not explicitly say this.
Third, there is the view I favor, the points and regions ontology (PRO),
according to which there are spatial points and spatial regions. Spatial regions are
simply sums of points of space. It is hard to see why anyone would seriously favor
POO over PRO. Once we have points of space, given classical mereology we have the
regions as well. Although the universal summation principle of classical mereology is
controversial, its application to points of space is not the source of its controversy.
Here, it seems harmless. And, once we have sums of points, is there any reason not to
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think that these are regions? I can think of none. I will henceforth ignore POO in what
follows.
Accordingly, the choice facing us is between ROO and PRO. Let us now attend
to Forrest’s argument for ROO (and hence against PRO). Forrest’s argument for ROO
has two premises. Forrest calls the first premise the Probability Premise. He writes:
The Probability Premiss states that in the best scientific theory we would
not assign point locations (or momenta) to particles, or consider values
of fields at point locations. We would instead assign probabilities to
regions. [Forrest (1996): 34-35],
Forrest’s basic idea seems to be this. Given that we are scientific realists, we
should accept the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories. The best
scientific theory is one in which an ontological commitment to regions of spacetime is
made. It is not clear, however, that the regions that our best scientific theory speaks of
need to be construed as other than sets of points. On this possibility, Forrest writes:
My objection is based on a rather general principle concerning set-
theoretic constructions, namely that when assessing a theory we must not
be beguiled by the apparent simplicity conferred by the mathematical
technique of nested definitions. That is, we should unpack the
definitions to arrive at the full description according to the theory
Applying this general principle to the case in hand, we should be
reluctant to treat regions as sets of points if in the formulation of our
theory we are considering assignments of probabilities to regions. For
assignments of probabilities to sets of points, if points are considered
fundamental, are more complicated than assignments to regions, if these
are considered fundamental. For the same reason, if the statement of our
theory were to require assignments of numbers to points, then we should
be reluctant to endorse a regions-only ontology, for on that ontology
points are constructed as sets of regions. [Forrest (1996): 36].
I have reproduced almost the entire passage since the argument here is
especially opaque. I am guessing that the main thrust here is that physical properties
should not be assigned to mathematical objects. So, if we have a theory that appears to
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assign physical properties to mathematical objects, such as sets or sequences, what the
theory is really doing is assigning complicated relational structures to the elements of
the sets or sequences. And these complicated relational structures are more complicated
than the simpler properties that we thought the theory was assigning. If this is Forrest’s
point, then I think that something like this is right. Mathematical objects, such as sets
or sequences, simply are not the right sort of thing to bear physical quantities. We can,
if we like, speak as if they have them, for example, when we say that a set of things is
located where its members are. But we shouldn’t take this sort of talk to be asserting
fundamental facts about the world.
However, as I mentioned, my interpretation of Forrest’s argument here is little
more than a guess. And one problem with this interpretation of Forrest’s argument is
that he says some things that suggest that he does not take the assignment of
probabilities to regions to be analogous to the assignment of other fundamental
quantities. For example, he writes that the probabilities being assigned need not be
genuine probabilities. They could instead be measures of degrees of truth or analyzable
as idealized relative frequencies. [Forrest (1996): 35]. Given this fact, it is hard to see
why an assignment of, e.g., an idealized relative frequency to a set of points is any more
complicated than an assignment of an idealized relative frequency to a region composed
of the same points.
Forrest provides a second argument against taking the regions that are assigned
probabilities to be sets of points:
either we have an ad hoc restriction on which regions are assigned
probabilities or we have an ad hoc restriction on which sets of points are
regions. For we can assign probabilities only to measurable sets of
points... [ Forrest (1996): 37].
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This argument also seems weak. First, given POO, there is no reason to claim
that some non-empty sets of points don’t count as regions. But the fact that only
measurable sets can have probabilities assigned to them provides a completely non-ad-
hoc reason for not assigning probabilities to them.
Forrest’s argument against POO seems unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it may be
that our best scientific theory requires either real regions or regions taken as sets of
points. In the former case, we have a commitment to real regions of space. In the latter
case, we have a choice between POO and PRO. But, as I argued earlier, there is no
reason to prefer POO to PRO and some reason to have the opposite preference. So if
our best scientific theory requires regions of some sort, we might as well take them to
be real regions.
Let us now turn to Forrest’s second premise in his argument for gunky space.
Forrest describes his argument against points as an Ockhamist argument:
the most straightforward Ockhamist argument against [PRO] concerns
the number of entities being posited. We should show some preferences
for smaller infinite numbers over larger ones. . . . One of the attractions
of a regions-only ontology, even apart from the Probability Premiss, is
that we might in fact propose that there are only beth-zero regions, an
economy achievable on rival theories only if space is discrete. On more
conservative versions of the regions-only ontology we shall have beth-
one many regions, represented by countable unions of spherical sets
which have rational coordinates for the centers and have rational radii.
On the rival points-and-regions ontology, there are, however, beth-two
regions obtained by summation from the beth-one many points. [Forrest
(1996): 37 -38 ],
Since PRO commits us to more things than ROO, and these additional things are
not part of the explicit ontological commitment of our best scientific theory, we should
prefer ROO.
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Of course, it s not clear that Ockham’s razor has a real application here. One
could argue that Ockham’s razor tells us not to multiply types of things beyond
necessity, but it does not require us to not multiply tokens beyond necessity. And, since
points belong to the same ontological category as regions and regions are simply sums
of points, PRO does not violate Ockham’s razor. 5
A second worry about Ockham’s razor is this. Even if we understand Ockham’s
razor as a maxim against postulating unnecessary tokens of things as well as types, it is
clear that we need to understand it as telling us not to postulate unnecessary distinct
things. For it seems reasonable to hold that, if we make an ontological commitment to
some entity, our belief in the entity’s parts does not constitute a further ontological
commitment. And these points are simply parts of the regions to which we are already
committed.
I conclude that Forrest’s argument for gunky spacetime is at best inconclusive.
4,4 What about Material Atomless Gunk?
I have argued against (CT) and argued that an alleged reason to disbelieve in the
possibility of spacetime points is not genuine. I have indicated (but not justified) my
preference for the necessity of simplistic spacetime over the necessity of gunky
spacetime. Accordingly, I am committed to:
(NP): Necessarily, every spacetime is simplistic.
I will now discuss the occupation thesis, which, recall, is the following:
(OT): Necessarily, an object is material atomless gunk if and only if it
occupies a gunky region of spacetime.
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(NP) and (OT) jointly imply the impossibility of material atomless gunk.
However, I will argue that (OT) is false. (NP) by itself does not imply that material
atomless gunk is impossible.
The case for material atomless gunk is not strong but it is not non-existent. The
fact that we have a coherent conception of atomless gunk provides some reason to think
that some possible object meets this conception. However, this evidence is defeasible.
If a strong case can be made against material atomless gunk, then the evidence will be
trumped. Accordingly, I will examine an argument due to Hud Hudson for the claim
that material atomless gunk is impossible. I will argue that Hudson’s argument fails.
Perhaps material atomless gunk is impossible, but we have not yet seen a reason to
think that it is. The weak case for atomless gunk as if yet undefeated. This will
complete my case against (OT).
4.4. 1 The Simple Question and the Occupation Thesis
In chapter 2 we examined various answers to the Simple Question. I will now
discuss what these answers imply about OT. I will begin by discussing views that
imply that OT is false.
We start with the Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon). MaxCon
implies that OT is false, for, if MaxCon is true, then there could be an object that
occupies a gunky region of space and yet is a simple. Recall that MaxCon states that an
object is a simple just in case it occupies a maximally continuous region of space. A
region of gunky space could be continuous and filled with matter. Any such region that
is also maximal is then a region filled with a simple, given MaxCon.
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Let us consider the Instance of a Fundamental Property View of Simples
(Instance). Instance also seems to imply that OT is false. Consider an object that
exactly occupies an extended region of gunky space. There is no principled reason why
such an object could not instantiate a perfectly natural property, But then, given
Instance, this object would be a simple.
Let us consider the Physical Indivisibility View of Simples (PIV). Presumably,
if gunk is possible, there are some gunky worlds in which physically indivisible objects
reside. These objects are counter-examples to OT, given PIV.
Three of the seven views discussed in chapter 2 imply that OT is false.
Unfortunately, this doesn’t show that OT is false, since I argued that each of these three
views is itself false. However, I hope that the recognition that several plausible answers
to the Simple Question do have this implication helps to loosen OT’s grip on our
intuitions.
What about the other answers to the Simple Question? The Brutal View of
Simples, which I favor, is silent on the question of whether OT is true. Independence
also seems to offer no help on this question. The Pointy View might seem to imply OT,
but in fact is consistent with the denial of OT. We will return to this issue later.
I conclude that we should be very cautious before endorsing OT.
4.4.2 Zimmerman’s Argument For Material Atomless Gunk
In Zimmerman (1996), Dean Zimmerman argues that material atomless gunk is
possible. Strictly speaking, Zimmerman’s conclusion is stronger than the mere claim
that material atomless gunk is possible: he argues that, necessarily, any continuous
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material object must have some gunky part. Given that there are worlds with
continuous material objects, it follows that material atomless gunk is possible.
Zimmerman, following Richard Cartwright, employs the following definitions:
R is an open sphere about p = df. the members of R are all and only those points
that are less than some fixed distance from p.
p is a boundary point of R =df. every open sphere about p has a non-null
intersection with both R and the complement of R.
R is a closed region =df. R contains all of its boundary points.
R is an open region =df. R contains none of its boundary points.
R is a partially open region =df. R contains some but not all of its boundary
points.
6
Zimmerman then introduces the following definitions:
(Dl): Object x is adjacent to region R =df. the region exactly filled by x has no
points in common with R, and the union of the two regions is a
connected region.
(In a parenthetical remark immediately following the statement of Dl, Zimmerman
notes that disconnected regions are those separated by at least a point that is included in
neither region, while connected regions must not be even that far apart.)
(D2): x is a closed object =dfx is a spatially located object; and, for every y
such thaty is a part of x adjacent to a region which is not filled by a part
of x, there is a set A of simple parts ofy such that each member ofA is
adjacent both to regions filled by parts ofx and by regions not filled by
any part of x.
(D3): x is an open object =df x is a spatially located object; x has proper
parts; and there is no set of simple parts ofx such that each member is
adjacent both to regions filled by parts ofx and regions not filled by
any part of x.
(D4): x is a partially open object =df x is a spatially located object; x has
proper parts; x is neither open nor closed. [Zimmerman (1996):6-7j.
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Definitions (D2)-(D4) employ both mereological and topological concepts, and
the concept of occupation. Zimmerman notes that, if we assume the Pointy View of
Simples, it follows that an object is closed if and only if it exactly occupies a closed
region of space. Zimmerman also notes that, ifwe assume that, necessarily, all
continuous material objects decompose without remainder into point-sized simples, it
follows that an object is open if and only if it exactly occupies an open region of space. 7
However, as Zimmerman points out, if we allow for the possibility of atomless
gunk, it is not true that an object is open if and only if it exactly occupies an open region
of space. Specifically, given Zimmerman’s definitions, a gunky object could occupy a
closed region of space. Zimmerman’s view leaves open the possibility, which was also
discussed in chapter 3, that an object could occupy a region and yet have a different
mereological structure than the region it occupies. A closed region of space contains
simple parts; a gunky object that occupies it need not.
What happens if we drop the assumption that all and only material simples are
point-sized? It was this assumption that grounded the equivalence between being a
closed object and exactly occupying a closed region. If we allow for extended simples,
what changes?
It is clear that no extended simple can be an open object. For it is part of the
definition of open object that open objects have proper parts. However, it is not part of
the definition of closed object that closed objects have proper parts. (This is important,
since all point-sized objects are closed given Zimmerman’s definition.) Suppose an
extended simple O exactly occupies region R. It follows then that O is a spatially
located object. And, since O has no proper parts, the set of simple parts of O contains
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only O. (The set of proper parts ofO is the empty set.) Given this, it emerges that O is
a closed object
,
since O is such that, ifO is adjacent to a region that is not filled by O,
then O is adjacent both to regions filled by O and by regions not filled by O. Note that
O will count as a closed object given Zimmerman’s definitions even ifO exactly
occupies an open region of space. This is strange: all extended simples are closed
objects, given Zimmerman s definitions, even if they exactly occupy an open region of
space.
Zimmerman’s definitions of closed and open objects obscure another question:
what are the topological properties of the objects that occupy regions of space?
Material objects can have shapes, just as regions of space can have shapes. One aspect
of a region’s shape is its topological structure, e.g., whether it is continuous, open, etc.
Likewise, one aspect of a material object’s shape is its topological structure. On
Zimmerman’s view, do material objects inherit the shapes of the regions they exactly
occupy? Or can these two kinds of shape properties come apart?
Given the Extrinsic Theory, which I argued for in chapter 3, a material object is
topologically closed just in case it occupies a closed region of space. Likewise, a
material object is topologically open]us\. in case it occupies an open region of space. It
is clear that Zimmerman holds that some shape properties of objects match those of the
regions they occupy, e.g., the volume of an object is equal to the volume of its region.
But, on Zimmerman’s view, can a material object be closed in Zimmerman’s sense and
yet still be topologically open, because it is an extended simple that exactly occupies an
open region of space? On Zimmerman’s view, can a material object be open in
Zimmerman’s sense because it is material atomless gunk and yet be topologically
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closed because it exactly occupies a closed region of space? We are left without clear
guidelines of how to answer these questions.
There are other strange features of Zimmerman’s definitions of open object and
closed object. For example, given these definitions, there are possible worlds that
contain an object that is both open and closed. (These objects, accordingly, are not
partially open.) Consider a possible world in which space is finitely extended, that is,
there is a maximally large region of space, which has finite extent. Consider a material
object O that has proper parts and exactly occupies this maximal region of space. O is
closed since O is spatially located and the second condition for being closed is
vacuously satisfied. The reason why the second condition is vacuously satisfied is that
there is no y that is a part ofO that is adjacent to a region not occupied by O or a part of
O. Similarly, O is an open object, since O is spatially located, has proper parts, and the
third condition for being open is vacuously satisfied. The reason why the third
condition for being an open object is vacuously satisfied is that there are no regions
adjacent to O that do not contain O or a part of O. So there is no set of simple parts of
O such that each member is adjacent both to regions filled by parts of O and regions not
filled by any part of O. Note that this result was achieved without assuming whether
the region exactly occupied by O is a topologically open region or a topologically
closed region. So, presumably, there are worlds in which space is finite and in which
the maximal region of space is topologically closed and exactly occupied by a material
object that is both open and closed. Similarly, there are worlds in which space is finite
and in which the maximal region of space is topologically open and exactly occupied by
a material object that is both open and closed.
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This is a strange result. Zimmerman’s claim that, given the Pointy View of
Simples and the rejection of atomless gunk, an object is closed (open) if and only if it
exactly occupies a closed (open) region of space, is false. In worlds with finite matter-
filled space, these equivalences do not hold. However, this is an admittedly unusual
case, and this feature of Zimmerman’s view does not seem to play a crucial role in
anything in the argument that follows.
Let us now turn to Zimmerman’s argument for the possibility of atomless gunk:
( 1 ) If extended objects could be entirely composed of simples, then
either (i) necessarily, every extended object is closed, (ii)
necessarily, every extended object is open, (iii) necessarily, every
extended object is partially open, or (iv) some “mixed bag
metaphysics” is true.
(2) Alternatives (iii) and (iv) are impossible.
(3) If (ii) were true, then extended objects could not be composed
entirely of simples.
(4) If (i) were true, then extended objects could not be composed
entirely of simples.
(5) So, if extended objects could be composed entirely of simples,
then they could not be composed entirely of simples.
Therefore, extended objects could not be composed entirely of
simples.
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By a “mixed bag metaphysics,” Zimmerman means a metaphysics that allows for the
compossibihty of some of the following: partially open objects, open objects, and
closed objects.
Zimmerman assumes the following propositions:
(Matter): Necessarily, if x and y are material objects, then it is not possible for x
and y to exactly occupy the same region of space (at the same time).
[Zimmerman (1996): 2-4],
(A) The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts. [Zimmerman (1996): 8].
(B) If two objects are in contact, then it is impossible for two distinct non-
overlapping objects to be closer together than the two objects in question.
[Zimmerman (1996): 9].
(C) For any two possible shapes of a part of the surface of an extended object, it
is possible for there to be extended objects having surfaces with those shapes
that are in contact. [Zimmerman (1996): 10].
(D) For every extended object x that fills a connected region, if extended objects
y and z are discrete proper parts of z such that every part ofx is a part of the
sum ofy and z, then y and z are in contact. [Zimmerman (1996): 10],
(B) and (D) seem relatively harmless, and I have nothing to say against them.
I have already discussed and criticized DAUP in chapter 3 and will not revisit those
criticisms. I will focus my critical comments on (Matter) and (C) before examining the
role that each of Zimmerman’s assumptions plays in motivating the premises of his
argument.
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Let’s begin with a discussion of (Matter). There are two ways to understand
(Matter). We can take (Matter) to be a synthetic metaphysical claim about the nature of
material objects. Alternatively, we can understand (Matter) as a stipulative definition,
one that imposes a constraint on what it is to called a material object
,
8
If we adopt the
former route, we can directly argue against this principle. This is the route that I took in
chapter 2, where I argued that there are good reasons to believe that co-located material
objects are possible.
On the other hand, if we adopt the latter route, we cannot claim that (Matter) is
false. We can, however, argue that nothing satisfies the definition of “material object”
that (Matter) partially fixes. In fact, I think a stronger claim is correct: necessarily,
nothing satisfies this stipulative definition. Given this partial definition of “material
object,” there could be no material objects. Accordingly, one would have no good
reason to introduce this definition to begin with. You can say it if you want to, but why
would you want to?
We need to distinguish the following two claims:
( 1 ) Necessarily, no two material objects occupy the same space at the same
time.
(2) Ifx is a material object and y is a material object, then it is necessary that
x andy do not occupy the same space at the same time.
If we understand (Matter) to be equivalent to (1), then (Matter) is an
acceptable stipulation in the sense that it is possible for objects to count as material
objects. Compare (1) and (2) with the following:
(3) Necessarily, no two bachelors are married to each other.
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(4) Ifx is a bachelor and y is a bachelor, then it is necessary that x and y do
not marry each other.
Since it is part of the meaning of the word “bachelor” that bachelors are
unmarried, but not part of the meaning of the word “bachelor” that bachelors are
essentially unmarried, something can be a bachelor. (3) is an acceptable stipulation.
(4), however, is clearly false, if understood not as a stipulative definition, and clearly
unacceptable if understood as a stipulation, for nothing could have an essence that is
impossible to have. There are no objects that are essentially bachelors. And, moreover,
there couldn’t be.
The important thing to note is that Zimmerman intends that (Matter) be
interpreted as (2), not as (1). And (2) is analogous to the unacceptable (4), not the
acceptable (3). Finally, the considerations discussed in chapter 2 for the claim that
material objects can interpenetrate also suffice to make (2) an unacceptable stipulation.
Since nothing can have an essence that is impossible to have, if we require that objects
be essentially impenetrable to count as material objects, we in effect eliminate the
possibility of there being material objects. This would be a strange thing to do.9
Let us now turn to (C), which states that, for any two possible shapes of a part of
the surface of an extended object, it is possible for there to be extended objects having
surfaces with those shapes that are in contact. Zimmerman’s informal statement of (C)
is that extended objects are not kept from touching one another simply because of their
shapes. [Zimmerman (1996): 9].
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There are a few technical issues that need to be addressed before we proceed
with a critical discussion of (C). It is not clear that Zimmerman has properly formulated
(C). There are two problems with Zimmerman’s formulation of (C).
The first problem with Zimmerman’s formulation of (C) is that it seems to imply
that objects that are extended are nevertheless point-sized (and can stand in contact to
boot)! I say that it “seems to” instead of “does” because I am not certain what
Zimmerman means by “surface.” On one straightforward understanding of this term,
(C) does have this implication. Intuitively, we can think of the surface of an object as
the region composed of the simples that occupy the boundary points of the object. Here
is an example: consider an open sphere S of radius n around point p. Then the surface of
S is the sum of points that are exactly n distance from p. The sphere is an extended
object. There are parts of its surface that are point-sized. So (C) implies that it is
possible for there to be extended objects that have a point-sized surface. But the
surface of an object just is the sum of its boundary points. If an object has a point-sized
surface, this means that it is in fact a point-sized object. So (C) implies that it is
possible for there to be extended objects that nonetheless are point-sized. Surely this is
unacceptable.
A similar worry about (C) is that it seems to imply that one-dimensional closed
objects are possible. Such objects would presumably be counter-examples to the thesis
that every extended object is open. The proof is similar to the previous one. Consider
our open sphere. Now consider two of the curved lines L and M that are parts of the
surface of the sphere. Given (C), it is possible that there are extended objects x and y
such that x has a surface with the shape of L, y has a surface with the shape of M, and x
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and y are in contact. Ifx and y are embedded in a three-dimensional space, the only
way that x and y can have surfaces that are the same shapes as L and M respectively is if
x is shaped like L and y is shaped like M But then x and y are one-dimensional closed
objects (that nevertheless are in contact). This sort of result seems unfortunate.
I suspect that Zimmerman intended something much simpler, such as:
(C*): For any two extended material objects, it is possible for those two
objects to be in perfect contact.
Or perhaps:
(C**) For any two extended material objects with shapes SI and S2, it is
possible for there to be two material objects xl and x2 such that xl has SI,
x2 has S2, and xl and x2 stand in perfect contact. 10
I will concentrate on (C**) in what follows, since it seems to me to be the most
plausible of the two. It is not clear why one would hold (C**) and not also hold a more
general claim:
(C***): For any possible material objects x and >>, it is possible for objects that
are shaped like x and y to be in perfect contact.
Admittedly, it is clear that (C***) is absurd, since it implies that two point-sized objects
could come into perfect contact. And, given the continuity of space, this is impossible.
But, if this provides a reason to doubt (C***), why doesn’t the impossibility of two
topologically closed material objects coming into perfect contact also provide evidence
against (C**)? When examining Zimmerman’s reasons for thinking that (C**) is true,
we should also make sure to see whether they also are reasons for thinking that (C***)
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is true. If Zimmerman’s rationale for (C*‘) also supports (C***), then we shouldn’t
trust his rationale.
Zimmerman’s rationale for (C**) is based on the claim that we should not
ascribe repulsive powers to objects simply because they have a certain shape:
If some configuration of the parts of the surface of an object were such
that no objects having those configurations could be brought into contact
— i.e., if (C) were false, -- we would find ourselves forced to posit
repulsive powers which must be possessed by all substances having
those shapes Thus (C) would seem to be at least a methodologically
sensible working assumption, to be given up only as a last resort.
[Zimmerman (1996): 12-13],
Zimmerman asks us to consider a case in which a topologically open cube and a
topologically closed cube approach each other, starting at 10 feet apart and moving with
sufficient force to come into contact after two seconds. Suppose, instead, that in this
example there had been two closed cubes. Zimmerman asks us how they are spatially
related after two seconds and notes that, given standard topological assumptions and the
assumption that material objects cannot interpenetrate, they must still be some finite
distance apart. Zimmerman writes:
Was their progress towards one another slower than that of the other
pair, or did it stop sooner? In either case, we seem forced to attribute
repulsive powers of some kind to the cubes - an ability each cube has to
“let the other know” that it has a skin of simples so that, if both the
approaching surfaces are closed, the bodies can make sure to slow down
or stop. Unless we ascribe repulsive forces to closed surfaces, Bolzano’s
world becomes one in which a certain class of objects are unaccountably
deferential to one another - always just managing to step out of each
other’s way - while they bang heedlessly into the members of another
class of objects. Surely repulsive forces would have to be posited to
explain such behavior. [Zimmerman (1996): 12],
In chapter 2, where I argued that co-located point-sized objects are possible, I
wrote:
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Suppose two point-particles are approaching each other at a rapid clip. If
co-located material objects are impossible, then they must swerve out of
each other’s way. Or they must stop dead in their tracks. Or one of them
must spontaneously disintegrate. Some event must occur in each world
that prohibits them from occupying the same space. There is a de re
necessary repulsion between these two objects. The price of denying the
possibility of co-located objects is accepting brute de re modal facts like
these. The price is too high.
So I agree with Zimmerman that we shouldn’t ascribe repulsive powers to an
object simply because it has a certain shape. But the case of point-sized objects
approaching each other seems perfectly analogous to the case of two closed objects
approaching each other. Zimmerman argues that the friend of extended closed objects
can avoid this worry by arguing that they are not wholly composed of simples. Since
Zimmerman endorses the Pointy View of Simples, it is clear that he cannot avoid the
analogous problem that arises when considering point-sized objects by arguing that
these objects are not wholly composed of simples.
Because Zimmerman is loathe to surrender (Matter) and accepts (C**) in order
to avoid postulating repulsive powers, he rejects the possibility of closed objects that are
composed entirely of point-sized simples. The analogous move to make in the second
sort of case is to reject the possibility of point-sized objects. But this is surely overkill.
A more conservative move would be to give up (C**) and avoid postulating repulsive
forces by denying Matter. This is the course I recommend following.
Both (C**) and Matter are employed in Zimmerman’s defense of premise (2).
So Zimmerman’s defense for (2) has been undercut. Consequently, Zimmerman’s
argument fails to establish that, if continuous extended material objects exist, then there
is material atomless gunk.
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4A3—A Coherent Conception of Material Atomless Gunk
However, although Zimmerman’s argument does not establish the possibility of
atomless gunk, Zimmerman’s project is not necessarily doomed. The conclusion that
Zimmerman aimed to establish is very strong: any possible world that contains
continuous extended objects contains material atomless gunk. But Zimmerman’s
purposes would be equally served if he could establish the weaker claim that some
possible worlds that contain continuous extended material objects also contain atomless
gunk.
Zimmerman describes two different metaphysics of continuous material objects,
which he calls the “Whiteheadian Metaphysics” and the “Brentanian Metaphysics.”
Both of these theories about the nature of continuous material objects postulate atomless
gunk. If at least one of these metaphysics is exemplified by objects at some possible
world, then atomless gunk is possible. So we should examine these two theories and
see whether we have reason to think they are true of objects at some possible world.
I will argue that the Brentanian conception of material atomless gunk is not
tenable. However, the Whiteheadian conception of material atomless gunk is tenable.
Let us now turn to a discussion of the Brentanian theory of the nature of
extended continuous material objects. As Zimmerman states the view, the Brentanian
metaphysics is a conjunction of five theses:
(i) All continuous extended objects are closed and hence have a skin
composed of point-sized simple parts.
(ii) All continuous extended objects are partially gunky.
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(iii) x and y are in contact just in case x has a point-sized part pl,y has a
point-sized part p2, and pi and p2 are co-located.
(iv) All point-sized parts of material objects are ontologically dependent on
the existence of the extended wholes that they are part of. That is, if x is
a point-sized part of^, then, necessarily, x exists only ify
exists. [Zimmerman (1996): 34],
(v) The existence of point-sized entities is entailed by the existence of
extended material objects. That is, necessarily, if an extended material
object exists, then point-sized objects located at the boundary points of
this object exists. [Zimmerman (1996): 28], 11
My first worry concerns (iv). Consider an extended object E and a point-sized
part of the object p. Now consider the object that is mereological remainder ofE minus
p. Let us call this object E-. p and E- are entirely distinct; they have no parts in
common. Given that these objects are entirely distinct, there should be no necessary
connections between them. But then there should be a possible world in which p exists
and E- does not exist. Presumably there is a world like this in which E does not exist as
well (because E- is almost all of E). But then p is not ontologically dependent on E,
contrary to (iv).
I suspect that most advocates of Brentanian extended objects will be unmoved
by this sort of Humean consideration. So, although I find this argument worrisome, I
don’t doubt that it won’t convince the advocate of Brentanian extended objects. So let
us attend to other concerns about the view.
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My second worry is about (i). The Brentanian grants that objects have point-
sized parts. In fact, they have point-sized parts located at each point-sized sub-region of
the region exactly occupied by the extended object. This is because the Brentanian
accepts DAUP and maintains that each arbitrary undetached part of an object is in
contact with the remainder of that object, and, given (iii), contact can occur only when
there are spatially coincident point-sized parts of the objects in contact. Let us attend to
the set of simples S that collectively exactly occupy an open sub-region R of the region
of space exactly occupied by an extended continuous material object. R is a continuous
three-dimensional region of space. If there is a fusion of the elements of S, then that
fusion is an open object that is nonetheless both continuous and extended. So the
Brentanian is committed to denying that there is such an object. But then the
Brentanian is committed to denying the principle of unrestricted composition, which I
have embraced. This constitutes my second, and more serious, worry about the
i 'y
Brentanian picture.
I conclude that the Brentanian metaphysics is not viable.
Let us now attend to the Whiteheadian conception of material atomless gunk.
According to this conception, every material object is continuously extended in three
dimensions. [Zimmerman (1996): 17-19]. On the Whiteheadian picture, material
objects do not have point-sized, one-dimensional, or two-dimensional parts. Finally, on
the Whiteheadian picture, every material object is gunky since it is not composed of a
set of atomic point-sized parts.
Most advocates of Whiteheadian material objects hold that they are located in
Whiteheadian spacetime, where a spacetime is Whiteheadian just in case it has no parts
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that are not three-dimensional continuous regions. 13 However, we should ask whether it
is possible for there to be Whiteheadian material objects in a classical simplistic
spacetime. If we can develop a clear picture of the metaphysics of Whiteheadian
material objects in a simplistic spacetime, then we will have conceived of a counter-
example to OT.
I will now turn to a discussion of a recent argument against atomless gunk,
which can be found in a book by Hud Hudson, titled A Materialistic Metaphysics ofthe
Human Person. [Hudson (2001)]. I intend to use Hudson’s argument as a foil; although
I believe it is unsound, a careful examination of why it fails will provide us with a clear
and distinct conception of the metaphysics of Whiteheadian material objects.
4.4,4 Hudson’s Argument Against Material Atomless Gunk
Hudson’s argument is intriguing for several reasons. First, Hudson directly
appeals to specific answers to the Simple Question, which we discussed in chapter 2, in
order to settle the dispute concerning the possibility of atomless gunk. Second, Hudson
appeals to claims about the nature of spacetime. The overall structure of his argument
is as follows:
(a) Either MaxCon or the Pointy View is true.
(b) If MaxCon is true, then atomless gunk is impossible.
(c) If the Pointy View is true, then atomless gunk is impossible.
(d) So atomless gunk is impossible. [Hudson (2001): 84-90].
In chapter 2, 1 argued that both MaxCon and the Pointy View are false.
I won’t revisit my criticisms here. I will not challenge premise (b). Instead, I will focus
on Hudson’s defense of (c).
Hudson’s defense of premise (c) consists of the following argument:
(1) The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts.
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(2) Necessarily, no hunk of material atomless gunk exactly occupies
a point-sized region of space.
(3) Necessarily, any hunk of material atomless gunk exactly occupies
some region or other.
(4) Necessarily, any region has at least one point-sized subregion.
(5) Necessarily, any point-sized region is exactly occupiable
[Hudson (2001): 88-89],
Hudson claims that premises (2), (4), and (5) are each supported by an appeal
to the Pointy View of Simples. Since (l)-(5) jointly imply the impossibility of material
atomless gunk, we have an argument from the Pointy View to the impossibility of
atomless gunk. Hudson writes:
From (1) through (5) we can get the conclusion that material atomless
gunk is impossible. Suppose (toward reductio) that there is some hunk
of material atomless gunk, H. So, by (2) and (3), H exactly occupies
some non-point-sized region-hereby named ‘R\ So, by (4) and (5), R
has at least one exactly-occupiable, point-sized subregion—hereby
named ‘P\ So, by (1), H has a part—hereby named ‘A’—that exactly
occupies P. So, by (2), A fails to be gunk. But
. . . every part of gunk is
itself gunk. So, H fails to be gunk, too. Reductio complete. [Hudson
(2001): 89].
Let us turn now to Hudson’s rationales for premises (l)-(5).
We begin with premise (1). Let us first recall what the Doctrine of Arbitrary
Undetached Parts says:
(DAUP): Necessarily, for every material object M, if R is the region of space
occupied by M, and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R whatever
,
there
exists a material object that occupies the region sub-R and which is a part ofM 14
Hudson claims that:
Many are inclined to admit the possibility of material atomless gunk
because they are attracted to a principle known as the Doctrine of
Arbitrary Undetached Parts... A historically popular argument to gunk
from DAUP and a denial of point-sized objects observes that any
extended thing will have a right half and a left half (given some
orientation or other), and that the halves in question will each have a
right half and a left half, and that the process continues without end. . .
.
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It is hard to see how to motivate the possibility of gunk without
something like DAUP, and thus I think the gunk theorists should be
inclined to leave premise (1) alone. [Hudson (2001): 88-89],
Let us note that it is possible for someone to reject DAUP and yet believe that
gunk is possible. I reject DAUP for the reasons discussed in chapter 3. But I believe
that gunk is possible, because I believe that gunky worlds are conceivable and that their
conceivability provides as of yet undefeated evidence of their possibility. As I see
things, both extended simples and material atomless gunk are possible. We have
similar reasons to believe that both are possible, specifically, that they are both
conceivable. If you accept the possibility of extended simples, you must reject DAUP.
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily undercut any motivation for accepting the
possibility of material atomless gunk.
DAUP seems to play a major role in Hudson’s argument, since it is DAUP that
guarantees that, whenever a material object occupies a region of space, the mereological
structure of the material object will be isomorphic to the mereological structure of the
region.
15
Ifwe reject DAUP, then we reject this necessary isomorphism. This is why
anyone who accepts the possibility of extended simples must reject DAUP. Similarly,
we might wonder whether an advocate of gunk could hold that a gunky object could
exactly occupy an extended region of space without having parts that correspond to the
point-sized subregions of that region. Such an object would have a part at every
extended subregion of the region that it exactly occupies and yet have no part at any
point-sized subregion. One could even hold that this is possible while accepting the
Pointy View of Simples and the remaining premises of the argument. So, without
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DAUP, Hudson’s argument that the Pointy View of Simples implies the impossibility of
material atomless gunk fails.
If one adopts this strategy, then one must reject OT as well. So it seems that it is
DAUP that grounds OT.
Let us now turn to premise (2), which states that, necessarily, no hunk of
material atomless gunk exactly occupies a point-sized region of space. Hudson points
out that, given the Pointy View, this premise is clearly true. Hudson is definitely
correct on this issue. For suppose an object exactly occupied a point-sized region of
space. Given the Pointy View, this object is a simple. So, given the Pointy View, this
object is not material atomless gunk.
We might think that, even if we reject the Pointy View, we still could have good
reason to accept premise (2). For example, if we have independent reasons to think that
being point-sized implies being a simple, we ought to endorse premise (2).
16
However,
the reasons that I gave for rejecting the Pointy View in chapter 2 are also reasons for
rejecting the claim that being point-sized suffices for being a simple. In chapter 2,
1
argued that there can be complex objects made out of co-located point-sized objects. If
these arguments are sound, being point-sized is not sufficient for being a simple.
Once we accept that being point-sized does not imply simplicity, we might
wonder whether being point-sized at least implies being non-gunky. The counter-
examples I proposed in chapter 2 all involved point-sized complex objects that were
composed of point-sized simples and hence are not counter-examples to this weaker
claim. However, I think that I can produce a counter-example to even the weaker claim.
In order to generate the counter-example, I must make use of the Extrinsic Theory,
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which I employed earlier in chapter 3 when defending the possibility of extended
simples. Recall that, according to the Extrinsic Theory, a material object has its shape
in virtue of the fact that it bears the occupation relation to a region with that shape. The
shape of a material object is fixed by the fact that it bears a relation to a region of space
that has that shape.
Let us consider a world w in which spacetime is gunky. Let us consider a
material object, M, that exactly occupies a region of spacetime at this world. Let us
assume that the mereological structure ofM is isomorphic to the mereological structure
of the region it occupies in w. So, in w, M is itself gunky.
Now the mereological structure of an object is an intrinsic feature, whereas the
shape of a material object, given the extrinsic theory, is an extrinsic feature. And so
there is no reason why they should be necessarily correlated. It was this insight that led
to the argument that undercut DAUP in chapter 3. Once we see that these two aspects
of a thing can come apart, there is no reason to hold that the mereological structure of
an object must always match that of the region it exactly occupies. Given this, what is
there to stop an intrinsic duplicate ofM from exactly occupying a point-sized region of
space?
In chapter 3, 1 claimed that the occupation relation is a perfectly natural relation.
Now the instantiation of a perfectly natural relation should not be constrained by the
intrinsic properties of its relata. So the fact that an object has a particular mereological
structure should not prevent it from occupying a region of spacetime with a particular
shape, just as the fact that an object has a particular charge does not limit the regions of
spacetime it can occupy. So a duplicate ofM should be able to occupy a point-sized
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region of spacetime. So there is a possible world in which an object with the same
mereological structure as M occupies a point-sized region of spacetime. This is a world
that contains a counter-example to premise (2).
As Hudson points out, premise (3) seems uncontroversial. Let us attend to
premise (4), which states that, necessarily, any region has at least one point-sized
subregion. I suspect that here is the place that most advocates of gunk will balk. In
defense of (4), Hudson writes:
Recent and intriguing defenses of a Whiteheadian theory of space — a
view that may deserve the description “gunky space”— are available in
the literature. The central idea is that one may be a realist about space
while taking points to be constructed out of those regions. But, strictly
speaking, questions about the occupiability of point-sized regions could
not even arise, for there would be no point-sized regions to have
questions about. Accordingly, by invoking [the Pointy View] together
with DAUP one might reject premise (4) and mount a defense of the
possibility of material atomless gunk by appealing to the possibility of an
extended material object in gunky space. The problem, as I see it, is that
the defense is too strong. The mathematical project of constructing
points out of sets of infinitely many, converging, nested, extended
regions does not guarantee the metaphysical possibility of gunky space
any more than the formal consistency of geometries of arbitrarily many
dimensions establishes the metaphysical possibility of four-dimensional
space. At most the mathematics helps remove one kind of objection to
the relevant proposals. More pressing, however, it seems to me that the
claim that “space is gunky” must have its truth-value as a matter of
necessity. But then, if we ground our belief in the possibility of material
atomless gunk with an appeal to gunky space, we will effectively rule
out the possibility of material simples, given [the Pointy View], And
that consequence, I submit, is too high to pay. [Hudson (2001): 90],
I think that the fact that the Whiteheadian theory of space is consistent tells us
more about metaphysical possibility than Hudson allows. For, since the Whiteheadian
theory of space is consistent, we have excellent reason to believe that there is a possible
relational structure that behaves in accordance with this theory. However, I agree with
Hudson that the consistency of the Whiteheadian theory of space does not show that
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spaCe is a relational structure such that it is metaphysically possible that it behaves in
accordance with the theory. In fact, in section 4.2, 1 presented an argument for the
claim that, necessarily, space is not Whiteheadian. The argument presented - if sound -
provides evidence that trumps our intuition that space could exhibit the structural
features dictated by the Whiteheadian theory.
However, it is important that the reason I gave in section 4.2 for denying that
Whiteheadian spacetime is possible are not also reasons for denying that material
objects could be Whiteheadian. In section 4.2, 1 argued that if both simplistic
spacetimes and gunky spacetimes are possible, then the degree to which some
properties are natural is contingent. No such argument can be generated if we accept
the Extrinsic Theory, for the geometrical properties of both gunky and simplistic
material objects are inherited from the regions of spacetime that they occupy.
So our intuition that material objects could behave in accordance with
Whiteheadian theory is not undercut. So we have defeasible reasons to believe that
possible material objects are structured as the Whiteheadian theory dictates. But then
we have reason to believe that material atomless gunk is possible.
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Notes
Some philosophers also endorse the stronger claim that there are possible
^nnn\
at **** (°F sPacetime) »s partially gunky. (See, for example, Sider
(2000a).) Space is partially gunky just in case (i) there are some xj such that each of the
xs is a simple, (11) there are some ys such that each ofthe ys is a gunky region of space,
and (iii) space is the fusion of the xs and the ys. Presumably, one believes in this
alleged possibility only if one also believes that CT is true. So I will not provide a
separate discussion of this intriguing possibility.
2
1 am assuming that propositions have something analogous to 1 st and 2nd order
syntactic structure. Perhaps these propositions are really sentences in a Lagadonian
language. See Lewis (1986a): 145-146.
3
See Armstrong (1989): 44, Armstrong (1997): 166-169, Black (2000) Heller
(1998), and Sider (2002).
4 What follows could probably be fairly described as doing a poor job of
reinventing the wheel. I developed these definitions on my own (with Jake Bridge
watching over my shoulder), although similar ideas have been developed in Forrest
( 1 996), Gerla ( 1 990) and Roeper ( 1 997).
5
See Lewis (1986): 120-123 for further development of this response.
6
See Cartwright (1975) and Zimmerman (1996): 5.
7
Strictly speaking, this is not quite right, for reasons that will emerge
momentarily.
8
See Sider (2000a).
9
See Sider (2000a).
10 Zimmerman has indicated to me in a personal communication that C** better
captures his intentions than C did.
1
1
Note that this is a de dicto necessity. The thesis is not the claim that extended
wholes are ontologically dependent on their boundary points.
12
See Sider (2000a) for a similar worry.
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Whkh WC discussed earlier
> Provides a lengthy explanation of
what a Whiteheadian spacetime would be like.
14 DAUP is discussed in van Inwagen (1983). My statement ofDAUP is
slightly different from van Inwagen’ s, but agrees with Hudson’s formulation See
Hudson (2001): 88.
Strictly speaking, this holds only if every region is a receptacle
,
where a
region of space is a receptacle just in case it is possible for a material object to exactly
occupy this region. If certain regions are not receptacles
-for example, point-sized
regions - then DAUP does not imply that the mereological structure of a material object
will always be isomorphic to the mereological structure of the region it exactly
occupies.
16
For example, Ned Markosian argues that MaxCon entails that being point-
sized implies being a simple. See Markosian (1998a).
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